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THE ECONOMICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN GREAT BRITAIN

BRITISH professors have their own opinion as to academic standards in America; in fact, they quite generally believe that the American collegian at the age of twenty is about two years behind his contemporary in the old country. They shake their heads in friendly disapproval of the complexity of the American curriculum, the "public school" atmosphere of American undergraduate life both in the classroom and outside, and the limitation of academic freedom to which, in their understanding, the American professor is subjected. In such respects, whatever be the amount and quality of their information, they confess little envy of their American cousins across the sea. But there are certain manifestations of deep and real enthusiasm for education in the United States that strike them into admiration.

Public support of higher education by taxation, such as that provided for our state universities, they can understand, for the beginnings of like support have been made in Great Britain. Before the War the nation divided about one hundred and fifty thousand pounds annually in recurrent grants among all its institutions of higher learning, a sum considerably smaller than that which the state of Utah appropriates for its university and agricultural college. Since then the Government's patronage has greatly expanded and now the annual allotment from national and local treasuries for the twelve institutions in England, counting the multipartite University of London as a unit, together with those for the four colleges of the University of

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Wales and the four institutions of Scotland, totals about two and a quarter million pounds. This progress during the last fifteen years is remarked with satisfaction; earnest and long continued efforts of university committees have been thus handsomely rewarded. But this sum is considerably less than the combined current appropriations made by two states, Minnesota and California, for their public universities. Manchester, among provincial cities, does the best in local grants for higher education, but it does no better than Cincinnati, about half its size; and it must also be borne in mind that an American city which maintains a municipal university like Cincinnati is taxed also for its large share in sustaining the state university or, as in Ohio, universities, as well. A fair notion of the British method may be obtained from the ledger at Nottingham, where the university college receives twenty-five thousand pounds from the government, fifteen thousand from the city corporation, fifteen hundred from Nottinghamshire, and one thousand from Devonshire. Such sources must be counted upon for the great bulk of support of the newer universities, for less than one-tenth comes from the endowments. In fact, the total income from endowments for all English Universities, excluding Oxford and Cambridge, last year was only two hundred and sixty-eight thousand pounds.[1]

When in answering the questions of British friends one explains that the federal government has presented the state institutions with land endowment amounting to three times the area of Wales, they express astonishment, but they doubtless trace such munificence, properly enough, to the fortune of America rather than to the conscious personal sacrifice of its citizens. The staggering sums now allotted each year by the states themselves, however, obviously represent continuing enthusiasm. What surprises them the most is to learn that it is the general custom in America to exempt all private or endowed colleges and universities from state and local taxation. For example, in Minnesota and California, the states we have cited as generously supporting their public universities, there are about thirty endowed institutions receiving this indirect

[1] In this article "last year" should be understood as 1927.

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subvention. Every institution in England except one of the colleges of the University of London and the University College of Southampton has to pay its assessed share of the rates; bursars wistfully reckon how much could be pushed off the red-ink side of their ledgers if the American example were followed.

The British executives had heard disquieting stories of interference by American state governments with respect to policies of instruction in the state-supported institutions; they understood that any moment a professor might be criticized on the floor of a legislature for teaching some doctrine that was unpalatable to the majority of the taxpayers. When Parliamentary grants were first proposed, then, there was apprehension lest this intolerable result should follow there as well. Persistent inquiry among the well-informed today fails to bring one complaint upon that score; everyone seems abundantly satisfied with the propriety of the administration of these Treasury funds by Sir William McCormick and his committee. Higher education has not consulted popular prejudice since the Parliamentary subvention began any more than it did before. It was feared by some that the University Grants Committee would tend to standardize university practice into flat uniformity, to the sacrifice of individual character, as dearly cherished by a British institution as by a British citizen. It has, indeed, tended to standardize bookkeeping and the like, but it has recognized the right of self-determination in university policy. One executive told me, however, that he has himself suggested several desirable local changes to the committee, whose public statement of the same had made his way very much easier in overcoming the opposition of some of his own professorial colleagues.

The tyranny of the University Grants Committee was soon proved to exist only in unfounded fears. But there has been no such reassurance as to the effects of grants from local authorities. The strength of radical labor in some industrial cities which aid in the support of universities is enough to bring some apprehension of embarrassing interference, not only among the professors of economics, political theory and the

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like, but among the general faculty of arts, whose instruction might appear less "useful" than that of their technological colleagues. It is said that in some cities, like Sheffield, Birmingham and Manchester, there has been real cause for such fears. The Scotch universities are like the endowed institutions in America, in that they get exemption from the rates but no public grants. When some new professor there in need of funds for his department suggests an application to the city for a grant in aid his principal shows little sympathy. Being a Presbyterian and well acquainted with his Bible he very likely quotes a verse about a mess of pottage.

If they admire the support the American taxpayer gives to higher education the British executives are still more impressed with the generous patronage of wealthy individuals, marvelling at the frequency and magnitude of the gifts to endowment and equipment. A considerable number of British universities are in the thick of campaigns for funds. These recurrent enterprises we call "drives"; they call them "appeals". The one word indicates confident energy bearing down all before it; the other something of supplication. Of course the latter implication does injustice to the zeal and devotion of those in charge; nevertheless, there is an observable difference in the spirit of the two. The result of the appeals has been encouraging but not satisfactory.

Even if no new enterprise were started in any university there would still be a growing need for funds. University education is a queer business; the more is sold the greater the financial loss. As a commercial transaction between bursar and student, the buyer always wins, as he never pays more than a fraction of the cost of what he acquires. The English universities are therefore troubled by their success. Take for example University College in London, founded a little more than a hundred years ago. Since the beginning of the present century it has increased by over four times; when one considers that in most departments the student's fees cover about one-third of the cost of his instruction it is not strange that the college committee is making an appeal for funds to insure continuance on the present scale. But tuition fees supply a larger

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proportion of income in this and the other institutions of the University of London than they do elsewhere. In Great Britain, as a whole, the students' total contribution is less than thirty per cent of the necessary income. It is imperative that other streams of revenue be increased.

Casting about for explanation as to why the new universities have much less financial support than most of their American contemporaries, one obvious factor is their youth, most of them having secured university status within the present century; time is needed for prestige. It is true that this argument may be overstressed, as in most cases there was a previous collegiate state reaching back to mid-Victorian days at least. But the English public have not long been conscious of having universities, outside Oxford and Cambridge. As for these ancient institutions they have been for many generations handsomely independent of anyone's financial interest. Founded so long ago by pious benefactors who endowed them with landed property all over England, they have enjoyed a growing revenue; with the increase in land values in a crowded country during the last six hundred years, most of their colleges have been easily able to sustain their costs, more or less rigidly limited as each is with respect to numbers. The older universities as general corporations, apart from their constituent colleges, have similar endowments, mostly of such antiquity as now to seem quite impersonal.

Take the receipts of Oxford University, for example, and note the items under estates: "Lands let at rackrent, Lands let out on beneficial leases, Houses let at rackrent, Houses let on beneficial leases, Houses and sites let on long leases, Fines and fine loans, Copyholds for lien, Copyholds of inheritance, Leaseholds, Tithe rent charges, Quitrents, rent charges and other fixed payments, Timber and underwood, Minerals, Other properties". Besides the income from investments, college contributions, and student fees, there are other receipts from external sources, such as from wine licenses and from the Oxford market. But the largest revenue, as has been suggested, is received by the colleges themselves from their own properties, some of which in urban districts are heavily profitable.

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The rise in prices, or in other words the decline in the purchasing power of money, which has been a phenomenon of British as well as American economics during the last fifteen years, has cut down the investment returns of the old colleges, but the institution, or institutions, could probably go on very comfortably without the annual hundred and thirty-six thousand pounds it gets from government sources. At first it might seem ungracious for them to accept state subventions when their neighbors stand so much in need of them, yet on second thought it is clear that the dignity of the newer universities is much better maintained if the government treats all alike.

Oxford and Cambridge, then, have not taught the British public how to give; they do not conduct appeals to wipe out deficits or to finance expansion, at least for the instruction of men. They are at present soliciting funds, it is true, but it is significant that their purpose is to preserve the scenery, or as they say the "amenities", of the two university towns. Vulgar little bungalows were creeping toward the hallowed halls of ancient learning; an automobile manufactory flaunted its graceless modernity before their very windows. High tables buzzed with apprehension, fellows were summoned into conference and Preservation Trusts were formed last year, first at Oxford and then at Cambridge. A "Christmas circular" was sent to all Oxford graduates on the Parliamentary register, which produced eight thousand pounds in cash and seven thousand more in promises. But this was only a christening gift, it was said, the trust needs a hundred thousand quickly and something like a quarter of a million in the end. The ex-Rhodes scholars are to be circularized, too; the first alumni drive is under way; perhaps even the ancient universities will aid in teaching the British people how to give to higher education.

A campaign to save something may very possibly interest Englishmen more than a campaign to start something. Yet not even this is always waged with confidence. At any moment the twelfth-century castle wherein is housed a part of the University of Durham may slide down the hill into the

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River Wear. It is now shored up with timber, but geologists and architects agree that it has at last leaned so far by reason of the slipping of the soft soil underneath that its remaining days are few, unless a hundred and fifty thousand pounds are immediately found for thorough-going grouting and underpinning. A building which is not only a university hall but one of the finest monuments of Norman architecture is in grave peril; yet the money comes very slowly.

In America such a drive would be organized with the support not only of a powerful alumni association but likewise of a professional concern which would draw up a list of probable donors, arrange meetings, conferences and public notices, and furnish valuable advice in the light of considerable experience. One organization has more than a hundred and fifty successful campaigns to its credit, and there are several others with enviable records founded upon energy, sagacity and correctness in deportment. It is coming to be a recognized profession and it is conceivable we shall in time see universities themselves offering courses in its technique. In England, though known, it is upon a very precarious footing still. Three attempts to employ it by British universities and colleges resulted in thorough-going failures; in only one has there been a notable success. Whether this discouraging record is due to the inefficiency and maladroitness of the professionals or the unreadiness of the public is hard to say.

What sustains many a college campaign in America is the assurance of support from one of the great philanthropic foundations set up by very wealthy families to aid worthy educational projects wherever they present themselves. These are virtually non-existent in Great Britain. A striking exception is the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, which allots shares of its income of a hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds to the four universities for research, though a large part of its funds goes for scholarships. Recourse may in the future be had more and more to the Empire Marketing Board which has collected a large sum to be used for forwarding commerce in every way. It has begun to work through universities as is illustrated by its gift last year to the University

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of Edinburgh for aiding research in animal breeding. There are other foundations which might be approached such as the livery companies of the City of London, which are possessed of much valuable property; the annual income of the twelve "great" companies is about six hundred and fifty thousand pounds, to say nothing of the sixty or seventy other companies in London alone. Some have long since founded institutions of higher education, like the Technical College of the Society of Merchant Venturers, now a part of the University of Bristol. Others have made gifts, like the Drapers' Libraries at the University College at Cardiff and elsewhere. University executives will probably not leave these old guilds undisturbed. Certain active trade associations contribute to research in their own problems. The clothworkers of Leeds sustain the textile museum at that university and have furnished much other equipment; the Nottingham hosiers and lace manufacturers provide for the technical instruction given in their branches by the university college at that place; the glass workers bear the expense of the work in glass technology, a unique enterprise carried on by the University of Sheffield; in several institutions the coal trade maintains laboratories and staffs for fuel research by means of one twenty-fifth of a penny appropriated from the price of every ton of coal sold in England.

Impressive as these illustrations are, it yet remains that there is almost nothing, outside the Carnegie Trust in Scotland, available from great foundations for general endowment. It is not surprising in these circumstances that university executives should look across the seas for aid. The historian may well point out that this is but redressing an ancient balance. He recalls the colonial days when Elihu Yale, of Wrexham, Wales, bought immortality cheap, in the words of Cotton Mather, by a gift to the college in New Haven, or somewhat later when the institutions which were to become Columbia, Pennsylvania, Brown and Dartmouth sent agents to England to collect subscriptions. The friendly interest of the British nobility was sometimes markedly acknowledged as in the naming of Kenyon College, and it was well on in the nineteenth century that the institution which was later to be called Trinity College, at Hart-

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ford, quite frankly offered to name itself after any nobleman who would contribute handsomely. It may be bad philosophy to ascribe continuing personality to nations, and to talk of cultural obligations; there would be little justice in demands from the old country that such debts be paid, and, of course, no one makes them. But there is some historical propriety in subscription now from this side.

Needs, politely presented by British university executives, have been recognized, and contributions have already been made toward meeting them. The International Education Board, of New York, last year appropriated seventy-four thousand pounds for the department of Zoölogy in the University of Edinburgh, and thirty thousand for research and instruction in animal genetics—over half a million dollars to one institution. The Rockefeller Foundation recently bestowed a new pavilion for obstetrics and nurses' house upon the University College Hospital in London and still later nearly a hundred thousand pounds to develop the studies of anatomy and physiology; the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Foundation has just put very large sums at the disposal of the London School of Economics for specific enterprises; all these are in addition to the princely gift by the Rockefeller Trustees of four hundred thousand pounds which made possible the purchase of a great eleven-acre site for the University of London, directly adjacent to the British Museum. Mr. Edward S. Harkness gave nearly fifty thousand dollars for various purposes to the University of St. Andrews and contributed heavily to the building of the new great hall. There have been other American donations to various institutions, for such projects as revision of catalogues, library development, new buildings, and special studies of social problems. All these have received grateful attention. The rich American is on the minds of the vice-chancellors. But, as the King observed in his address at University College in June, 1927, "Fortunate as you and the University of London have been in benefiting by such noble generosity from the great American nation, it is upon home support that you must rely".

But British educationalists—and, incidentally, they insist

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upon that word—observe dispassionately that their countrymen do not support higher education with the zeal and sacrifice that distinguish Americans. We had to rely on public taxation, at least as one source of maintenance, from the very beginning, when in 1636 the first collegiate venture, at Cambridge, Massachusetts, got four hundred pounds from the colonial legislature; in this we had nearly three hundred years the start of England. Private generosity responded as soon as wealth had accumulated. In a new country where the ratio of man to circumstances is still heavily in favor of man, progress is a prime article of faith; and education is the infallible means to progress. In England it has to argue its way against habit. Education has figured there rather to preserve society than to change it. One would scarcely make that comment within the lively precincts of the London School of Economics, it will be admitted, but it remains true in the main that higher education as an instrument of general progress has only begun to fire the British imagination.

If you ask half a dozen educationalists why wealth does not more generously aid them, you will get more than half a dozen answers. You will be told in the first place that the rich men of England are not so rich as their counterparts in America; no one could set up an institution like that at Chicago or the immense new enterprise at Durham, North Carolina. You mention the great fortunes of the nobility, and immediately there is revealed an important difference in the position of wealth in the two countries. An American millionaire can give away his fortune and live as simply as he pleases; his munificence wins only praise. For an English duke to do as much, even if he were not bound by legal entails, would involve a treason to tradition. From the top well down into the the middle class, the English son inherits with his legacy a definite obligation to keep up a certain style. He feels he must maintain the family seat, however extensive the area of its roofs and gardens, and however numerous its staff of service; he must keep the family stables and the pack of hounds; he must give the annual ball and sustain the family charities. He regards his fortune as really not his own, but inherited in trust

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for such semi-public uses. His first regard is to hand on the old name, the old manner and the old property unimpaired to his son. To rob his posterity would be almost as scandalous as to rob his neighbor. Hence he does not give a building to a university. Continuous substantial contributions to such funds, moreover, are not a part of his inherited obligation.

Money made in trade has, in times past, taken much the same direction. Disraeli begins the seventh chapter of his *Sybil* with an historical review of English wealth in modern times. First came the merchant adventurers trading to the Levant, next the West India planter, then the nabob from the Far East, then the loan-monger reaping profits from the Napoleonic wars, and finally the manufacturer. But each in turn has bought land, a spacious country house and all its proper appurtenances; thus a trading fortune was transmuted into respectability. It is true that the custom grows steadily less insistent, but still, generally speaking, a newly rich Englishman would rather found a family than found an institution. He apparently does not have the American confidence that grandchildren can shift for themselves.

Suppose, however, that he has been enjoying so large an income that he has usually spent but half of it, saving the other half. In the days before the War, the newer universities might possibly have had a chance at the other half had they pressed it, but now that half has actually disappeared under the demands of the income tax. The well-to-do Englishman today, at least the man who has been wealthy for some time, can give only at the expense of his scale of living; which, as has been said, strikes him as disgraceful. The professional man finds himself mulcted of one-fifth, one-fourth, or one-third of his income. Actually, during the last few years, many incomes themselves have decreased, especially in such old staple trades as coal and iron, which for reasons too complex to be developed here, have been and are in a very low state indeed. Surely these are factors in explaining the halting response to university appeals.

One possession which English university executives envy Americans is an intangible but immensely valuable one, the

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sentiment of loyalty among the alumni. To say that this does not exist in England would be quite extravagant, for there is a deep feeling for one's particular college, especially among Oxford and Cambridge men. But it has not yet turned to financial expression. That it could be caught and harnessed for the moment was proved by Cambridge in 1898; but as we have pointed out as far as those ancient universities are concerned, there has been little need. In America drives are carried through by the powerful support of the graduates, each giving "till it hurts" and often far beyond that point, whether the individual be rich or poor. Englishmen stand amazed when they read that a large part of the twenty million dollars recently raised by Yale came from alumni subscriptions. The class gift from time to time is one of the American institutions they admire most. Nothing interests them more than an account of permanent alumni funds, such as those of Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard and Yale, to which each alumnus gives a stated annual sum to a total which may be used to wipe out deficits or otherwise to ease the university's burden. The only important enterprise figuring in English education which approaches this ideal is the fund organized recently by former Rhodes scholars for continuous giving to Oxford—an American plan administered by Americans.

Alumni organizations, or Old Students Associations as they are termed, do exist in Great Britain; in fact, there is at least one such for every university and university college, except Oxford, in England and Wales. They are, generally speaking, loose organizations in which annual membership costs from two shillings and sixpence up to twice that sum, though those for the technical colleges run a little higher. In one case the association elects a representative to the University Council, corresponding somewhat to our Board of Trustees. The activity is largely social, in many cases including a dinner and dance at least once a year, and possibly a choral club, dramatic club, or special clubs for badminton and tennis; a few publish news magazines, more or less regularly, or a pamphlet year-book. Several keep up connections with the university appointments board, helping them to place graduates in desirable positions,

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while others maintain student-loan funds. One advertises free access to college libraries and cheap use of the playing fields. In all this there is little suggestion of the American alumni association with its paid staff in its suite of rooms at the university, its vast structure of committees, its impressive periodical literature making real contributions to education as well as reporting university news. There is no suggestion of "alumni days" or of the Commencement reunion with its costume parade, its class house-parties and its great mass-meetings.

Two facts stand out: first, the English alumnus as such does not give; second, the successful business man is not generally a college graduate. The principal of a new university college in search of financial support recently addressed the Chamber of Trade in his city, a body of some fifty men representing the leading merchants of a community numbering three hundred thousand people, a city of great antiquity and known throughout the world. He observed afterwards in conversation that his task would have been easier if at least one of his listeners had had a bachelor's degree. Guesses on such matters are treacherous, but it is probable that in a similar meeting in America half or two-thirds would be college-bred men. The breeding, perhaps, would not be very deep, but certainly they would know what colleges were like. America, its circumstances constantly bearing toward the democratic ideal, early realized that higher education should not be confined to ministers, lawyers, doctors, and teachers; it broadened the college curriculum so that a young man might choose that course of study which would fit him to be a good citizen even if he had no professional aspirations. American business forty years ago was sceptical of the college graduate, just as English business still is today, but as he increased in number and variety he had to be received, and now in many enterprises is much preferred to the practical apprentice. American commercial and industrial men, then, are oftentimes college alumni; their English counterparts are not—another reason why university money comes a little easier in America.

If all the factors set forth in this long recital were permanent the prospect for higher learning in Great Britain, outside

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of Oxford and Cambridge, and also the heroic Scottish universities, which have always done much with little, might seem somewhat discouraging. Yet, plausible as they all seem when presented by the witnesses, there are evidences of change on every hand. In the first place, the business depression which has disheartened many sections of England is lifting; whatever foreign competition may do, British pluck and intelligence will set British industry upon a profitable basis. It is improbable that taxation will grow more burdensome, and it is quite possible that international adjustments will make for its decrease. Really, one listens to the jeremiads in which some Englishmen like to luxuriate with a good many reservations. The visitor looking about on the newer universities finds their present existence the most impressive testimony to a growing interest in higher education. He soon realizes that he has come to England in the midst of a great educational renaissance, comparable to that in Germany a century ago.

The graduates of these new institutions will go into business and industry in far greater proportion than have those of Oxford and Cambridge, and will have free money, not landed property, some of which will undoubtedly be available for such contribution. If the newer universities develop more residential life beside or very near the college buildings, that is to say, hostels (as they call dormitories) and club-houses, the same warm sentiment, the home-feeling, will grow in the hearts and memories of their students, as has moved so much generosity in America. Educationalists are citing the American example, and British pride will respond. About a year ago Sir William McCormick, Chairman of the University Grants Committee, stressed this point. He said incidentally that the annual library expenditure of all the institutions in Great Britain only about equaled that of Harvard and Yale combined. To maintain that this disparity will not be much cut down requires one to prove that Great Britain is going into a permanent decline, which, as we used to say in geometry, is absurd.

It is not necessary to depend upon theory for such conclusions. Setting sums aside and fixing upon tendencies, the

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curve of progress with respect to public grants in aid during the last fifteen years, as was shown some pages back, is one of the most striking features of recent British social history. And private munificence has been establishing noble precedents as well. At Bristol there has arisen a fine new Gothic fabric so stately as to suggest a smaller University of Chicago; the new Physics Building might rouse the envy of most American universities. Those halls are all the gift of the Wills family, well-known in the tobacco trade. The Palmers, whose name when coupled with that of Huntley, suggests to Americans an excellent brand of tea biscuits, have been chiefly responsible for the prosperity of the new University of Reading. To the wise generosity of Thomas R. Ferens, chairman of the company making Reckitt's Blue, is owed the foundation of the remarkably promising new University College of Hull. Sir Edward Brotherton has recently given a hundred thousand pounds for a new library at the University of Leeds, making about a quarter of the sum raised by the appeal of 1925–1927 for a new building programme in that place. Most impressive of all, perhaps, has been the munificence of Sir Jesse Boot, whose drug stores dot Great Britain; as the result of his gifts there is rising a great group of white marble buildings at Nottingham, fronted by an artificial lake and surrounded by nearly a hundred acres of grounds and playing fields. The extent and equipment of these halls and classrooms and laboratories make all the more probable a university charter for the old University College of that place.

During the last thirty years England has undertaken a magnificent expansion of university opportunity. To carry on they need the support especially of English business men. They are getting it, in part because English business is beginning to feel the need of universities. "Muddling through" is well recognized today to be impossible. The problems are too great. England is thinking through as she never did before, and she begins to realize that universities, and plenty of them, are essential to the achievement.

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THE ORIGINS OF THE SOUTH SEA COMPANY

IN these days of frenzied finance, and of economists who firmly believe in business cycles with a recurrence of periods of speculation followed by economic depression, it is curious that so little attention has been paid to the origins of the "Company of Merchants of Great Britain trading to the South Seas." Recent writers[1] on the subject, however, have restricted themselves to the history and organization of the company. This paper attempts only to trace its origins and suggest the importance of South Sea trade in the War of the Spanish Succession.

Since the days of the Elizabethan sea dogs, Englishmen had been seriously interested in the South Sea trade. Considering the influence of mercantilism, with its great emphasis upon bullion, the lure of the treasure of the Spanish Indies, the impetus given by the defeat of the Armada, and the religious hatred between the Elizabethans and the Spanish, it is difficult to understand why England did not immediately challenge Spain's economic supremacy in that area. James I sought to use Raleigh, one of the earliest English imperialists, as his tool in a diplomatic duel with Spain, but shamefully sacrificed him at the command of the Spanish king. The quiescent stage of the early Stuarts was rudely broken by Cromwell, who intervened in the contest between Hapsburg and Bourbon for the hegemony of Europe and received, as part of his reward, Jamaica.

Even though possessed of this window upon the Caribbean, England did little directly towards extending her influence

[1] L. Melville's (L. S. Benjamin) popular *South Sea Bubble* (London, 1922) shows little appreciation of the political importance of the organization of the company. W. R. Scott's *Early History of Joint Stock Companies* (Cambridge, 1910-12) is mainly concerned with its financial aspects, of which it contains a masterly treatment. The French and Spanish trading ventures into the South Sea are better served by G. Scelle, *La Traite Négrière aux Indes de Castille* (2 vols., Paris, 1906), and E. W. Dahlgren, *Le Commerce de la Mer du Sud jusqu'à la Paix d'Utrecht* (Paris, 1909).

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there, though enterprising buccaneers, such as Sir Henry Morgan, did much to call attention to the wealth obtainable in the area. The entire Restoration period, moreover, found England too firmly attached to Louis XIV's chariot wheel to take the initiative in colonial affairs, although English merchants as well as buccaneers were far from passive. The Glorious Revolution, however, brought Louis face to face with a rival in both the colonial and commercial spheres, an aggressive rival who now ruled both the great colonial powers. During the first act of the Anglo-French duel for Empire (1689–1763), both nations showed considerable interest in the Caribbean. The English ministers, obsessed with mercantilist ideas, eagerly sought to prevent any bullion from reaching France to be used in waging war against England. The safety of Jamaica was particularly important, for through that center English merchants secured much Spanish bullion in return for English goods.

The French navy, meanwhile, sacked Carthagena, one of the greatest trading-centers in Spanish America, and harried the coast of the English continental colonies, interfering seriously with the commerce between them and the West Indies.[1] Boston learned that a dozen warships from Canada would attack the coasts and trade of New England and pass to the West Indies. These things in turn affected unfavorably the revenues of the mother country, at a moment when, after seven years of war, English finances were in a bad way. The English authorities, somewhat disheartened by repeated defeats in Flanders and failures in the West Indies, were completely downcast by the "loss of a rich convoy outward bound . . . , a crowning disaster, which made them eager for peace."[2] Little of a per-

[1] *Cal. St. Pap., Col., 1696-7*, pp. 159, 285, *et passim;* G. P. R. James, *Lettres Illustrative of Reign of Wm. III* (London, 1841), vol. I, pp. 87, 151, 254, 347; *Bath MSS.* (Hist. MSS. Com.), vol. III, p. 140.

[2] *C. C., 1696-7*, p. xix; W. Coxe (ed.), *Priv. ..... Corr. of ..... Shrewsbury with King Wm.* (London, 1821), p. 166; Sir J. Dalrymple, *Memoirs of Gr. Brit. and Ire.* (London, 1790), vol. III, p. 111. It must have been scant consolation for the English to learn that the French commander brought "home after all but eight millions French livres, and above half his equipment are dead and sick." *Bath MSS.*, vol. III, p. 163.

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manent nature having been accomplished in the colonial sphere by either nation through war, the exhausted participants made a truce at Ryswick (1697), that each might help decide who should receive the Spanish Empire, and more particularly the Spanish Indies, at the death of the child-man, Charles II.

The great importance attached to the South Seas is evident throughout Anglo-French negotiations over the Partition Treaty of 1698, for both monarchs were deeply interested. William III expressed a desire for Havana, which Louis XIV vetoed immediately he recognized its strategic importance. The correspondence suggests that William might have favored the pretensions of a Bourbon prince to Spain, had France been willing to guarantee the commercial interests of the maritime powers in the Caribbean and Mediterranean. Louis feared making such concessions lest they "involve the ruin of the commerce of all the rest of Europe in the Mediterranean and the Indies", a stand which probably led William to support the claims of the electoral prince of Bavaria in the first Partition Treaty.[1]

The sudden death of this young prince required a new treaty but the Indies do not bulk large in its negotiation, for William now realized that a conflict with France was inevitable. The English ministry heard that France was preparing a squadron to take over the choicest portions of the Spanish inheritance in America. This rumor, coupled with the Scottish interests in the area, called England's attention, perhaps, as never before, to the value of the South Sea trade and the advisability of organizing a trading company to monopolize it. The indomitable William Paterson, by no means cast down by his Darien disaster, presented a strong case for the Caribbean. The conquest of the West Indies, he asserted in a letter to William, would enable England not only to carry on the war at the expense of the enemy, but make possible a most lucrative commerce with Mexico and Peru. The sixth article of the Grand

[1] P. Grimblot, *Letters of Wm. III and Louis XIV and their Ministers* (London, 1848), vol. I, pp. 301-504, *passim*; *C. C.*, *1697-8*, pp. 33-5, 340, 568; *1699*, p. 282; E. S. Grew, *Lord Portland and Wm. III* (London, 1923), pp. 322-55, *passim*.

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Alliance (1701) suggests that William profited by Paterson's advice.[1]

The English colonists also feared that France might become predominant in the Caribbean. The concern of Englishman, Scot and colonial was measurably increased by the news that the unfortunate Charles II, powerful only in death, had bequeathed all his vast possessions to Philip of Anjou, Louis XIV's grandson, thus raising anew the whole question of the South Sea. The year 1701, therefore, became one of "preparation for war," and the English West Indies, for excellent reasons, became tremulous with fear lest France seize them all.[2] In some respects William, as ruler of the two great maritime powers, was more interested in commerce and the Caribbean than in Europe. He must at any cost check Louis's plan for engrossing the South Sea trade[3] and possibly later creating in Antwerp a rival of London as the entrepôt of the world.

William was repeatedly informed that France planned to organize the South Sea trade under her own auspices. He heard that Spain was willing to exchange Flanders for Roussillon; that French merchants had established a company with six million francs capital to trade to Mexico and Peru; and that France had secured the Asiento for ten years. A prominent merchant trading to Spain wrote later that the French "go frequently to all the Spanish ports in the West Indies under pretense of carrying niggers, etc., according to their agreement, and at the same time introduce their and other commodities and return with the proceed to France, which the Spanish resent, but can't

[1] A. Boyer, *Polit. State of Gr. Brit.* (London, 1711), vol. I, p. 393; C. Cole, *Memoirs of Affairs of State* (London, 1733), p. 416. See also S. Bannister, *Life of Wm. Paterson* (Edinburgh, 1858), pp. 333, 343, 354; Bannister, *Writings of Wm. Paterson* (Edinburgh, 1859), vol. I, pp. xcix, 127; C. von Noorden, *Europäische Geschichte im 18ten Jahrh.* (Düsseldorf, 1870), vol. I, p. 357.

[2] *C. C., 1700,* pp. 82, 189, 333, 562; *1701,* Preface, nos. 515-6. See Grimblot, *op. cit.,* vol. II, p. 476; *A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning Trade and particularly Trade to the West Indies* (1707), p. 4; Scelle, *op. cit.,* vol. II, p. 149.

[3] Archives des Affaires Étrangères: Correspondance Politique, Espagne, 86, f. 244; A. T. Mahan, *Influence of Sea Power on History, 1660-1783* (N. Y., 1890), pp. 463-73.

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help."[1] To meet such threats against her already extensive South Sea trade, threats backed by the presence of French warships, England sent Admiral John Benbow to police the West Indies.[2]

Such was the situation at Anne's accession. Whereas England, together with Holland, who also feared the loss of her lucrative West India commerce, planned a joint attack upon France in the South Seas, their associate in the Grand Alliance, the Emperor, was much perturbed by the secret provisions permitting each ally to retain whatever he might conquer in the Indies. The imperialists even suggested that the Archduke Charles, candidate of the allies for the Spanish throne, should compensate the two nations with "free liberty to trade into all those parts,"[3] as soon, presumably, as the Spanish inheritance was safely won for him by the allies. The imperial general, Prince Eugene, is supposed to have made England attractive offers if she helped make the archduke king of Spain, while the Imperial ambassador in London addressed a letter to Queen Anne, claiming that the maritime powers would get everything and the Hapsburgs nothing from the West Indies. Bonet, Prussian secretary in London, also became uneasy lest England, and to a less degree Holland, might increasingly monopolize the South Sea trade "*étant d'un grand profit à cause des maîtres d'or et d'argent.*"[4]

Meanwhile the English colonials likewise planned to prevent France from profiting from the Asiento which was considered so lucrative. They sought to police the region around Cartha-

[1] *Downshire MSS.* (Hist. MSS. Com. Rept., 1925), p. 824; Cole, *op. cit.*, pp. 297, 280, 399, 408, 419; Mackintosh Papers, Add. MSS., 34, 515, f. 111.

[2] *C. C., 1702,* pp. 578, 677. See also H. L. Osgood, *American Colonies in 18th Century* (New York, 1924), vol. I, p. 60.

[3] Baschet Transcripts from French Archives (P. R. O.), 197, f. 354; Correspondance Politique, Angleterre (Paris), 233, ff. 37-40; Wratislaw to Emperor, Jan., 1703, Staats-Archiv (Wien), England, B. 52; James, *op. cit.*, vol. III. p. 177.

[4] Bonet's dispatch, Feb. 14, 1708, Geheime Staats-Archiv (Berlin), 33 Rep. XI, 73 Y. Three years later Bonet wrote, "L'intérest ni les vœues de ce Royaume [England] ne sont pas de l'agrandir en Europe, mais bien en Amerique pour étendre son Commerce et sa Marine." *Ibid.*, Rep. XI, 73, Conv. 37.

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gena, and cut off the Guinea trade, so that the French would be incapable of furnishing "the quantity of negroes contracted for, and their Asiento must break the first year and then the Spaniards will be glad to take them of the English, for the French can never furnish the number the Spanish must have except assisted by both English and Dutch."[1] Meanwhile, Benbow reported that Admiral Whetstone (Whiston?) was sailing to intercept the French leader Ducasse, "who, I hear is expected with four sail men-of-war to settle the Asiento at Carthagena and destroy the trade of the English and Dutch." The Admiralty was especially interested in intercepting any Spanish-American treasure designed for France or Spain, and might have succeeded, had it not been for the pusillanimity and cowardice of some of Benbow's captains.[2]

Loudly lamented by the English merchants and colonials, this failure of the navy to destroy the enemy's power in the South Seas was at least partially due to the Dutch refusal to coöperate.[3] Marlborough, the great English general, had feared this, and advised both the secretary of state and Admiral Sir David Mitchell to be quite frank in explaining their policy in the West Indies to the Dutch, who were obviously jealous. Mitchell's instructions indicate that the ministry anticipated great things from a joint expedition, because he was to acquaint the Grand Pensionary, Heinsius, that the project was of the greatest importance, "both for our commercial interests and in prejudice of our enemies, by depriving them of the supply of money and plate which they seem to rely on for ye support of the war."[4]

[1] *C. C., 1702,* p. 324.

[2] *Cal. St. Pap., Dom., 1702,* pp. 49, 60, 122, 543; *C. C., 1702,* pp. 368, 500, 578, 677; *Jour. of Adm. . . . . Rooke* (Camden Soc., 1897), pp. 164-229, *passim; Memoirs of Lord Torrington* (Camden Soc., 1889), pp. 89, 127.

[3] W. Blackley, *Corr. of Rich Hill* (London, 1845), pp. 86, 183; T. Lediard, *Naval Hist.* (London, 1734), p. 744. Bank stock fell 3% apparently because of the "ill success of Admiral Benbow's encounter," J. E. T. Rogers, *First Nine Years of Bank of Eng.* (Oxford, 1887), p. 158.

[4] Godolphin Papers, Add. MSS. (Brit. Mus.), 29, 587, ff. 103-6 (Library of Congress, Brit. Transcripts); Sir G. Murray, *Letters . . . of . . . Marlb.* (London, 1845), vol. I, pp. 8, 19, 504. Three years later, Marlborough still hoped that he might get the Dutch to comply with "Her Majesty's desires since it is equally to their interest as to the private good."

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Men like Daniel Defoe and William Paterson saw clearly how large a rôle the Anglo-Dutch navy could play by conquering the Spanish and diverting the treasure of the Indies to the treasuries of the allies. Although the English navy prevented the Spanish treasure fleet from reaching home for two years, and then luckily managed to wreck it and make a rich haul after it was apparently safely in port at Vigo, English merchants and colonial traders continued to demand a more aggressive Anglo-Dutch policy in the Caribbean. One memorandum read: "Without the acquisition of a port such as Havana and some others . . . where we may lay up naval stores, refit and clean our ships, our trade to Jamaica and other ports cannot be safe." [1]

This same group also objected to the illicit trade with the Dutch West Indies, to which William Penn, the Quaker, was accused of being privy. Among the most vocal of them was Sir Gilbert Heathcote, a wealthy West India merchant, soon to be lord mayor of London and governor of the Bank, who maintained that the English "have as good an appetite for gold and silver as they [Dutch] have, and much better conveniencys from Jamaica to gratifye it." The New York authorities wrote the Queen that "nothing brings money into this province but the trade to your Majesty's islands in the West Indies, and to those subject to the States Generall, . . . from the latter of which we bring nothing but heavy money." [2] The first minister, the Earl of Godolphin, also realized that the possession of Havana would greatly benefit English commerce in the New World. The Dutch felt, however, that trade with the Spanish West Indies must be formally opened in the name of Charles III (Archduke Charles), if that commerce were to flourish once more. "It is only through this trade," wrote Vryberge, the Dutch envoy extraordinary to England, "that England and

[1] "Reasons Why the United Forces of England and Holland should Sail to the West Indies." C. O. 318/3, no. 17; D. Defoe, *Appeal to Honour and Justice*; *Downshire MSS.*, p. 813; J. Corbett, *Eng. in Mediter.* (London, 1904), p. 480.

[2] *Acts of Privy Council* (Unbd. Paps.), p. 93; *C. C., 1702*, p. 226; *1702-3*, pp. 128, 661; *1704-5*, p. 340.

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the united Provinces can obtain bullion, whilst the Spanish galleons are enabling France to supply specie." England acceded to this request and colonial observers soon reported a most gratifying increase in their trade, a merchants' paper claiming, "in less than a year we have had from the Spaniards in bullion by the modestest computation 1,200,000 pieces of eight," and prophesied that if the trade were protected it would greatly increase.[1]

Both the English and French displayed a lively interest in the West India trade. Admiral Sir George Rooke vainly sought, after his happy Vigo adventure, to intercept galleons. The lack of concrete advantages gained in the South Sea areas led to more serious reflections on the Dutch and on the inefficiency of the English navy.[2] Despondency respecting the navy was happily relieved by the unexpected capture of Gibraltar, and entirely forgotten in Marlborough's crowning glory at Blenheim. These two gratifying successes, however, came so early, and apparently so easily, that they tended to create Anglo-Dutch jealousies and center attention upon Flanders and the Mediterranean rather than upon the Caribbean, although it must be conceded that the English disappointments in the

[1] *C. C., 1704-5,* pp. vii, 69; Godolphin Papers, Add. MSS. 28,058, f. 31; *House of Lords MSS., 1706-8,* p. 310. "Foreign trade (by which alone riches are increased) has now so great an influence on the Government of the world, that it ought to be the peculiar care . . . . to encourage and promote it, especially in these islands [West Indies]." *Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning Trade* (1707), p. 1.

[2] Murray, *op. cit.,* vol. I, p. 504, vol. IV, p. 178; *C. C., 1703-4,* p. 75; Torrington's *Memoirs,* p. 171; *C. S. P. Dom., 1703-4,* pp. 520, 535, 547; Blackley, *op. cit.,* pp. 416, 452, 740; *House of Lords MSS., 1742-4,* p. 500, *1704-6,* p. 88. , The Duke of Shrewsbury noted: "I find it confirmed . . . Rooke has taken four of the Spanish galleons designed for the Indies." "It had been better," the duke grumbled, "had [he] the good luck to have met with those who were coming home and that I hear are got safe to Cadiz." The Earl of Petersborough also complained because the navy spent too much time in fruitless galleon-hunting. W. Cobbett, *Parliamentary Hist.* (London, 1810), vol. VI, p. 952; *House of Lords MSS., 1706-8,* pp. 127, 231. "I must confess", wrote the governor of Jamaica, "I was dissatisfied at Captain Allen's misbehavior in running away from the two French merchant ships, one of 46 guns, worth 100,000,000 of livres, the other of 26 men with 100 barrels of indigo and a great deal of money." *C. C., 1708-9,* pp. 54, 214, 287.

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South Sea, together with the unfriendly attitude of the Dutch and Imperial authorities, contributed to the same end.

Yet successes in that area would have been of the greatest value in weakening Louis XIV's resistance. Nor did it seem exceptionally difficult, inasmuch as the Spanish colonists at first were too suspicious of France to permit her to do much in defending the vulnerable points in the West Indies. English colonial administrators fed this fear through their insinuations that Louis was sending a few ships at a time until he had a sufficient force to seize Carthagena or Havana. At the same time the Spaniards in the West Indies were assured that if they accepted Charles III, "shaking off the avaricious and devouring French Batt", England would even assist them in retaining their economic position.[1]

Adopting such a policy for a season, the English attempted to gain control in the Spanish West Indies through diplomacy rather than war. John Methuen, negotiator of the treaty which converted Portugal for a century into a political and economic satellite of England, was most anxious to conciliate influential Spaniards, offering "some of the queen's ships to go with them," to carry the same message to their own colonials. Anne herself promised to send over a squadron superior to that of France and commanded her West India governors to inform the Spanish colonial authorities that she would gladly convoy their galleons safely to Spain. The queen also instructed the governor of Jamaica to win over the Spanish colonists and asked Charles III to send over influential Spaniards to coöperate.[2] Truly a beautiful dream! Yet it might have become a reality but for the disaster which befell the allied cause at Almanza in 1707. Throughout the previous year, English and colonial authorities expressed continual concern at the growing strength of France in the West Indies, and the increased bold-

[1] *C. C., 1706-8*, pp. 16, 99; N. Mesnager (probably Defoe), *Negotiations* (London, 1717), pp. 5-11. See also Abbé Raynal, *Hist. of East and West Indies* (trans., Edinburgh, 1792), vol. III, p. 321; Lediard, *op. cit.*, p. 806.

[2] *Marlborough MSS.* (Hist. MSS. Com. Rep., vol. VIII), pp. 33, 44; *House of Lords MSS., 1706-8*, p. 369.

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ness of her privateers in attacking English seaports on the American mainland.[1]

Such complaints of the ineffectiveness of the British navy swelled into a crescendo in the autumn session of Parliament (1707), when the Whig junto joined the Tories in attacking the Admiralty—a slight suggestion that the political influence of the commercial bourgeoisie was a force to be reckoned with the moment it felt its shipping really endangered through the lack of suitable convoys. The outstanding fact in the debate, however, was the insistence of the opposition that the ministry should change the emphasis in the war from Flanders to Spain and the South Sea, and it is, perhaps, significant as well as interesting that the queen attended this fiery debate incognito.[2] From this it is clear that the aggressive West India merchants would welcome the organization of a company to protect more effectively their economic interests.[3]

To silence somewhat such embittered assaults upon the Admiralty, the government endeavored to stimulate the activity of West Indian privateers and planned to send more powerful squadrons to the New World. The Board of Trade was assured that if France were prevented from trading to Lima and the Caribbean, English trade would soon be "fflourishing." The government was asked in fact to remove France from America, the West Indies, Canada and Newfoundland. One colonist insinuated that "if the Spaniards suffer patiently the french to goe sharers with them in the Peruvian trade, its equally reasonable that the English should aim at getting some of the Mexican."[4]

[1] Charlevoix, contemporary Jesuit historian, complained that the New Englanders caught all the fish off Acadia and monopolized the West India market with them. *Hist. of New France* (Shea trans.), vol. V, p. 201. The importance of the commercial interests in the West Indies becomes evident from an examination of the *Calendars Colonial*, particularly for 1706-8.

[2] James, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 300; [D. Jones], *Compleat Hist.* (1711), p. 455. See also Add. MSS. 17677EEE, f. 37; *N. Y. Col. Docts.* (O'Callaghan ed.), vol. V, p. 31; *C. C., 1706-8*, pp. 9, 160, 506.

[3] "I have solicited some merchants and found some willing to adventure to settle a factory to carry on the Spanish Trade, which is the most profitablest in the known world." Memorial (printed 1706). *C. C., 1706-8*, p. 114.

[4] *C. C., 1708-9, passim*; James, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 359; Murray, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 143.

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An added reason now appeared for increasing British activity in the South Sea—the Union with Scotland. Since the collapse of the ill-starred Darien venture, the Scots had been inconsolable. Smarting under their heavy losses, and seeing themselves rapidly distanced economically by England, they eventually accepted the terms of the Union, largely in the hope of recouping themselves through their admission to full economic privileges in England and her colonies. This is manifest in Paterson's plan of finding compensation for their Darien losses, by trading to the South Sea under the British flag. Because of the early successes of the Royal African Company, and the "mighty profits" usually associated with the slave trade in the West Indies, he felt that Parliament should provide for a trading company in the New World, "as the western plantations and the English factories in Africa . . . are now [1702] the main support of England, and what enable that nation to make that figure in the world it now doth."[1]

Paterson clearly foreshadows the English Asiento, the South Sea Company, and the struggle over the Caribbean during the negotiations later at Utrecht. Defoe and Hugh Chamberlen, lately court chirurgeon and author of the Land Bank scheme, also sensed the need for a South Sea Company. Definite action on this idea may have been delayed partly on account of the dismissal of Robert Harley from the ministry in 1708. Fortunately, interest in colonial affairs did not lapse for long, as his successor, urged by the British colonists, soon decided to send a large force to assist the mainland colonists in capturing Canada, although he was forced at the last moment to divert the force to Portugal.[2]

New England and New York, as soon as they heard this discouraging news, began preparation for another expedition and

[1] Paterson's *Writings*, vol. I, p. 27, vol. III, pp. 9, 24. D. Defoe, *Hist. of the Union* (London, 1786), p. 313; *A Letter to a Member of Parliament concerning Trade* (1707), p. 5.

[2] C. O. 5/9, No. 24; C. O. 5/898, No. 3; *Parliamentary Hist.*, vol. V, p. 994. See also *C. C. 1708-9*, pp. 56, 486, 559. "What seems absolutely necessary, especially for Jamaica," wrote one colonist to the Board of Trade, "is to remove the French from among our settlements in America." *Ibid.*, p. 319.

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a delegation of Indian chiefs was sent to wait on the queen to enlist her support. Although the Indians aroused much public interest, the political upheaval in England during the summer prevented any ambitious enterprise in the New World that year, although Torcy heard that Peterborough would set out, probably to conquer some area in Mexico, "*d'y établir un commerce avec les Indiens du pays.*"[1] Autumn brought the Tories into power almost at the same moment the New Englanders were capturing Port Royal in Acadia.

An aggressive campaign in the South Sea during 1710 may also have been delayed by the hope that peace might be made at Gertruydenberg. Louis XIV's position was truly precarious, due to the British capture of Minorca, the victories of Marlborough and failing credit. The allies might at this time have made a more advantageous peace, perhaps, than they did three years later, had they not overreached themselves. The negotiations broke down, it is important to observe, largely because France refused to compel Philip of Anjou to evacuate Spain and the Indies, or as the Dutch States General recorded: "The restoration of Spain and the Indies, with their dependencies, being the foundation and essential part of the negotiations, the allies would not continue in any uncertainty concerning it."[2]

Peace parleys closed just before the advent of the new Tory ministry. Although Harley and St. John, the new leaders, were both exceedingly anxious for peace, they desired, while negotiations were pending, to emphasize in true Tory style the naval phase of the war with particular reference to the colonies, in the hope that they might at the same time check the flow of bullion from the New World into the coffers of Louis,[3] and by capturing some places in Spanish America gain valuable diplo-

[1] C. P. A. (Paris), p. 230, f. 421; W. T. Morgan, "The Five Nations and Queen Anne", *Miss. Valley Hist. Rev.*, Sept., 1926; *Downshire MSS.*, p. 877.

[2] Register of States General, *Annals* (1710), vol. IX, p. 27; J. F. Chance, *Brit. Diplom. Instns.: Denmark, 1689-1789* (Camden Soc., 1926), p. 25; D. Defoe, *Appeal to Honour and Justice* (1715).

[3] In March, 1710, a rich flotilla contrived to reach Cadiz. Add. MSS. 17677 DDD, f. 434. Du Clair [Ducasse?] was reported as "bound for Brazill to possess themselves of an island or some other place where there are gold mines." *C. C., 1710-1*, p. 98.

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matic pawns in negotiating peace. Friedrich Bonet, the astute Prussian secretary in London, reported:

> *Le nouveaux Ministère reproche au vieux de ce qu'il n'a pas travaillé à se prévaloir des conditions stipulées par le Traitté de la Grande Alliance qui parle que les Anglois demeurent Maitres de ce qu'ils occuperont dans les Indes Occidentales pendant la guerre qu'on entreprendoit pour le recouvrement de la Monarchie Espagnole.*

Colonial clamors for the capture of Canada could no longer be denied, even in the face of serious military disasters in Spain. Harley's interest in the South Sea had been thoroughly aroused by Paterson, Godolphin, and Defoe. St. John, the versatile secretary of state, had also a vision of empire, and discerned at once why France clung so tenaciously to the Caribbean area. "The French are wise enough to take care of that part, 'tis from thence that they know they may depend on a compensation for all the poverty and distress which the war has brought or can bring upon their nation."[1]

Secret overtures to France for peace went on hand in hand with naval and colonial schemes. Godolphin had scarcely been dismissed before secret advances were made by the English ministry to Abbé Gaultier, a French spy at that time chaplain to the Countess of Jersey and also, *mirabile dictu*, to His Excellency, the Imperial ambassador in London. Soon thereafter, St. John began preparations for conquering Canada, and

[1] Dispatch, Sept. 4, 1711, G. S. A. (Berlin), Rep. XI, 73, Conv. 37; G. Parke, *Corr. . . . Bolingbroke* (London, 1798), vol. I, p. 7. Chamberlen (p. 376) made the same complaint. See also Swift, *Conduct of the Allies* (T. Scott ed.), vol. V, p. 79; *Annals*, vol. X, p. 151; *Portland MSS.*, vol. IV, p. 652. Lediard, a contemporary historian, also realized (p. 834) that capturing the Spanish galleons would deprive Louis XIV of his financial resources. See also [Gibson], *Compleat Supplt.* (London, 1729), p. 11. In fact some years later it was claimed that French trade in the South Seas during the war was sufficiently profitable to repay the French war debt: J. B. Botsford, *Eng. Soc. in 18th Cent.* (N. Y., 1923), p. 168. Admiral A. T. Mahan calculated the French returns from Spanish-American trade (1701-1716) at £40,000,000 in specie: *Influ. of Sea Power, 1660-1783*, p. 218. See also Dahlgren, *op. cit.*, pp. 77, 314.

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Harley turned his attention to the Caribbean,[1] two movements nicely synchronizing with the preliminary peace negotiations.[2]

To assure its continuation in office, the new ministry must do two things, and quickly: improve credit and secure peace. A more aggressive campaign in the New World, particularly in the West Indies, might well advance both. England was staggering under heavier taxation than ever before, and becoming thoroughly weary of a war that had degenerated into a policy of watchful waiting, since Louis XIV refused to risk another battle against Marlborough. Peace was most necessary, too, because the overthrow of the Whigs, who were supported by the moneyed classes, had brought with it a dangerous decline in credit,[3] accentuated, moreover, by the impoverished condition of the treasury at the time of the dismissal of Godolphin, in whom the financiers placed implicit confidence.

Harley's plan for improving credit was, therefore, doubly difficult, and necessitated the greatest haste in its execution. Already, before Godolphin's disgrace, two Whigs, the Duke of Newcastle, England's wealthiest landowner, and Lord Halifax, one of her financial geniuses, were deep in Harley's plans. As Harley deliberated, England entered a financial panic. A wave of speculation, accompanied by the organization of questionable insurance companies had brought on a crash almost simultaneously with the change of ministry. Harley, faced with a crisis, was advised by John Drummond, his confidential

[1] C. P. A. (Paris), 235, f. 411; *Portland MSS.*, vol. IV, p. 652; G. L. Wickham-Legg, *Diplomatic Agents of England and France* (Oxford, 1909), p. 33. As marines had embarked for the Indies — C. P. A. (Paris), 230, f. 97 — even before Harley was actually in office, the new secretary of state demanded information relative to the force necessary to protect the West Indies—State Papers, Domestic: Entry Book, 110, f. 9.

[2] For the possible relation of these two projects, see the author's article in *Hispanic American Historical Review*, May, 1928.

[3] C. P. A. (Paris), 230, ff. 281, 285; *ibid.*, 233, ff. 79-116, *passim;* J. Arbuthnot, *Law is a Bottomless Pit*, Pt. I. The Whigs expected Harley to fail in establishing public credit: [D. Defoe], *Account of the Conduct of Robert, Earl of Oxford* (London, 1714), pp. 31, 49. See also O. Weber, *Der Friede von Utrecht* (Gotha, 1891), p. 73.

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agent at Amsterdam to "send all his fleet bound for the West Indies." [1]

Speed, therefore, was the first requisite, if public credit were to be retrieved. Harley seriously considered Drummond's suggestion, while Paterson again called his attention to the Spanish Indies. "We ought to insist to have . . . Newfoundland . . . Canada, and . . . two or three cautionary places in South America from Spain until the repayment of at least some of the vast expenses we have been, and still must be at, for the recovery of that monarchy to the house of Austria." Harley now recalled the secret treaty between England and Charles III, granting English subjects the same privileges in the West Indies as the Spanish, particularly the right of going every year with ten ships, each of 500 tons burden, to any part of the West Indies.[2] These merchant vessels might also be convoyed by warships as long as the latter carried no merchandise. This treaty, together with Paterson's letter, clearly suggest the Asiento, which Philip of Anjou had already granted to France.

> *Nous sommes pareillement chargés d'offrir et assurer aux deux puissances* [Marlborough was informed], *non seulement les mêmes avantages pour le commerce d'Espagne et des Indes, dont elles ont jouie pendant le règne du feu roi Charles II, mais encore tous tels autres que la Reyne de la Grande Bretagne et les Estats Généraux estimeront nécessaires pour le bien de leur sujets et maintien la perpetuelle alliance entre les trois nations.*[3]

From the beginning of the war, English merchants had been jealous of this French privilege, which Philip had supplemented by other commercial concessions.

Harley, therefore, with the Asiento and the value of the South Sea trade in mind, planned to improve credit. A suc-

[1] C. P. A. (Paris), 230, f. 284; *Portland MSS.*, vol. II, p. 217, vol. IV, pp. 560, 578.

[2] Add. MSS. 22294, ff. 14-5; *C. C., 1708-9*, pp. 120, 228; *Portland MSS.*, vol. IV, p. 583. See Paterson's *Writings*, vol. III, p. 24.

[3] Translation of a letter (in Spanish) by Duc d'Albe and Comte de Bergheick, Aug. 15, 1709: Murray, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 577.

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cessful expedition to the South Sea might, by capturing important territory or a few richly laden galleons, do much to improve the financial position of the government. In the peace negotiations with France, already in train, Harley emphasized the Asiento, concerning which he probably had a gentleman's agreement with Louis XIV.[1] His claims to the slave trade would, moreover, be measurably strengthened by a successful attack upon the Bourbon possessions in the Caribbean. From this it must have been easy to pass to commercial concessions and plans for a South Sea Company to take them over. Any hopes Harley may have entertained of capturing Bourbon territory in the Indies were wrecked largely because of the Dutch failure to coöperate, as the English navy was not sufficiently strong to attempt the task alone. France had a considerable force in the West Indies which she was busily strengthening, and she had been able to fortify both Havana and Carthagena. Meanwhile rumors persisted of an English expedition against the West Indies, a project which Prince Eugene favored to prevent France from "drawing yearly so great a treasure."[2]

When Parliament opened late in November, 1710, Anne's speech from the throne clearly indicated a change of emphasis in the war from Flanders to Spain, and called attention to the perilous condition of public credit, which may well have been intended to prepare the way for the South Sea Company.[3] As a beginning, however, Harley made arrangements for two lot-

[1] When Harley formed the South Sea project, "it was the opinion of many . . . . he had verbal assurances given him that France and Spain would grant to the Company, either some settlement, or at least a free trade in the Spanish West Indies, provided a peace were concluded whereby king Philip should remain in possession of the monarchy of Spain." P. Chamberlen, *Impart. Hist. of Reign of Queen Anne* (London, 1738), p. 384.

[2] Rawlinson MSS. (Bodleian), C. 392, f. 182; Parke, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 18, 25, 34, 83; N. Luttrell, *A Brief Relation of State Affairs, 1678-1714* (London, 1857), vol. VI, p. 608. Despite their failure to assist in the West Indies the Dutch realized the importance of the policy and complained because nothing was done! *Annals*, vol. IX, App. i, pp. 20, 23.

[3] *C. C., 1710-11*, pp. 307-310; *Annals*, vol. IX, p. 256. See also C. O., 388/14, M. 69.

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teries totaling over three millions, which, though highly successful,[1] served to arrest only slightly the decline in stocks. Consequently, more ambitious measures became imperative, if the ministry were to remain in power.

The expedition was already on its way to conquer Canada, and possibly after that it might go on to the West Indies. French fears were aroused. Pecquet, secretary to the French Foreign Secretary, Marquis de Torcy, noted that if England ever secured a foothold in Spanish America, she would soon be entirely mistress there—

> *on y verroit en peu d'années un grand nombre des habitans des ports fermés, et le plus grand entrepôt du monde des manufactures d'Europe et d'Asie, dont les Anglois fournaient les royaumes du Perou et du Mexique . . . Ce raisonnement portoit sans contredit que soixante millions d'or et d'argent sortant annuellement des mines seroient l'objet et la fruit de leur industrie.*[2]

Pecquet also thought that Jamaica desired above everything else direct commerce with Peru, from which the English had drawn indirectly a considerable revenue for thirty years.

For similar reasons Paterson urged Harley to go forward with the plans for trading to the South Seas, for the benefits which France had reaped from it—

> are a sufficient argument for undertaking it, and the weariness of a peace will not afford any reason to slacken our preparations . . . This trade may prove the speediest, if not the only means of procuring peace to Europe. It may be the sinews of war as the South Sea trade is the fountain of supply to France. The consequence is obvious; and the public and private interests are so interwoven that quickness of returns being considered no trade can compete with this.[3]

[1] Bonet's Dispatch, Feb. 20, 1711, G. S. A. (Berlin), Rep. XI, 73, Conv. 37; *Portland MSS.*, vol. V, p. 464; [D. Jones], *Compl. Hist.* (London, 1711), pp. 115, 212, 276. Curiously enough, the floating of a lottery scheme also preceded the founding of the Bank: *C. S. P., D., 1695,* p. 262.

[2] C. P. A. (Paris), 233, ff. 29, 75-82.

[3] Paterson, *Writings,* vol. III, p. 291. A contemporary pamphleteer asserted that this project, "which had drawn us into all the misery and folly", could

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In keeping with such suggestions, Harley introduced a bill for a South Sea Company, which was soon transformed into a law.

In the meantime Abbé Gaultier carried secret overtures of peace to Louis XIV, and Admiral Sir James Wishart went to the Grand Pensionary to ask for Dutch coöperation in a joint attack upon the West Indies. The former mission succeeded; the latter failed. Louis grasped eagerly at the English suggestion, although it became clear at once that the question of the Spanish Indies would be a crucial one in the negotiations. Torcy noted that the object of the English ministers "*étoit d'obtenir pour sûreté quelques places aux Indes, . . . Gibraltar ou Corogne, enfin Port Mahon dans la Méditerranée.*"[1]

As the secret parleys continued through the early months of 1711, Harley's demands for trading privileges in Spanish America increased because he realized that only through them could his company flourish. Through the Board of Trade, he was in close touch with English merchants interested in the Spanish trade, and the rumors of a West India expedition increased apace. The utmost confusion as to the destination of Admiral Sir Hovenden Walker's force prevailed. Spain, Mexico, Cuba, Porto Bello, Peru and Canada were all suggested in London coffee houses. Harley now insisted upon both commercial concessions and treaty ports in the Caribbean. In this he was supported by St. John, who complained that although France liberally promised Gibraltar, no mention was made of the West Indies. When Louis late in April advanced specific

not possibly succeed, and would do England no good even if it did. "The present proposals of peace", he concluded, "or any future proposals of what kind soever that should leave Spain and the Indies to the House of Bourbon ought by every true Englishman to be rejected with indignation." *Remarks on Present Negotiations of Peace* (1712). Spain and the West Indies "must either be taken from the House of Bourbon, or these islands must soon lose their trade and their liberties are not of a very much longer continuance." *Our Ancestors as Wise as We* (1712). See also the memorial of Bothmar, Hanoverian envoy at St. James, and a *Letter from a Merchant in Amsterdam* (1712). Peterborough and Shrewsbury were also skeptical. *C. C., 1708-9*, p. 452; T. Somerville, *Hist. of Reign of Queen Anne* (1798), p. 414.

[1] Gaultier's "Verbal report," C. P. A. (Paris), 232, f. 129; Anne's "Secret Instrns. to Sir James Wishart," Jan. 14, 1711, Parke, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 23; Dahlgren, p. 624.

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promises as a basis for the negotiations, Article I provided, "*que les Anglois auront des sûretés réeles pour exercer desormais leur commerce en Espagne, aux Indes, et dans les ports de la Méditerranée.*" Immediately, England required a clear statement of "*sûreté réele*," but Louis steadfastly refused to be explicit as to the guarantees for English commerce in the Spanish West Indies.[1]

As soon as the Anglo-French preliminaries were agreed upon, they were reported to the Hague, and St. John instructed the English minister there to play up to the article providing "*une barrière suffisante pour la sûreté de la république d'Holland*," that the Dutch might forget "*la sûreté de commerce de cette nation.*" Fears of Dutch hostility, the stabbing of Harley, and the sudden deaths of the dauphin and the emperor probably seriously delayed floating the company. Yet the need for action was doubly urgent. Credit was sinking; peace negotiations at a standstill. Harley, fighting not only for his physical but his political life, had arisen from a sick-bed to launch his program for a South Sea Company; two days later Walker started for Canada. The English negotiators meanwhile insistently demanded the Asiento and four cautionary towns, two in North America and two to the southward, together with the most-favored-nation status in the East Indies.[2] Such concessions would do much to further the prospects of the company, while Walker's expedition, generally suspected of having the Caribbean as its objective, contributed directly to the same end.

The plan for organizing the company was satisfactory to the financiers, and its possible connection with the slave trade and the gold and silver mines of Spanish America tended to attract small investors. The project was in reality an extension of

[1] Parke, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 106, 110, 352; vol. II, p. 194. C. P. A. (Paris), 233, ff. 36-47, 214, 232; 235, ff. 202, 251, 311; Baschet Transcripts (P. R. O.), 197, f. 354; C. O. 388/14, M. 69.

[2] Torcy's "memorandum", C. P. A. (Paris), 233, ff. 249, 456; Torcy, *Mémoires*, vol. III, p. 52; F. E. Ball, *Corr. of Jon. Swift* (London, 1910), vol. I, p. 254; J. R. Robinson, *The Princely Chandos, A Memoir of James Brydges* (London, 1898), p. 24.

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credit along somewhat modern lines, although to the conservative eighteenth-century moneyed men it may have suggested the extreme of frenzied finance. Its purpose, as set forth in the act, appeared manifold. "For making good beneficiaries and satisfying the public Debt, and for erecting a Corporation to carry on a trade to the South Seas, and for the Encouragement of the Fishery, and for Liberty to trade in unwrought Iron with the Subjects of Spain; and to repeal the Acts for registering Seamen." It provided for organizing a company to fund the floating debt amounting to more than nine millions, which was guaranteed six per cent interest. This company was granted a monopoly of the South Sea trade, and government securities would be accepted at par in payment for stock.[1]

The project was received with a general acclaim in England. Fortunately, too, for Harley's plans, British trade had prospered during the year 1711, making it much easier to secure support in funding the debt at a fair rate of interest. The debt itself was for the time enormous, and finding the interest upon it, a distinct challenge to the Tory ministry. Coupling the debt and the trade to the South Sea was a tempting bait to the Whig moneyed interests, buttressed as they were by the Bank and the East India Company. When the latter organization protested and asked to be heard before the Commons against the bill, there is a suggestion that Harley may have intimidated them. The South Sea scheme was the first successful attempt of the Tories to win the support of the moneyed classes, which they retained until the treaty of Utrecht caused these financiers once more to take fright. The entire policy, moreover, was in perfect keeping with the Tory doctrine of utilizing the navy to strengthen England's political position; perhaps it might, at the same time, decrease the land taxes of the English aristocracy by securing additional revenues from the Caribbean.[2]

[1] 9 Anne, c. 15 (c. 21), *Statutes of Realm*, vol. IX, p. 424; Torcy, *Mémoires*, vol. III, p. 36; Roscoe's *Harley* contains a curious error in quoting from the act.

[2] C. P. A. (Paris), 230, f. 205; *Pol. State*, vol. I, pp. 447-9; W. Coxe, *Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole* (London, 1798), vol. II, p. 2; *Annals*, vol. X, p. 152. In this connection, see also a *Letter to a Member of the October Club* (1711).

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The Queen was to name the directors of the company for the first year. Harley, now Earl of Oxford, was appointed governor; Sir James Bateman, a prominent financier, whom the *London News* reported as subscribing 200,000 francs, deputy-governor; and Blount, who had successfully managed the lottery, secretary. The directors were some of the outstanding moneyed men of England. Among the wealthier were Sir Theodore Janssen, Sir Richard Hoare, Sir John Lambert (recently created a baronet), Samuel Shepheard and Christopher Bouerie. The last named was a business associate of the Harley family and Lambert's baronetcy came as a result of his successful work in preserving credit. The temptation to exchange stocks listed below 70 for the South Sea stock at par was too strong to be resisted.[1] Particularly was this true when it was noised abroad that England would secure the Asiento, and was negotiating "*d'obtenir pour sûreté quelques* [4] *places aux Indes et* [1] *dans le Continent de L'Espagne.*" Even Louis XIV's reluctance to make any promises on behalf of his grandson did not dampen their ardor, although it became generally known that France was rapidly expanding her trade in the Caribbean "to the great advantage of the inhabitants."[2]

Such rumors as the Dutch heard of the secret negotiations relative to the Asiento increased their jealousy and made them altogether reluctant to support a joint expedition. L'Hermitage, Dutch secretary in London, reported that the fleet (probably Walker's) had gone to Panama to seize two places to facilitate English commerce and interrupt that of Spain in the area.[3] As soon as subscriptions to South Sea stock seemed to be going well, thrift caused the Dutch to think more favorably of the company, which even the Imperial representatives in London mentioned with approbation. The rapidity with which the subscriptions were filled was partially due, perhaps, to the

[1] L'Hermitage's dispatches, Add. MSS., 17677EEE, f. 216, 219; C. P. A. (Paris), 235, f. 302; *Portland MSS.*, vol. II, p. 248; *Polit. St.*, vol. II, p. 248.

[2] C. P. A. (Paris), 235, ff. 251, 311; *C. C., 1711-2*, pp. 15, 22; *Portland MSS.*, vol. V, p. 1. See also J. W. Gerard, *Treaty of Utrecht* (N. Y., 1888), p. 198.

[3] Add. MSS. 17677EEE, f. 228; *Portland MSS.*, vol. V, p. 2. The petition of the Dutch Council of State is printed in *Annals*, vol. X, App., p. 17.

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current belief that an English expedition had gone to the South Sea. During October the stock rose from 69 to 88, and "*on espère que si notre escadre peut faire quelque port de l'Amérique que ce soit, que cela encouragera beaucoup ce commerce, et fera augmenter le prix des actions.*" [1]

In the meantime, Matthew Prior and Nicholas Mesnager, a Rouen merchant, had been drawn into the secret negotiations because the question of *sûreté réele pour notre commerce aux Indes,* continued to give trouble. Prior insisted that England should have actual possession of some ports in both the Americas, frankly admitting that she expected to fortify them and control the trade as a recompense for the "prodigious expense we have been at in continuing the war," which was exactly in keeping with Paterson's suggestions somewhat earlier. The English ministers hoped that the islands when settled would annually bring to the English large sums from Mexico and Peru, and Prior told Torcy that he looked upon the cession of four places as indispensable for the continuance of negotiations, and they would never be missed in the vast extent of Spanish America, extending from the Straits of Magellan to California. Torcy replied that Louis XIV was preparing terms most reasonable "*mais pour les places, Monsieur, vous croyes qu'il ne s'accordera jamais.*" [2]

As peace negotiations languished, subscriptions to the company's stock continued. They got about four millions immediately and soon had six millions in sight, which the ministry considered one of the "wonders of Her Majesty's Most Glorious Reign." [3] Meanwhile, many persons in England, even those in high position, firmly believed that Walker had gone to the West Indies. The French were clearly nervous and prob-

[1] C. P. A. (Paris), 235, ff. 304-5; Bonet's dispatch, July 9 (O. S.), G. S. A. (Berlin), Rep. XI, B. 39; Hoffman to the Kaiser and Kaiserin, July 7 and 10, Staats-Archiv (Wien), England, B. 65; *Portland MSS.*, vol. V, p. 48.

[2] Prior's "Negotiations," *Portland MSS.*, vol. IV, p. 583, vol. V, pp. 35, 38; Paterson's *Writings,* vol. III, p. 24; C. P. A. (Paris), 235, f. 385; *Parliamentary Hist.*, vol. VI, p. 1022; *Annals,* vol. IX, p. 369.

[3] C. P. A. (Paris), 235, ff. 302, 304; *Polit. State,* vol. II, p. 52. The Dutch secretary felt that the amount would all be subscribed before the end of July. Add. MSS. 17677EEE, f. 262.

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ably attributed Prior's unbending attitude even in the presence of the Grand Monarque himself, to British hopes of success in the Caribbean, and to Harley's interest in the Asiento. Despite French assertions that they could give no assurances for the cession of security places, which would bind Philip of Anjou, England insisted upon such guarantees and demanded that each nation should retain such territory as it held at the signing of peace.[1]

Under such conditions the South Sea Company was born. It received some setback at first through the miscarriage of the Quebec expedition and the delay in the signing of peace. Otherwise it appeared to succeed from the outset, and did much to improve credit. In its inception, it was not only a financial measure, but a tempting pawn in the diplomatic game; it was not only a move to dish the Whigs, but also a bid for the support of the moneyed group. Finally, it was a scheme to utilize credit as never before in England, lighten the taxes of the landed class and, if peace negotiations failed, wrest from the Spanish Main sufficient bullion to defray the cost of the war. The scheme was politically, and perhaps economically wise, and had it not later been so closely tied up with the national debt in an era of wildest speculation, Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford, might perchance have ranked beside Godolphin, the younger Pitt, Peel and Gladstone as one of England's great finance ministers. Not to him alone goes the credit, however, for the ideas he put into practice were those of Chamberlen, the mid-wife, of Paterson, the financier, and of that most versatile genius, Daniel Defoe.[2]

WILLIAM THOMAS MORGAN.

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[1] C. P. A. (Paris), 233, ff. 177, 202, 220, 230; Swift, *Four Last Years* (T. Scott ed.), pp. 68, 153. Prior assured Louis XIV that he would find England "prête a faire toute pour la paix qui puisse consister avec l'honneur de la nation et la sûreté de leur commerce en Amérique," because Harley was personally interested as the originator of the company. *Mémoires,* vol. III, p. 52. See also "Mémoire concernant deux propositions que fait le Sieur Mesnager touchant la sécurité du commerce des Anglois en Amérique." C. P. A. (Paris), 237, f. 147.

[2] *Portland MSS.,* vol. IV, pp. 18, 150, 300, 391; vol. V, pp. 2, 10, 36, 50, 58, 66.

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JOSÉ BONIFACIO, THE NEGLECTED FATHER OF HIS COUNTRY, BRAZIL

IT is no more possible to discuss Europe in the first fifteen years of the nineteenth century without mentioning Napoleon than it is to discuss the history of modern Brazil from 1822 to the present time without writing about José Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva.

Yet historians have slighted Bonifacio in a most amazing fashion. Ignorance as an excuse for this neglect on the part of unbiased scholars is not a tenable explanation since Armitage[1] and Handelmann,[2] writing respectively in 1835 and 1860, definitely assigned a great rôle to Bonifacio in the history of Brazil.

Brazilian historians may have neglected him in the past, but that is no longer the case. Since 1922, when the centenary of Brazilian independence was celebrated, a deluge of documents, essays, monographs, dictionaries and books has appeared on the movements of 1821, 1822 and 1823; many of these deal at length with Bonifacio, and all of them reveal, as never before, how ubiquitous was Bonifacio's direct and indirect influence in the most momentous period of Brazilian national life. Despite the overwhelming evidence of contemporary documents and the unstinted and uncontrolled praise of modern Brazilian writers, many works appearing or revised since 1922 still slight the "Father of Modern Brazil", as he is called by many.

There are probably two outstanding factors, among others, contributing to this neglect of Bonifacio. One is the language barrier. Portuguese seems to be a stumbling block even to scholars who can handle Spanish well. The second is the lack of appreciation of Brazil's place in the history and development

[1] Armitage, *The History of Brazil* (2 vols., London, 1835 and 1836).

[2] Handelmann, *Geschichte von Brasilien* (Berlin, 1860).

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of Latin America. The *number* of Spanish-speaking nations, terms such as *Hispanic* American, the proximity of Spanish-speaking countries to the United States, the absence in Brazil of great military heroes like Bolivar, San Martin and Sucre, the monarchism of Brazil from 1822 to 1889—all may have contributed to a lack of interest in Brazilian life and institutions. How else can one explain the neglect of one of the greatest figures America has turned out?

Bonifacio, son of a Portuguese nobleman and of a distinguished Paulista mother, was born in Santos, the seaport of the present coffee state of São Paulo, in 1765. He was proud of being a Paulista, the pioneer in most of the progressive movements of Brazil. First taught by his father, later, according to the custom of the day, when seventeen years old he was sent to the University of Coimbra in Portugal, where he obtained degrees from the faculties of Philosophy and Jurisprudence. He specialized in mineralogy and metallurgy.[1]

While a student he cultivated his poetical and literary talents. As a boy he had composed many poems and in Portugal his literary ability was greatly admired. He is included in Sylvio Romero's "History of Brazilian Literature"[2] and his work is criticized there as though he were merely a great figure in the realm of polite letters. When exiled after performing his great work for Brazil, in Bordeaux, under the name of Americo Elysio he spent most of his time composing verses of real literary merit. To say the least, he was versatile.

It was, however, as a scientist that he won European renown. After his graduation at Coimbra he was commissioned by the Portuguese government to make a scientific expedition in Europe. He traveled from 1790 to 1800. And what years for a trained observer! Bonifacio was a true scientist in that he used his talents for the observation of all natural phenomena

[1] For the life of José Bonifacio see: Sylvio Romero, *A Historia do Brazil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1892); *Diccionario e Enciclopedia Internacional*, Editor, Jackson (New York).

[2] For Bonifacio, the writer, see: Sylvio Romero, *Compendio de Historia da Literatura Brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro, 1909).

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and not only for those of his specialty. This will become clear in a study of Bonifacio's ideas. He visited France, Germany, England, Sweden, Denmark and the Tyrolese mines. It is unnecessary to enumerate the types of government and experiments in government he had an opportunity to observe. On this trip he formed friendships with some of the greatest minds of the day. Alexander von Humboldt was always eager to refer to Bonifacio as his friend and carried on a correspondence with him. Bonifacio worked with Volta, Priestley, Lavoisier and others. He was made a member of the Society of Research of Berlin, of the Natural History and Filomatic Society of Paris, the Geographical Society of London, the Mineralogical and Linnean of Jena. He studied at the University of Freiburg. While in Sweden he discovered several minerals until then unknown and contributed articles to many scientific magazines. He wrote mainly concerning minerals, their exploitation, etc., and showed even in these highly scientific productions that practical sense which was a marked characteristic of his whole life and work. One article in particular on the "Reforestation of the Monodego" showed not only the universality of his interests and knowledge but his great insight into the relation of natural and sociological phenomena. The relation of Bonifacio to Humboldt will serve more than anything else to indicate his rôle. He represented the modern spirit of Europe and was one of its most effective and intelligent apostles.

In 1800 he returned to Portugal as a professor at the University of Coimbra. He occupied other official positions such as supervisor of mines and chief of police of Cintra, and led a corps of students against French troops when Napoleon invaded the peninsula. In 1812 he was made secretary of the Academy of Sciences and Letters of Lisbon. In 1817 he made a remarkable speech in honor of the queen, of which only one sentence interests us. In speaking of Brazil, he says, "What a land for a great and vast Empire!" showing that he had not only not forgotten his native land but must have thought of her destiny and of her possibilities. In fact, a modern historian makes the comment that Bonifacio's faith in Brazil was his greatest attribute.

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After an absence of many years, Bonifacio in 1819 returned to his native land and devoted himself to study and research, only to be caught in the whirlwind of the great events that occurred in 1821, 1822 and 1823, of which he became the center, the director and the controlling mind. It was he who organized the Junta of São Paulo; it was he who persuaded the prince to remain in Brazil; it was he who led the prince and advised him; it was he who called for deputies of the various provinces; it was he who made Dom Pedro the Grand Master of the Apostolado, a lodge founded by Bonifacio. This lodge was in favor of a monarchical government while the lodge from which it broke away was republican in spirit.

Bonifacio and his two distinguished brothers ruled Brazil for the eighteen most momentous months of Brazilian history. It was he who laid down the basis of organization and also the most vital policies followed by Brazil in the solution of her most difficult problems. The three great changes in Brazilian life were, because of Bonifacio, bloodless, more the result of evolution than revolution. Brazil escaped the direful effects of the American Revolutionary War, of the French Revolution, and of the American Civil War because what these accomplished by blood was accomplished peacefully in Brazil. It was Bonifacio who met the Brazilian problem with a Brazilian solution. He did not make the mistake made by the Spanish-American republics of adapting the constitution of the United States as a remedy for their ills, which produced, as Professor William R. Shepherd puts it, "political indigestion". Brazil had no dictators, no great civil wars, no great revolutionary upheavals. Her evolution was slow but sure, and nearly always progressive. Bonifacio knew his people, their traditions and customs, their psychology, the land. He understood the system of production; he knew what was going on in Spanish America; he knew what had happened in France. He understood the real significance of slavery and of the Indian problem; he knew the meaning of democracy and how futile it would be in Brazil at that historical moment; he knew that there was as yet no Brazilian nationality, no national cohesion; he realized that extremely intelligent measures would have to

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be used to bring order out of chaos. He was arbitrary, human, and loved power—as a result he was exiled.

Probably the most reliable of the witnesses who lived in Rio during at least part of the time that Bonifacio walked the stage was Armitage,[1] referred to above. Even though he was closer to the trees than modern historians, Armitage saw the forest more clearly than they. He wore no nationalist spectacles; his vision was not blurred. He refers to himself as the impartial chronicler when he sums up the services of the Andradas to Brazil: "Their views were ever great and their probity unimpeachable. It was by José Bonifacio that the uncertain and inconstant resolutions of Dom Pedro were irrevocably fixed. . . . They retired from office undecorated and in honourable poverty." And in summing up the ten years of Dom Pedro I's reign he makes these significant comments:

> His accession to the throne was in all probability the means of preserving Brazil from an anarchy even more fatal than that which has hitherto been the fate of the Spanish colonies. Any premature attempts to establish a republic must have led to a sanguinary and protracted war in which the slave population would have taken up arms, and havoc and desolation would have been spread over the fairest portion of South America. . . . The regimen to which the people were accustomed was monarchical and the monarchy was the best instrument to introduce that civilization which was wanting.[2]

That Bonifacio was very much respected by his enemies is revealed by the very animosity of the leader of the Portuguese troops in Brazil, General Jorge de Avilez. The ardor of his wrath is in itself a pretty compliment; he refers to Bonifacio as the "naturalist who suddenly becomes a politician . . . whose language is unison with that of the demagogues of all time and of all places . . . hiding behind a mask of *patria*, constitutions,

[1] Armitage, an Englishman who resided in Brazil, took up the history of Brazil where Southey left off, and has two volumes covering the period from 1808 to 1835.

[2] Armitage, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 138.

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hatred of tyranny, and other terms with which revolutionary dictionaries abound." [1]

Even in the Portuguese Cortes his movements were watched and commented upon. Borges Carneiro, a member of that body, said:

> There [i. e. in Brazil] one man alone, José Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva, with the energy of his character improvises land and sea armaments, finds resources in abundance, and throws us out of doors with the least ceremony possible. We waste our time talking and do nothing but register the insults we receive from Brazil.[2]

Fortunately for future historians, some of the European diplomats in Brazil were not only conscientious but shrewd observers. It is only natural that the governments of Metternich and of Ferdinand VII should watch with keen interest the various steps of the movement in Brazil. The representatives of these two countries paid Bonifacio the great compliment of singling him out as the subject of long reports. Almost daily they registered their observations of his actions, his opinions, and the opinions of others concerning him. Consciously and unconsciously they reveal that they considered him the key to the whole situation. Baron Marschal[3] calls Bonifacio a man "of much grace" and says that it was due to him that the Junta of São Paulo adhered immediately to the Regency established by the King. On another occasion he comments, "José Bonifacio is going very far," i. e., towards independence.

José Delavat y Rincon, Spanish Minister in Rio, writes to his chief in Madrid,

> The majority of sensible persons with whom I have talked

[1] Laudelino Freire, "Acceitação do Titulo de Defensor Perpetuo do Brasil pelo Principe D. Pedro," in *O Anno da Independencia,* Tomo Especial (Rio de Janeiro, 1922) of the *Revista do Instituto Historico e Geographico Brasileiro.* Also, "Ministerio de José Bonifacio" by Arthur da Rocha Pinto.

[2] Oliveira Lima, M. de, *O Movimento de Independencia, 1821-1822* (São Paulo, 1921), p. 185.

[3] *Documentos para a historia da Independencia,* vol. I. (Bibliotheca Nacional do Rio de Janeiro, 1923).

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> . . . believe the Prince to have made a mistake when he dismissed the Andrada ministry. . . . It is believed the Prince will have to recall them.
>
> Andrada and his brother exercise a great influence in the Legislative Assembly of which they are members.[1]

To show the popular appreciation of Bonifacio and his brothers, the following quotation from the petition to the emperor requesting their reinstatement in the ministry is significant not only because of the content but because almost every class of Brazilian is represented among the signers. There are fifteen and one-half pages of signatures. The following are represented: druggist, priests and bishops, officers of the army, business men, professors, government officials, grocers, artisans, shoemaker, surgeon and students. Some sign for themselves and family, or for a club, or for themselves and friends. The petition in part reads as follows:

> The people of the capital and province, lovers of the great cause of the Empire of Brazil . . . swear that the dismissal of the well loved citizens José Bonifacio and Martim Francisco de Andrada e Silva is detrimental to the greatness and progress of the movement for independence of this growing but rich and vast empire. Their knowledge of things political, their literary renown, their honor, the confidence they have inspired among foreign powers, their patriotism and love . . . have made them the anchor (with your Majesty) of this Empire. Removing them threatens us with confusion, anarchy, desolation, despotism and civil war.[2]

To those who know Brazil of today, and something of the Brazil of the twenties of the last century, and to those who know Brazilians and Latin psychology, every one of the following quotations contains a noteworthy sentence. Bonifacio's ideas on education and athletics sound like those of present-day, practical-minded, non-poetic Anglo-Saxons. One must compare him with the other liberators of his day to get a truer

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 444.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 402 *et seq.*

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and better perspective on his philosophy. He reveals throughout his whole life a stark realism, and his policies and plans, therefore, are generally feasible and practicable. He had dug into real earth too long as a geologist to waste much time in reaching for unattainable clouds. He was an idealist, but his idealism was based on a foundation of reality and did not dangle footless from some beautiful star. His training as a scientist, his keen powers of observation,[1] and his cosmopolitan experience precluded loose and superficial thinking on social and political problems. He knew that it was just as impossible to transform copper into gold by a mere thought process as it was to make aristocratic Portuguese, illiterate slaves and savage Indians into intelligent democrats. In comparing him with Washington, San Martin and Bolivar, one notes that Bonifacio was not a soldier, nor did he lead armies.

In 1822, when Brazil had to strike out on her own as a free land, these were the great problems she had to solve.

1. Constitution of a government for a people with no experience in self-government, composed of three races and mixtures of those races, who lived in an enormous territory, with different climates and systems of production. Add to these factors the decentralization of colonial administration and the incipient dissolution produced by the decrees of the Cortes in 1820.

2. A slave population which was far greater than the white. There were 1,930,000 slaves, 1,000,000 whites, 260,000 civilized Indians and 526,000 mulattoes or free negroes.[2] The slaves seemed indispensable to the plantation owners. To the enlightened Bonifacio this problem and the civilization of the Indians were only second to the constitution of a government.

3. A large Indian population of about 800,000, of which only 260,000 were civilized.[3] Bonifacio considered both the

[1] Sylvio Romero, the great Brazilian critic, refers to his keen powers of observation.

[2] Albert Galloway Keller, *Colonization* (New York, 1906).

[3] *Diccionario Historico Geographico e Ethnographico* (Rio de Janeiro, 1922, Inst. Hist. e Geog. do Brasil), pp. 240 *et seq.*

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negro and the Indian as integral parts of the population and part of the patrimony of *free* Brazil.

It was to the solution of these great problems that Bonifacio bent every effort. The great glory of Bonifacio is that his solution in each case was the one adopted. For the first, he demanded a limited constitutional monarchy—one was established; for the second, he preached the gradual emancipation of the slaves—the slaves were emancipated gradually; and for the third, he proposed a comprehensive plan for the intelligent civilization of the Indians—and his plan was adopted later.

In explaining why he chose a monarchical solution for Brazil, he had in mind the peculiar needs of his people. He knew their weaknesses and had the courage to point them out. This is shown in the following quotations. The first is taken from the correspondence of Baron Marschal, the Austrian diplomat, as quoted by Lima.

> Bonifacio's program includes material improvements, construction of roads and canals, the impartial administration of justice, abolition of the slave trade, good schools, and the improvement of the race by means of gymnastics and athletics for the physical improvement of the youth of Brazil.[1]

> The Brazilians are enthusiastic supporters of a beautiful ideal, friends of their own liberty and do not give up easily the privileges they have once won. . . . Ignorant because uneducated but talented by nature . . . capable of great deeds as long as concentration is not required and as long as continued and monotonous effort is not demanded; sexually passionate because of climate, life and education. They undertake much but finish little.[2]

> They accuse me of having planted the monarchy, yes, because I saw that the customs of the people were eminently aristocratic; because it was necessary to get the support of the old families and the wealthy men who detested and feared the demagogues; because Portugal was monarchical, and the Brazilians imitative monkeys. Without the monarchy there would have been no

[1] Oliveira Lima, *O Movimento, etc.*, p. 200.

[2] Vicente Licinio Cardoso, *Figuras e Conceitos* (Rio de Janeiro, 1924), p. 225.

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center of strength and union and without this the nation could not have resisted the Portuguese Cortes and could not have achieved her national independence.[1]

Bonifacio was very much aware of the distracted state of the Spanish-American republics which were struggling with a form of government for which they were not prepared by temperament or by education. He remembered what he had seen while in France and recalled it to the Constituent Assembly in the notable speech reported by Armitage:

> José Bonifacio dilated on the unfortunate condition of Spanish America for 14 years involved in civil war; he dwelt on the sufferings of France, assuaged only by the return to a monarchical form of government; and after alluding to the present distracted state of the Peninsula concluded in the following words: "As far as my voice can go, I protest in the face of the present assembly, and of the entire people, that we will form a constitution not democratic but monarchical and I myself will be the first to concede to the Emperor that which is really his due." [2]

Bonifacio's ideas in regard to slavery and the aboriginal population are found in two monographs, "Apontamentos para a Civilização dos Indios" and "Representação a Constituinte Sobre a Escravatura", both found in a document of the Department of Agriculture of 1910.[3] He anticipated Lincoln in preaching that a democracy cannot live half-free and half-slave. The problem of slavery in Brazil was settled as in no other

[1] Arthur da Rocha Pinto, quoting Martim Francisco, grandson of José Bonifacio, in *O Ministerio*, p. 93.

[2] Armitage, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 120.

[3] *Homenagem a José Bonifacio no 88º Anniversario da Independencia do Brasil — Inauguração do Serviço de Protecção dos Indios* (Ministerio de Agricultura, Rio de Janeiro, 7 de Setembro de 1910). This pamphlet contains the two essays by Bonifacio on Slavery and on the Civilization of the Indians. There is an interesting introduction by General Rondon paying tribute to Bonifacio and stating that the program for the civilization of the Indians was, with few exceptions, precisely that outlined by Bonifacio. Rondon's only criticism of Bonifacio was that he was not a follower of the "incomparable master August Comte."

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country. It was abolished gradually and without bloodshed. The very close relationship of slavery to the monarchy and to colonialism is the subject of a detailed study being carried on in this country and in Brazil by a Columbia Fellow, Mr. Rüdiger Bilden. He has been kind enough to allow me to use certain parts of his excellent and scholarly manuscript. His trenchant statements are the result of careful thought and research. And yet he has no hesitation in saying, "Indeed the ultimate effect of his very fruitful political, scientific and literary activities mark him as the greatest personal factor in the gradual abolition of slavery and in the transmutation of Brazilian energy from which evolved the Brazil of today."

Bonifacio tore down the humanitarian arguments for the defense of slavery by showing its inconsistency with Christian teaching and with the teachings of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity. He found slavery incongruous in a state organized on the basis of popular sovereignty. He understood the moral effects upon society of the presence of large numbers of slaves and of slavery as an institution upon the economic and political life of the nation. He says:

> But how can there be a liberal and lasting constitution in a country inhabited by an immense multitude of brutal and hostile slaves?
>
> It is time and more than time that we end a traffic so barbarous and cruel; it is time that we should begin to end slavery gradually until it is absolutely eradicated . . . so that in a few generations we may have a homogeneous nation, without which we shall never be free, respected and happy.
>
> It is absolutely essential that we end such physical and social heterogeneity . . . harmonizing . . . discordant elements into a whole . . . which will not crumble at the least touch of political commotions . . .
>
> Luxury and corruption appeared in Brazil long before civilization and industry, and what is the cause of such a frightful phenomenon? Slavery, gentlemen, slavery, because he who lives on the earnings of his slaves lives in indolence, and indolence brings vice in its wake. Blind cupidity, however, says that slavery is necessary in Brazil because its people are flabby and lazy. They most certainly lie.

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He used these humanitarian arguments because he knew there was a class of Brazilians who could be enlisted in a crusade against slavery only on idealistic grounds. In his arguments on the economic unsoundness of slavery Bonifacio showed how far ahead of his day he was and how clearly he understood the relation of slavery to national development. Incidentally, of course, the only argument which could convert slave owners to emancipation would be the economic, and therefore Bonifacio set out to break down their misconceptions of slavery as a paying business. He spoke of the immense capital invested in slaves who die, who get ill and who become useless, an investment incommensurate with the profits received.

> The labor of slaves in Brazil does not produce the profits with which lazy and fantastic persons deceive themselves.
>
> . . . It either makes one mad or laugh to see twenty slaves carrying twenty sacks of sugar which could be carried in one or two well built wagons drawn by two oxen or mules.
>
> . . . Twenty slaves require twenty hoes, all of which could be saved by one plow.
>
> . . . The state loses because without slavery owners would use more intelligence and industry in caring for the patrimony of the nation.
>
> . . . Our woods full of precious lumber . . . would not be destroyed by the murderous axe of the negro or by the devastating flames of ignorance.
>
> . . . Cochin China has no slaves . . . and yet produced enormous quantities of sugar in 1750 . . . without the necessity of destroying the forests and sterilizing the soil as unfortunately is occurring with us.

Bonifacio realized full well that an abrupt freeing of the slaves was impossible, and he made it a cardinal part of his policy that they be freed gradually. In the many articles of the program he prepared for the assembly he has this gradual emancipation in mind. He says:

> I do not wish to see slavery abolished abruptly . . . such an event would bring great evils . . . it is necessary first to make them worthy of freedom.

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> . . . Make the negroes free and proud, give them incentives, protect them, they will reproduce and become valuable citizens.

He proposed the intermarriage of the negroes and the other races. That has gone on in Brazil, and Brazil has no "race" problem. Brazil emancipated its slaves gradually and compensated the slave owners. When slavery was finally abolished in 1888 there was no bloodshed. The monarchy which depended on slavery fell the next year.

The third great problem Bonifacio set out to solve was that of the wild Indian. The introduction to the essay on this problem is by General Candido M. da Silva Rondon, the present-day apostle to the Indians of Brazil. The occasion was the inauguration in 1910 of the service of protection of the Indians—part of the ceremony was an homage to Bonifacio because this service was based on Bonifacio's program. Rondon says:

> The process and the measures recommended by José Bonifacio to realize such a high aim are essentially the same adopted by the Regulation (June, 1910), where the dignity, habits and institutions of the Indians are respected religiously, as well as their life, family and property.
>
> To attract them to the enjoyment of our civilization, the Regulation uses the same means recommended by the Patriarch.
>
> The recommendation never to *force* the Indians to leave their errors and bad habits or force them to heavy and monotonous labors, but better to win their sympathy, friendship and trust, caring for their temporal and physical welfare, is scrupulously respected and followed in the Regulation.

Bonifacio's analysis of Indian psychology and development remind one of Boas's explanations of the conditions that influence the constitution of a population, "heredity, environmental influences and selection". It is unnecessary to recall the fact that Bonifacio lived in the day when race and blood were the universal explanations or excuses for inferiorities and superiorities of, or differences among, peoples. About the Indians of Brazil he says:

> Man in the savage stage . . . in Brazil must be lazy; he has

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> few or no needs . . . he has no idea of property, no desires for distinction, no social vanities, which are the powerful springs which put civilized man into action . . . he is stupid . . . [because] everything which does not concern immediately his physical conservation . . . escapes his attention . . . But the most apathetic man must satisfy his physical and indispensable needs . . . he must repel force with force . . . war becomes a necessity and a pleasure . . . thence come inveterate hatreds, desires for revenge, and unbridled atrocities.

Bonifacio then makes some general remarks on the process of civilizing the Indian.

> The Jesuits knew that with presents, promises and clear and sane reasons, given by practical men in Indian languages, they could do with the savages what they wished. . . . The Indian is a "mere automaton" whose springs can be set in motion by example, education and benefits. . . . They hate us . . . because with the pretext of making them Christians we have done and are doing them great injustices and cruelties.

He proposes in forty-four[1] articles the means for civilizing the Indians. He describes fully the machinery he would set up to accomplish his high aim. It is impossible to reproduce it here because time and space forbid. Every step is marked by common sense, practicality and thoughtfulness for the Indian and for the white alike. Some proposals, such as those relating to intermarriage, seem extreme, but he is careful to recommend all sorts of safeguards to avoid disagreeable results. He develops a system of checks and counter-checks so as to guarantee that the Indian will not be exploited. He is equally anxious that the white too shall not be deceived or injured by the Indian or discriminated against by the government in behalf of the Indian.

Some of these articles are so startling in their modernity that I quote them in full.

1. Justice—purchase their God-given lands.
2. Kindness, consistency and patience on our part.

[1] *Homenagem etc.*, as cited above.

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3. Trade with savages even at a loss.
7. Send trained missionaries . . . because it was crass ignorance, not to say brutality, to wish to civilize and domesticate Indians by force of arms, with soldiers and officers, mostly without sense, prudence or morality.
8. To get virtuous, prudent and educated missionaries it is necessary to guarantee them the proper salaries and necessary privileges.
14. It is necessary to arouse their curiosity [i. e. of the Indians] and to give them exalted ideas of our power, knowledge and wealth. It would be expedient for missionaries to take an electrical apparatus . . . to make beautiful and curious experiments in their presence.
20. Besides schools for the three R's, schools of arts and trades.
21. Avoid abrupt changes of climate which increase mortality. Choose healthy places. Accustom them slowly to new types of work and to new foods.
25. Missionaries should introduce plows to lighten burdens of farming.
26. Missionaries should take all precautions to avoid famines.
28. Banks which will pay interest on Indian savings.
35. Vaccination, etc., etc.

Bonifacio was not "a prominent republican politician of Brazil", as he is described in Roosevelt's book, *Through the Brazilian Wilderness*. He was neither a republican nor a politician. He was much more.

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A SURVEY OF BRITISH POLICY IN THE FASHODA CRISIS

THERE is nothing more likely to impeach the doctrine of the "inevitable" in human affairs than the surmounting of an exceptionally grave international crisis without war. The long-accumulated exasperation engendered by the colonial rivalry of France and Great Britain during the last decade of the last century should, if we weigh the strength of historical forces, have produced a terrific explosion over the question of the possession of the Upper Nile. Seldom, even to the present day, are French and British writers so consistently at variance as when they treat the merits of the Anglo-French controversy over Fashoda; and it was clearly due to no recognition of a moral solution of the question that the dispute failed to provoke a war. The recent publication of volume I of the *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914* enables us to gauge the temper of the Salisbury Ministry during the fateful months of September and October, 1898, and throws fresh light upon the determination of the outcome. But rarely has a struggle been so fraught with complications, political, geographical, and juridical; and, until the archives of the Quai d'Orsay and the Pavillon de Flore are thrown open to the investigator, there is much in the preliminaries of the struggle that must continue to remain obscure. Particularly is this true of the evolution of French policy in the Sudan; for frequent changes of ministries[1] led to as many revisions of plans, and there was sometimes even a painful want of cohesion between the various ministerial departments.[2]

It is not necessary to the purpose of this article to give more than a brief survey of the dramatic struggle which led to "Fashoda". The abandonment of the Egyptian Sudan by

[1] From May 30, 1894, to the close of the Fashoda crisis in November, 1898, there were six ministries.

[2] See Schefer, *D'une guerre à l'autre*, pp. 203, 228.

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the Gladstone Ministry in 1885 left the advantage of possessing the Upper Nile and its tributaries to the first European Power which chose to extirpate Mahdism and establish "effective occupation"[1] of the debatable territory. Just east of the watershed between the Congo and the Nile, and watered by numerous tributaries of the latter, lay the densely-wooded region, once lightly controlled by Egypt,[2] known as the Bahr-el-Gazal, considered of much potential value[3] save the eastern portion which comprised a broad stretch of fever-ridden morass extending to the edge of the Nile.

The motives of the French designs on this region were various. "The idea of spanning Africa from west to east . . ." as one colonial minister has confessed, "prevailed in France for several years."[4] Some, no doubt, like the explorer de Brazza, were hoping to force the whole Egyptian question into the crucible;[5] while even the more moderate imperialists espoused a policy of "penetration", designed to give France a favorable position before seeking a settlement by negotiation. Since by her treaty with Leopold in 1887 France got the frontier of the Congo State fixed well to the south of the Bahr-el-Ghazal, it may be presumed that she already cherished the thought of occupying that region, and apparently some such design was contemplated by de Brazza three years later.[6] Not, however, until 1893, when Théophile Delcassé became under-secretary

[1] Although this condition, laid down by the Act of Berlin, applied only to coastal regions (see Hertslet, *Map of Africa by Treaty*, vol. II, p. 485), the application of so useful a precedent to the Egyptian Sudan seems to have been assumed by both sides in the subsequent discussion over Fashoda.

[2] See the interesting article of Dehérain, "L'Occupation égyptienne du Haut Nil" in *Revue des Deux Mondes*, vol. CL, pp. 182 *et seq.*

[3] Felkin, "The Soudan Question", *Fortnightly Review*, vol. LXXIV, pp. 483 *et seq.*

[4] Lebon, "La Mission Marchand et le Cabinet Méline", *Revue des Deux Mondes*, vol. CLVIII, p. 276.

[5] In February, 1895, de Brazza was quoted as saying, "L'accès par le Sud de la vallée du Nil est le seul moyen qui permettra un jour de trancher conformément à nos intérêts la question d'Égypte." *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française*, 1895, p. 83.

[6] Liotard in *Le Temps*, October 7, 1898.

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of the colonies, did the idea take definite shape; and Colonel Monteil, one of the most daring of French explorers, was then designated for the task of heading an expedition to Fashoda on the Nile. Yet this first project died stillborn.

Meanwhile Leopold had pushed his outposts into the forbidden region, and, while France was engaged in trying to bring him to terms, a check came from an unexpected quarter. The British government, which had already barred Germany and Italy from the upper Nile valley, concluded in May, 1894, a convention with the Congo State, conferring upon Leopold a lease of most of the Bahr-el-Ghazal during his lifetime. Such a move was not only a thrust across the path of French expansion; it bespoke the right of Egypt—and, thereby, Great Britain—to take possession at some future time. France promptly protested on various grounds, including the fact that the Sultan of Turkey, as the khedive's suzerain, had given no sanction to the transaction; and, when Great Britain, deciding that she had been over-hasty, released Leopold from the agreement, France made in August her own bargain with Leopold, which fixed the northern frontier of the Congo State at the river Mbomu.

The renewed energy of France had been due to Delcassé, now minister of the colonies, and to the new foreign minister, Gabriel Hanotaux. Now that the way was clear once more, orders were sent in September, 1894, to M. Liotard, lately appointed commissioner of the Upper Ubanghi, to occupy the Bahr-el-Ghazal with a view eventually to pressing forward to the Nile. As a matter of fact, Liotard's resources were insufficient to enable him to do more than consolidate French possession of the Mbomu; and Monteil, whose order to join him had been countermanded, concluded that it was intended that "our expansion should pursue in the future a less rapid course."[1] Speaking somewhat later in defense of his policy, Delcassé stressed the importance of holding the line between the Congo and the Mbomu;[2] of the Nile as an objective he

[1] Monteil, *Souvenirs vécus*, p. 121.

[2] Séance du 2 mars, 1895, *Annales de la Chambre des Députés*.

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uttered no word.[1] It may be suspected, perhaps, that the "colonial party" had been held in leash by a stronger hand. The policy of Hanotaux, as he has told us, was to prevail upon the British to negotiate a treaty of delimitation, and it was not his fault that the Dupuy cabinet failed to make the most of a British overture in the fall of 1894.[2] The French were still some five hundred miles from the Nile; while from the side of Uganda Colonel Colville, acting commissioner of that colony, was engaged in strengthening its defenses by a punitive expedition at the point where the Nile leaves Lake Albert.[3] Such were premonitions of the coming storm.

Before long the battle of conventions and diplomatic bargaining was succeeded by a battle of orators. On February 28, 1895, an ardent imperialist, François Deloncle, impressed it upon the Chamber of Deputies that the way to the Nile was open, and that, though France did not meditate conquering territories belonging to the sultan, she intended to be in a position of vantage in the event that Great Britain evacuated Egypt, as she had promised.[4] Was this a challenge to British good faith? One wonders. At all events, so imprudent a declaration (which had followed close upon a similar utterance of de Brazza's[5]), coupled with vague rumors of French activity on the Upper Nile, soon brought the question before the House of Commons.[6] To an inquiry as to whether the British sphere

[1] M. Reynald suggests (*L'Œuvre de M. Delcassé*, p. 13) that Delcassé was not in sympathy with the more ambitious aims of French imperialism. Granting that that is true, he was at least an opportunist—unless we are to suppose that he was at times a tool of the more aggressive element.

[2] Hanotaux, *Fachoda*, pp. 88-90.

[3] Fox-Bourne, "The Uganda Protectorate and its Relation to the Sudan", *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review*, third series, vol. VII, pp. 326-7.

[4] Séance du 28 février, 1895, *Annales de la Chambre des Députés*.

[5] See page 55, note 5.

[6] Freycinet suggests (*La Question d'Égypte*, p. 403) that perhaps the brilliant personality of Monteil, who had been sent to the Ivory Coast, led the British to suspect that an expedition to the Nile was on foot; but Grey himself informs us (*Twenty-five Years*, vol. I, p. 19) that the British cabinet did not believe the rumor, though he felt that some such warning as he gave might prevent the forming of such a plan.

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covered the whole of the Nile, Sir Edward Grey, then under-secretary of the Foreign Office, responded rather cryptically, "No, but the Egyptian and British spheres together cover the whole course of the Nile."[1] Interpellated again on March 28, Grey then made his famous declaration in which he warned France that, in view of the "claims we may consider we have under past agreements and the claims which we consider Egypt may have in the Nile valley", the advance of a French expedition into that region "would be an unfriendly act and would be so viewed by England." Here was certainly a case of diplomacy *aux mains nues;* and so public a pronouncement was hardly atoned for by the foreign secretary's subsequent efforts to tone down his subordinate's language.[2] Since France had never, like Italy and Germany, recognized the British sphere on the Upper Nile, she could hardly be expected to submit to a unilateral decision; and Hanotaux, speaking to the Senate on April 5, protested warmly against the British pretensions and the language which had accompanied them, though he added that, provided the rights of the sultan and khedive were respected, France and England should be able to arrive at an agreement. It was doubtless because the rights of Egypt might some time be revived—rights which France did not propose that England should liquidate alone—that the French government was later so stirred[3] by the news of the "march to Dongola".

Unfortunately the struggle was soon to enter on its third phase, a race of expeditions. The Salisbury ministry, which came into office in July, 1895, began toward the end of the year to consider the notion of reconquering the Sudan, and the idea of an expedition to Dongola was even broached to the French government. Again, it seems, Paris distrusted British

[1] *Parliamentary Debates,* fourth ser., vol. XXXI, 781-2.

[2] Kimberley told the French ambassador that the British claim might be accepted or not—it was an open question—and he looked forward to the day when Great Britain would end her occupation of Egypt and its attendant responsibilities. The French and British versions of this affair are both summarized in Gooch, *History of Modern Europe,* pp. 273-4. Grey's declaration was criticized by Labouchère (who followed him in the debate) as "amounting to a quasi-declaration of war against France": *Parl. Deb.,* vol. XXXII, 418.

[3] See Hanotaux, *op. cit.,* pp. 102-3.

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overtures, and the opportunity was allowed to slip.[1] Yet this suggestion of renewed activity on the part of the rival across the Channel determined the sending of Captain Marchand on his celebrated anabasis to Fashoda. It was, according to the tenor of his instructions (dated February 24, 1896), to be a "peaceful penetration", chief reliance being placed upon friendly natives (whose expected coöperation may doubtless account for the slender force confided to Marchand), while, still further to make the effort seem innocuous, the captain was subsequently subordinated to Liotard, who was duly informed that "the mission cannot be considered a military enterprise". If not "military", its purpose was almost certainly political. As a matter of fact, Liotard was expected to take care of all dervishes in the rear of the "explorers", while an attempt to enlist the aid of Abyssinia might have succeeded, but for unforeseen circumstances.[2] After all, the real significance of the project lay in the concluding portion of Marchand's instructions: "if we are to anticipate Colonel Colville on the Nile, it is necessary to get there first."[3] All this was, of course, unknown to the British government, which at last took the step in March, 1898, of ordering Kitchener's advance to Dongola—a move which France had endeavored to get Turkey to prevent,[4] and in which the parliamentary opposition discerned ulterior objects.

By April, indeed, the mask was off, and, with the victory of Omdurman and the capture of Khartum, the British had effectually broken the power of the Khalifa, and had definitely set foot on the debatable region. But meanwhile Marchand had at last come to the end of his laborious pilgrimage. On July 10 he had reached Fashoda. It was more than three months later—on September 20—that the famous "incident" took place, when the initial danger of war was averted by the

[1] Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-2. The overture was obviously prompted by the desire to get the expenses of the expedition defrayed by the Egyptian treasury—a plan which France easily frustrated.

[2] Details are given in Lebon, *op. cit.*, pp. 285-93.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 279.

[4] *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914*, vol. XI, no. 2725.

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cool resourcefulness of the two commanders. It is a curious irony that the village which became the focus of attention in the coming struggle was all but hidden by tropical reeds. "A more dreary and uninviting place (so ran a British consular report) it is impossible to conceive." [1]

Although the French occupation of Fashoda was a surprise to the general public, the British government had not been entirely unprepared for this event. On September 7 Delcassé, now minister of foreign affairs, had informed Sir Edmund Monson, British ambassador at Paris, that Kitchener might meet Marchand on the Nile, but that the captain had been told that any "question of right" must "appertain exclusively to the competence of the British and French governments." [2] Anticipating the probability of such a meeting (for the French were already known to be in the Bahr-el-Ghazal [3]), Salisbury had written Cromer on August 2 that "nothing should be said or done which would in any way imply a recognition on behalf of Her Majesty's Government of a title to possession on behalf of France or Abyssinia, to any portion of the Nile valley"; [4] and to Monson on September 8 he declared that "all the territories which were subject to the Khalifa passed to the British and Egyptian governments by right of conquest." [5] Thus, while Delcassé looked forward, *à la mode d'Hanotaux*, to an amicable negotiation, the British government had decided that the question was not susceptible to discussion. It was a hazardous beginning for a diplomatic duel. To Delcassé, who had ignored a German overture some months ago,[6]

[1] *Accounts and Papers, 1899, Egypt, no. 5*, p. 11.

[2] Monson's words: *Brit. Docs.*, vol. I, no. 188; *cf. Livre jaune: Affaires du Haut Nil*, no. 3 (cited hereafter as *Livre jaune*).

[3] The progress of the Marchand expedition was noted, for example, in *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française*, Jan. 1898, p. 4. In its issue of Jan. 6 the *Times* took note of some letters (published in the *Temps*), in which the expedition was represented as about to pass into the Nile valley. The *Times* promptly reminded its readers of Grey's declaration.

[4] *Brit. Docs.*, vol. I, no. 185 (already printed in *Egypt, 1898*, no. 3).

[5] *Ibid.*, no. 189.

[6] Bourgeois and Pagès, *Les Origines et les responsabilités de la guerre*, p. 375; *cf.* Schwertfeger, *Die Diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes*, vol. III, pp. 26-27.

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the situation might well have furnished material for reflection.[1]

One thing which undoubtedly hindered any adjustment of the pending question was its intricacy. Not only were the premises of the two contestants fundamentally divergent, but neither had adhered consistently to its own position, and there were, besides, some questions of fact on which evidence was scanty. It would hardly be profitable to follow the diplomatic debate in any chronological sequence; yet one cannot well ignore the legal aspects of the controversy, if, for no other reason, than that they provided the fodder for public opinion.

The British position was, at least, as a French writer has expressed it, one of "absolute simplicity".[2] Fashoda had been a possession of the Khedive's, and title was not lost by the fact of its conquest by the Mahdi. Hanotaux himself had recognized that the Sudan belonged to Egypt, and Great Britain was, of course, acting in Egypt's name. Kitchener had taken the Mahdist capital (Khartum), which implied the recovery of sovereignty over the whole of the lost province; and, anyway, penetration of the Sudan by a handful of men (saved, indeed, by Kitchener's timely victories) could hardly be regarded as "effective occupation". Moreover, the Upper Nile lay within the British sphere of influence, which Germany had recognized in a convention that France had not disputed. But the kernel of the British argument was that the territory in question belonged to Egypt, and was recovered for Egypt, and Great Britain had duly warned the French government against any intrusion into this region. Again and again British despatches, speeches, and editorials cited Grey's declaration as though it formed a postulate of unquestionable validity.

Naturally enough, the French diplomats could not admit the British claim to prohibit French soldiers from occupying terri-

[1] Without any special reference to Germany the *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française* (1898, p. 60) had already remarked, "La préparation diplomatique d'une entreprise comme celle que nous poursuivons sur le Bahr-el-Ghazal est encore plus importante que sa préparation technique. L'une sans l'autre pourrait n'être q'une aventure." New in his present office, Delcassé, as Schefer points out (*op. cit.*, p. 222) was something of an amateur in diplomacy.

[2] Caix, *Fachoda*, p. 257.

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tory on the plea of a sphere which Paris had never recognized; and, in any event, the expedition of Marchand was an offshoot of Liotard's activities, set on foot long before Grey's declaration. It was denied that the occupation was not "effective"; French posts had long been established in the Bahr-el-Ghazal (so Kitchener's victories had no bearing there), and the size of Marchand's forces was no indication of his strength, as there was considerable native support on which he could draw. The capture of Khartum was all very well, but Fashoda had actually been taken first, and Marchand's success had contributed to make Kitchener's decisive. But the main French contention was that the Bahr-el-Ghazal was *res nullius*. The Mahdi had dispossessed Egypt of the Sudan, and the British government had deliberately induced its abandonment. The notion that Egyptian sovereignty lay dormant during the fourteen years of Mahdist occupation was held by the French to be untenable. Moreover, if the British contended that Egypt's territories could not be dismembered; it was to be recalled that Great Britain herself had appropriated the equatorial province, besides trying to deliver the Lado district to Leopold.[1] Finally, if Egypt did have uncontestable right to all these lands, by what right should Great Britain pronounce judgment instead of Egypt herself, or the suzerain Power, Turkey? This was, of course, raising the Egyptian question, and conveyed a threat which France could always venture, if driven into a corner.

It was, of course, futile to suppose that either side would be subdued by dialectics; and, indeed, the position of each was vulnerable enough to be readily assailable. While France was in no way bound to recognize a British demarcation of a British sphere, she had, herself, espoused the rights of both the sultan and the khedive, when Hanotaux had made his famous rejoinder to Grey's declaration; and it is at least rather doubtful if the possessory rights of Egypt had been automatically

[1] Monson told Delcassé, who brought up this point, that he was "not authorized to discuss the question of right." *Brit. Docs.*, vol. I, no. 214; *cf. Livre jaune*, no. 13. When Courcel pointed out to Salisbury that France had as much right to touch the Nile as the Belgians, the premier reminded him that Leopold's possession was for life only. *Egypt, no. 3*, 1895, no. 1. This was obviously begging the question.

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terminated by the mere fact of her dispossession by an insurgent movement, now clearly on the wane. Yet Great Britain was on weak ground when she claimed the territory for Egypt —first, because she had more than once disregarded Egypt's rights herself, and secondly, because her position in Egypt was but an arbitrary *fait accompli*, unsanctioned by the Powers, and admittedly provisional. It is a little curious that France herself had not grasped the strategic advantage of acting also as the self-appointed mandatory of the nominal lords of the Sudan.[1] Such procedure, besides stealing some of the British thunder, would have placed the question on a basis which the British would have hesitated to dispute. But it would seem that France was not disposed to risk a battle over the Egyptian question, if only Great Britain would allow her a reasonable solatium for the mistake she had made in 1882. As a British writer puts it, "Not able . . . to enter the Nile region by the front door, France tried to enter from the rear."[2]

But, whichever side may have had the better legal case, the immediate question was not so much one of argument as one of tactics. Delcassé, notwithstanding German opinion to the contrary,[3] was surely justified in feeling that French sentiment would hardly tolerate the immediate recall of Marchand at the dictation of the adversary. Might not the British ministers come to realize, themselves, that insistence on such a demand would not only render compromise more difficult, but be more than likely to provoke war? "Do not drive me into a corner,"[4] he is reported to have begged; and it was not in vain that the London correspondent of the *Matin* wrote of the prevalence in British circles of the dreaded word, "ultimatum"[5]

[1] An article in the *Bulletin du Comité de l'Afrique française* (1896, p. 107) had gone so far as to say: "Nous sommes persuadés que nous serions d'aussi bons dépositaires des droits de l'Égypte sur le Bahr-el-Ghazal, que l'Angleterre au Caire, à Dongola, et à Khartoum."

[2] W. H. Dawson in Ward and Gooch, *History of British Foreign Policy*, vol. III, p. 250.

[3] See *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. XIV, no. 3911.

[4] *Brit. Docs.*, vol. I, no. 198.

[5] *Matin*, Sept. 18.

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Clearly what the French diplomat wanted was to negotiate a treaty, by which France should obtain access to the Nile—not essential for commercial reasons (since Great Britain did not usually raise economic barriers), but an all-important concession to French vanity—or, at the very least, the recognition of her claim to the bulk of the Bahr-el-Ghazal. To this end, the possession of Fashoda was the visible sign of the long and persistent pressure of French claims; though it must be understood that every utterance of Delcassé was couched in a conciliatory tone. In the meantime, he deliberately played for time by insisting that he must await Marchand's report before agreeing to his withdrawal.[1] The next few weeks would enable him to plumb the depths of public opinion, as well as to see if by any chance the British government might be budged from its *non possumus* position.

For the present, certainly, Salisbury assumed an attitude that fundamentally precluded discussion. Whether it is true or not, as the German ambassador declared, that Chamberlain and others of the cabinet preferred war to the least concession,[2] the premier himself was sufficiently mindful of his recent reverses in the Far East to know that his attitude on this question would be subjected to a none too friendly scrutiny; and it is not improbable, moreover, that that reputation for "gracious concession", which he had earned through certain recent dealings with France,[3] had come to acquire a rather malicious connotation. Yet Salisbury may well have thought that even an inflexible attitude would not necessarily mean war, so long as he refrained from pushing his case to the point of an ultimatum. When Delcassé asked for the courtesy of a British vessel to bring a message to Marchand, the premier was, no doubt, glad of an excuse for not forcing the issue, though he bade Monson inform Delcassé that "if the present situation is prolonged,

[1] *Livre jaune, op. cit.*, no. 13.

[2] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. XIV, nos. 3908 and 3941; *cf.* Gardiner, *Life of Sir William Harcourt*, vol. II, p. 471. There was a meeting of the cabinet on September 20: *Standard*, Sept. 20. The *Standard*, which was considered the government's paper, remarked, "They cannot, if they would, retrace their steps."

[3] Notably settlement of the Niger dispute, June 14, 1898.

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. . . some immediate publication of the facts by the government will become necessary."[1] Even this threat was not immediately acted upon. On October 5 Salisbury and Courcel, the French ambassador, indulged in a long and inconclusive debate on the matters under dispute. In his own account of the interview Salisbury seems to have given his interlocutor no encouragement,[2] but according to Courcel's version he hinted a willingness to discuss the question of delimitation with his colleagues, who (he added) were *dispersés en ce moment.*[3] Five days later he published a blue-book, containing a selection of despatches pertinent to the dispute. It was a definite appeal to the arbitrament of public opinion.[4]

The French "apparition" on the Upper Nile was first rumored in the British press on September 10, and by September 12 the story was given general credence. However much desultory discussion there may have been of the possibility that the strange force might be French, the confirmation of the news, coming as it did on the trail of Kitchener's triumphs, produced a shock, which, as an eminent observer later expressed it, "*avait coupé comme d'un coup de cravache la joie d'Angleterre.*"[5] True, some Liberal papers, like the *Manchester Guardian*, the *Daily News* and the *Daily Chronicle*, saw no ground for hasty assumptions, and believed an opening might be found for peaceful adjustment. With unusual keenness the *Guardian* reflected somewhat later that the question of whether the French should keep Fashoda was by no means contingent upon their immediate withdrawal, which was cer-

[1] *Brit. Docs.*, no. 197.

[2] *Ibid.*, no. 203 (also in *Egypt, no. 8, 1898*, no. 1).

[3] *Livre jaune*, no. 25.

[4] For a study of British public opinion during the Fashoda crisis the files of the following papers were examined for the months of September, October, and November, 1898: (London dailies) the *Times, Standard, Morning Post, Daily Chronicle, Daily Telegraph, Daily News, Westminster Gazette, Daily Mail, Morning Leader, Evening News, Star,* and *Globe* (through October 10); (provincial papers) *Manchester Guardian, Yorkshire Post, Liverpool Post, Birmingham Daily Post,* and *Glasgow Herald;* (weeklies) *Spectator, Observer, Saturday Review,* and *Punch.*

[5] M. Blowitz in *Matin*, Oct. 22, 1898.

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tainly not worth a war.[1] But the Conservative press, while fairly moderate in tone, was inflexible on the question of maintaining Egypt's right against the trespasser; and the more radical sheets, such as the *Star*, the *Globe*,[2] the *Morning Leader* and the *Evening News* seemed for a moment to be trying to outdo one another in virulence. "There is no need to argue the point," declared the *Evening News*, "If a householder finds a man in his back garden, he does not go to arbitration about the matter or enter into elaborate arguments to show that he, the householder, is the owner of that garden. He simply orders the trespasser out, and, if he will not go out of his own accord, he has to go in another fashion."[3] The *Daily Mail* talked equally of ejecting the intruder, if he would not go willingly;[4] and the *Morning Post* warned its readers that, if there was no disavowal of Marchand's expedition, there would be "no other course open but an ultimatum, coupled with the mobilization of the military and naval forces of the Empire."[5] Even the stolid *Spectator* declared, "It is quite clear that Fashoda must be retained, even at the cost of war."[6]

The French press showed, on the whole, a more pacific spirit, though such obdurate support of the British claims stiffened its attitude for a time. But the general public on both sides of the Channel had little notion of the part which diplomacy might be playing until the first British blue-book appeared in print.[7] It was something of a relief, no doubt, to discover that France at least was anxious to avoid war, though the uncompromising attitude of the British government met with

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 24, 1898; *cf.* Westlake, in *Times*, Oct. 27. Courcel had suggested to Salisbury that the evacuation of Fashoda should be agreed upon as preliminary to a general adjustment of boundaries: *Livre jaune*, no. 25.

[2] An article in the *Globe* on October 10 even drew a complaint from Delcassé: *Brit. Docs.*, no. 209.

[3] *Evening News*, Sept. 13, 1898.

[4] *Daily Mail*, Sept. 13, 1898.

[5] *Morning Post*, Sept. 12, 1898.

[6] *Spectator*, Oct. 1, 1898.

[7] Published October 5. A second one was published October 25 after the appearance of the *Livre jaune* on October 23.

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general approval in England.[1] "We cannot conceal from ourselves," remarked the *Times*, "that Lord Salisbury and his colleagues have taken a position from which retreat is impospossible. One side or the other will have to give way. That side cannot, after the publication of these papers, be Great Britain."[2] The *Daily Chronicle* considered the situation "grave",[3] though the *Guardian* believed the crisis less acute than it had been.[4] Much, of course, might depend on the degree of support which Salisbury received from the country; for, if that support were meagre or half-hearted, the French cabinet would be able to temporize without incurring too great a risk. For this reason the speech of Lord Rosebery on October 12 was of much significance. No new argument was brought forward, but the leader of the Liberals placed himself unreservedly behind the premier in support of British claims.[5] Asquith spoke in similar vein on the 13th.[6] "The British nation is indeed united," wrote the *Morning Post*, "in a way that it perhaps never was before."[7] On October 20 a radical organization, the Yeovil Workingmen's Liberal Association, while condemning in general the foreign policy of the government, expressed approval of its present attitude.[8] No wonder the German ambassador came to the conclusion that, with the whole of public opinion arrayed on his side, Salisbury would certainly find it hard to retrace his steps.[9]

The unequivocal expression of British opinion (taking it by and large) had undoubtedly made an impression upon Delcassé, who now voiced his willingness to discuss the withdrawal

[1] Delcassé's unfortunate quibbling over the status of Marchand, whom he had described as "nothing but an emissary of civilization" (*Brit. Docs.*, no. 188), came in for a good deal of ridicule in British journals and speeches.

[2] *Times*, Oct. 10, 1898.

[3] *Morning Chronicle*, Oct. 11.

[4] *Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 11.

[5] *Times*, Oct. 13, 1898.

[6] *Ibid.*, Oct. 14, 1898.

[7] *Morning Post*, Oct. 13, 1898.

[8] *Times*, Oct. 21, 1898.

[9] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. XIV, no. 3890.

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of Marchand, provided Great Britain (as he intimated) would negotiate on the Bahr-el-Ghazal, in respect of which he laid great weight on the progress of the French occupation.[1] It is not improbable that Delcassé was also influenced by his communications with Russia, three of whose ministers arrived in Paris about the middle of October. Monson had been rather disturbed by this visit, and wondered if Russia would encourage France to take a defiant stand.[2] It was possibly the turning-point of the crisis. However hard France may have tried to beguile her ally (and that ally's value had long been rather dubious), the moment for a war crisis was certainly not well-timed for Russia, already immersed in her plan of a disarmament conference. At first, it is true, Count Muravieff, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, had apparently tendered Russia's approval of French policy, promising that she would "associate herself with any step that might become necessary in consequence."[3] But, on coming to Paris, where even military circles were a prey to political turmoil, Muravieff seems to have advised Delcassé to evacuate Fashoda and try to seek some settlement of the Anglo-French frontier.[4] Nevertheless, Monson was still ill at ease, and, as late as October 27, he telegraphed Salisbury that he could "state with positive assurance that France can count on more than moral support on the part of Russia in the event of a rupture with England."[5] Had Delcassé known of this telegram, he might have played his cards with a little more confidence.

But the British cabinet was not greatly troubled by the Russian bogy, for the longer the period of indecision, the smaller the chance of Russia's being able to use her fleets be-

[1] See Monson's letters of October 11, 16 and 21: *Brit. Docs.*, vol. I, nos. 209, 212 and 214. Delcassé asserted that ten posts had been established in the Bahr-el-Ghazal. *Cf.* Caix, *Fachoda*, pp. 222-23; Rouire, "Omdurman et Fachoda", *Revue géographique*, vol. XLIII, p. 408.

[2] *Brit. Docs.*, no. 214.

[3] *Ibid.*, no. 221.

[4] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. XIV, no. 3893; *Brit. Docs.*, vol. I, no. 215; *cf. Memoirs of Count Witte* (Eng. trans.), p. 178.

[5] *Brit. Docs.*, vol. I, no. 218.

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fore winter arrived to erect its barrier of ice. There was little doubt but that British opinion was now well instructed on the points at issue; for members of Parliament from both the great parties were eagerly imparting their convictions, and, while the provincial press seemed, on the whole, less excited than the London organs, the government could hardly complain that its case was not fully presented to the country. The Duke of Devonshire, the first member of the cabinet to give public expression of the government's attitude, paid his respects to the encouragement which it had received from the Opposition, and assured his audience that, while communications had been exchanged with the French government, there was nothing of the nature of a negotiation.[1] If one consults the files of the London journals, one finds—if we except the more conciliatory *Chronicle*—a fairly even tone of approbation. The only really discordant member of the press was the *Manchester Guardian*, which early sought to show that the government's Egyptian policy was nothing but hypocrisy,[2] and pleaded consistently for some recognition of French claims in the Bahr-el-Ghazal.[3] One or two lesser lights in the Liberal ranks ventured to find some flaws in official reasoning,[4] but it is probable that *Punch's* famous cartoon of the French organ-grinder[5] had far more influence than all the writings and speeches—and there were not many—that favored conciliation. Nor did the author of the famous "no-trespassing" declaration fail to make an impression when he declared on October 27, "Egypt is the Nile, and the Nile is Egypt." If the head-waters of that river were in the possession of an unfriendly Power, then, in the opinion

[1] *Times*, Oct. 19, 1898.

[2] "The immorality of the expedition consists of this, that we have used Egypt in this matter merely as a stalking-horse of our own ambitions in the Upper Nile." *Manchester Guardian*, Sept. 10, 1898.

[3] *Ibid.*, Oct. 12, 24, 25, etc.

[4] E. g., speeches of Sir James Courtney and James Bryce, reported in *Times* of October 19 and 21 respectively, and letter of Atherley Jones, *ibid.*, Nov. 2. Sir Robert Reid attacked the Conservatives for going about the country, making inflammatory speeches: *Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 25.

[5] "John Bull: 'Go away! Go away!' French organ-grinder: 'Eh? What will you give me, if I go?' John Bull: 'I'll give you something if you don't.'"

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of Sir Edward Grey, the water, needed in Egypt for irrigation purposes, might be diverted to similar uses in the Sudan.[1] This opinion might, of course, be countered by Courcel's suggestion that the Nile could be given an international status like the Niger,[2] but recourse to an international settlement would hardly find weight with a nation which had been quarreling with France at every point. "The British nation," said the *Morning Post*, "has set its heart on the Nile Valley from end to end. If the French nation seriously intends to interfere with the fulfilment of that British purpose, the queen's subjects will accept the sacrifices necessary to make it good. There is nowhere any inclination to compromise in this matter."[3] This placing the matter on the basis of patriotic longing was probably putting the emphasis where it belonged.

Meanwhile, the store of British patience was beginning perceptibly to ebb. On the 19th, the chancellor of the exchequer had gone beyond any statement hitherto uttered by a member of the cabinet, and declared that, while he hoped for an amicable solution, "this country has put its foot down. If, unhappily, another view should be taken elsewhere," he added, "we, the ministers of the queen, know what our duty demands."[4] Under-secretary Sanderson told the German ambassador that public opinion would not countenance any yielding;[5] and, looking at the situation from across the Channel, the veteran diplomat, Blowitz, remarked that he had never known in England an example of such intense national anger over an affair of foreign policy.[6] None of the papers wrote as if war were imminent, but the stock market was more affected than at any time during the crisis, and on October 25 consols fell to

[1] *Times*, Oct. 28. A British traveler, who had been with Gordon in 1878, declared such a suggestion preposterous, as the volume of water was too immense to make such diversion possible, as long as Great Britain continued to hold the point where the Nile left Lake Victoria: *Morning Post*, Sept. 14, 1898, p. 4.

[2] *Livre jaune*, no. 30.

[3] *Morning Post*, Oct. 25, 1898.

[4] *Times*, Oct. 20, 1898.

[5] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. XIV, no. 3895.

[6] *Matin*, Oct. 22, 1898.

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107.[1] As if war were really within perceptible range, the British dockyards bristled with activity, and the navy was put in readiness to act at the shortest notice. It is not improbable that the cabinet was counting on this turn of the screw, as it were, to bring France to terms, though a French response in kind was certainly not lessening the tension. But the best omen for peace at this moment was the domestic plight of the Brisson ministry. On the 24th, all Paris was talking of the demonstration which the anti-Dreyfusards were planning for the morrow; and on the same day the foreign editor of the *Temps* hazarded the statement that "it is the settled intention of the French government, with the perfect assent of the French people, to evacuate Fashoda."[2] The next day, the ministry crashed to its downfall.[3] Certainly, with so much confusion in Paris, there was no purpose in coming to an ultimatum as yet.

Already, before the ministerial crisis at Paris, Salisbury had issued a summons for a meeting of the cabinet for October 27.[4] Whether this step occasioned the French ambassador's hasty visit to Paris, we cannot say; nor have we knowledge of what passed between Courcel and Delcassé. On the 24th the ambassador was back in London,[5] and the next day he requested an interview with Salisbury, who declined to see him until after the meeting of the cabinet—much to the disappointment of the ambassador, who seemed to fear that an ultimatum was contemplated.[6] Of the decision of the cabinet we can only judge by the account which Salisbury wrote Monson of his conversation with Courcel on the afternoon of the same day. "I intimated to him," wrote Salisbury, "that, so long as M. Marchand floated the French flag at Fashoda, any discussion between the English and French governments upon frontier question [*sic*] in that

[1] *Times*, Oct. 26, 1898.

[2] M. Pressensé's letter was addressed to and published in the *Daily Chronicle*, Oct. 26.

[3] It was remarked that there was no mention of the crisis with England in the affray which led to the ministry's downfall: *Westminster Gazette*, Oct. 26.

[4] *Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 21, 1898.

[5] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. XIV, no. 3899.

[6] *Brit. Docs.*, vol. I, no. 216.

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region was impossible. . . . He [Courcel] thought it . . . not improbable that M. Marchand would receive orders to retire. . . . If M. Marchand [Salisbury continued to Monson] should receive the orders the French ambassador had indicated, the obstacle to a discussion of the frontier would be removed."[1] The decision of the cabinet was, therefore, no more than a confirmation of the stand which the government had taken all along, except that, for the first time, it showed a willingness to look forward to a settlement of the frontier. More significant is the assertion of Courcel that Marchand might be ordered to retire; and, in view of this admission, it is difficult at first to see what Delcassé had to gain by threatening to resign, if France were not assured an outlet on the Nile.[2] Perhaps it may be conjectured that he wanted to remind Monson of his earlier statement that a successor would in all likelihood prove less tractable;[3] whereas Courcel, who had had a possible emergency to face, may well have been instructed to avoid an ultimatum at all costs. In any event, public opinion had to wait a few days more in order to learn what was brewing, though the tension seemed rather lessened. "It is satisfactory to notice on all sides," wrote the *Daily Chronicle*, the day after the meeting of the cabinet, "that the outlook has become distinctly brighter in the last forty-eight hours."[4]

In Paris, of course, decision had to await the formation of the new cabinet, which task was finally completed on the 31st. Whether Delcassé would be retained as minister of foreign affairs was, for a time, a matter of doubt. He was reported to have said that he would not remain, if it meant evacuation of Fashoda.[5] Yet, a few days later, he accepted the same office in the Dupuy ministry, and seems to have been the actual one to advise the withdrawal of Marchand.[6] The resolution was

[1] *Brit. Docs.*, vol. I, no. 223.

[2] *Ibid.*, nos. 221 and 222.

[3] *Ibid.*, no. 209.

[4] *Morning Chronicle*, Oct. 28, 1898.

[5] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. XIV, no. 3901.

[6] *Ibid.*, no. 3902.

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adopted by a meeting of the French cabinet on November 3, and the British government was duly informed that Fashoda would be evacuated with the least possible delay.[1] On November 4 Salisbury announced in a speech at the Mansion House that the French had yielded.[2]

The news of victory on the immediate point of contention was accepted calmly by the British press, and some journals even felt that the rancor which France must harbor as a result, would make the victory itself of somewhat doubtful value.[3] Only the *Spectator* refused to see light ahead: "She is a Power with feminine impulses and a man's strength, and infinitely difficult to deal with. . . . We suppose we must fight in the end, but let her begin it."[4] No doubt, there were Gallophobes in England, who regretted the loss of an opportunity to humble the traditional enemy, but the correspondent of the *Matin* testified to the fact that "*la masse de l'opinion publique qui d'ailleurs n'a jamais cessé d'être calme, n'a temoigné contre la France aucun sentiment hostile ni aucune aigreur.*"[5] "We had recently to consider the question of a European war," declared the premier at a banquet on November 9, "not, I will say, from a very near distance, but, at all events, with great anxiety and consideration. The result has turned out happily. At one moment it seemed possible that it might be otherwise."[6] Possibly the most discontented with the outcome was the German Emperor, who had vainly tried to stir the Tsar into some action, and deplored France's surrender to "British greed".[7]

In France the decision to recall Marchand was viewed with mingled feelings. The veteran economist, Leroy-Beaulieu, affirmed that the upper Nile valley was too advanced a position

[1] *Brit. Docs.*, vol. I, no. 226.

[2] *Times*, Nov. 5, 1898.

[3] "Our drop of triumph," declared the *Glasgow Herald* (Nov. 7), "has lost us the good will and friendship of France"; *cf. Manchester Guardian*, Nov. 7.

[4] *Spectator*, Nov. 5, 1898.

[5] *Matin*, Nov. 9, 1898.

[6] *Times*, Nov. 10, 1898.

[7] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. XIV, no. 3913.

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to supply with provisions or to hold with safety;[1] and the semi-official *Matin* reminded its readers that national honor was never at stake in a colonial enterprise.[2] Yet, there is little doubt but that much soreness existed over so abrupt a *volte-face*, and most of the Paris journals made much of the continued naval preparations of the British and their probable intention of goading France into war.

It is somewhat difficult to understand why Great Britain continued to arm, as though war were still probable. It was officially denied that the naval reserves had been called out,[3] and the premier explained that preparations, once begun, could not be stopped in a moment.[4] Sir Thomas Barclay, who tells us that war had been much nearer than people realized, implies that British preparations slowed down when Marchand was recalled,[5] and such may well have been the case. But there was much speculation among the embassies; and the German ambassador, who steadily refused to note any change for the better, persisted in his belief that Great Britain was secretly plotting war.[6] Salisbury, when questioned on the matter, denied any significance in these proceedings, and said that they were determined by naval policy a whole year before the Fashoda crisis.[7] But it is very doubtful if this is more than a fraction of the truth; and it is not improbable that the British cabinet was trying in this indirect way to persuade France that the mere evacuation of Fashoda was not the only concession required, since the Bahr-el-Ghazal, which the *Times* declared was "as much Egyptian territory as the place from which the French are retiring",[8] was still the actual stake in the conflict. Certainly, there was not much subtlety in British diplomacy at

[1] *Journal des débats,* Nov. 7, 1898.

[2] *Matin,* Nov. 4, 1898.

[3] *Daily Chronicle,* Nov. 1, 1898.

[4] *Times,* Nov. 10, 1898.

[5] Barclay, *Thirty Years,* p. 145.

[6] *Die Grosse Politik,* vol. XIV, nos. 3909 and 3923.

[7] *Ibid.,* no. 3925.

[8] *Times,* Nov. 7, 1898.

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this juncture. The speech of Monson on December 6 to the British chamber of commerce in Paris[1] could hardly have been better calculated to wound French feelings. Even as late as the opening of the new year, reports of British military and naval preparations continued to harass the French public;[2] and, when we consider that a war with Great Britain would have been fought chiefly on the seas, it is not astonishing that France, in her isolation at that time, should have quailed at the possibility.

It now remained to be seen whether Great Britain would allow France any satisfaction to cover her retreat. "To refuse to yield a single mile of swamp is magnificent," wrote the *Daily Chronicle*, "but it is not business."[3] Yet few journals went so far as to urge a division of the spoil; and, while the chancellor of the exchequer announced publicly that Great Britain was ready to negotiate a convention of delimitation, the general tone of his and Chamberlain's speeches was none too friendly.[4] Furthermore, the publication of a British blue-book full of complaints of French agents in Madagascar did not fail to prove a new source of irritation,[5] and might well be considered symptomatic of the cabinet's mood. Happily, Delcassé was not to be deterred from an effort to come to terms. While he was still not averse to using diplomacy as a club—on December 8 he hinted to Monson that he had hopes of Germany's support in event of war[6]—he finally came to the point of a direct overture to Great Britain. On January 10,

[1] *Ibid.*, Dec. 7 (quoted in part in Stuart, *French Foreign Policy from Fashoda to Serajevo*, p. 28).

[2] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. XIV, no. 3927.

[3] *Daily Chronicle*, Oct. 28, 1898. The *Manchester Guardian* (Oct. 24) even favored granting territorial access to the Nile.

[4] *Times*, Nov. 24 and Dec. 9. Campbell-Bannerman, the new leader of the Liberals, accused Hicks-Beach of "swashbuckling". It is evident that the Liberals were beginning to tire of "jingoism".

[5] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. XIV, no. 3928.

[6] *Brit. Docs.*, vol. I, no. 28. Monson believed that France had been paying court to Germany (*cf. Die Grosse Politik*, vol. XIV, no. 3928) and that Germany was trying to "keep up the panic in France": *Brit. Docs.*, vol. I, no. 243.

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1899, Paul Cambon, lately appointed French ambassador to London, opened a discussion of pending questions with Salisbury—not, as he explained, in accordance with instructions, but with the assumption that the premier would be willing to discuss the matter. Salisbury noted that his manner was "exceedingly conciliatory", and that he seemed (when the Premier stood firm on the question of the Bahr-el-Ghazal) to "indicate that the French government had abandoned the idea that their flag should float in any part of the valley of the Nile."[1] Judging from the weeks that passed without appreciably nearing decision, it may be true that Salisbury told the German ambassador that the negotiation was not prospering;[2] but, by the middle of February, the premier was diligently pouring over a map of Africa with Cambon,[3] and a month later the French ambassador made (apparently) his last—but ineffectual—stand for a foothold in the Bahr-el-Ghazal.[4] A visit of the queen to Nice (even though the citizens were said to be cold in their greetings[5]) was perhaps a good omen, seeing that tourists had been wary of the Riviera during the winter;[6] and even the quarrel over Muscat[7] failed to check the progress of an understanding in London. At last, on March 21, a convention was concluded, which fixed the boundary between the French and British spheres in Central Africa, and awarded to Great Britain the whole of the Bahr-el-Ghazal. Having given up the "point of honor", it was not so difficult for France to yield most of the tangible advantages.

The convention of 1899 was, of course, not an adjustment of all the existing difficulties which contained the germs of war. There was no mention of Great Britain's position in Egypt, which might still remain a subject for bickering or bargain.

[1] *Brit. Docs.*, vol. I, no. 240.

[2] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. XIV, no. 3930.

[3] *Brit. Docs.*, vol. I, no. 244.

[4] *Ibid.*, no. 245.

[5] *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. XIV, no. 3940.

[6] *Ibid.*, no. 3926.

[7] See Lémonon, *L'Europe et la politique britannique*, pp. 138-39.

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"We must never despair," Marchand is quoted as saying. "Who can say that the Sphynx may not be about to smile?"[1] But, whatever the future might ordain, Delcassé was satisfied, as he told the Senate, that the Bahr-el-Ghazal was not worth a war;[2] and there was probably much more that he could have said, had he cared to reveal his fixed intentions. It is hardly to be denied that the French diplomat had fought rather obstinately to enforce his country's claims, but, having finally decided that the trumps were in British hands, he proposed to pin his faith on a new shuffle of the cards. The result was to be the Entente Cordiale.

Looking back upon the factors which produced the outcome of the Fashoda crisis, one may almost agree with Joseph Chamberlain that it was "as much due to the spectacle of a united nation . . . as it was to those military and naval armaments about which the foreign press talks so much and knows so little."[3] The obstinacy with which most public men and reputable journals upheld the cabinet not only strengthened Salisbury's resolution to insist upon Marchand's recall, but enabled Chamberlain and the so-called "War Party" to hold out against any concession whatever in the valley of the Nile. In the face of such determination, French opinion seemed vacillating and spiritless. "Neither the French government, nor the French people," remarked the *Manchester Guardian*, "is, it seems to us, so anxious for the possession of Fashoda as the English, and the stronger will is usually the one to prevail."[4] Nevertheless, if France had not been so engulfed in the Dreyfus affair—a distraction which had produced a cabinet upheaval

[1] Quoted in *Times*, Nov. 16, 1898, p. 5.

[2] Stuart, *op. cit.*, p. 31. According to the German ambassador at Paris, Delcassé told Muravieff that he was so little inclined to push an African policy that he not only let Fashoda go, but doubted if he would raise a finger if Great Britain declared a protectorate over Egypt: *Die Grosse Politik*, vol. XIV, no. 3924. There had been some belief in French circles that that had been the object of the British arming.

[3] *Times*, Nov. 16, 1898.

[4] *Manchester Guardian*, Oct. 12, 1898. "Fortunately for the French and for the world, the colonial party has by no means so strong a hold in France as in England": *ibid.*, Nov. 8.

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at a critical moment—one cannot but wonder if the result might not have been different. Judging from what we know of the Gallic temperament, there had been grounds for fearing war, notwithstanding the *bon mot* of a British speaker: "It is the first war scare in which nobody has been frightened." [1]

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[1] The speaker was Sir Nowell Salmon, quoted by Chamberlain in his speech, referred to above.

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COLONEL HOUSE'S STORY[1]

WHEN the first two volumes of the House Papers were published in 1926, they were criticized by some reviewers as unduly emphasizing the influence of Colonel House in the Wilson administration, at the expense of the President's own initiative and responsibility. The figure of the President, it was said, was rather nebulous as compared with the clearly etched features of the Colonel. Outlines of policy, drafts of papers, advice as to the proper time and subject of speeches, all seemed to come from the quiet mentor, while the President's part consisted largely in expressions of gratitude and acquiescence, more or less qualified. Moreover, the volumes failed to show to what extent the advice or criticism of hundreds of other associates of the President, official and unofficial, influenced his policy. These strictures would undoubtedly find much justification if Professor Seymour had put forth his volumes as a history of the Wilson administration. But he is explicit in his disclaimer of any such purpose. The volumes are only, as he modestly says, "the raw material for history", a contribution, like Tumulty's, Houston's, Lansing's or Daniels' (though the immense superiority and serviceableness of them to these and most other memoirs of the administration are evident to any student), to the definitive story of the administration. If Colonel House is the central figure of the volume, it is not because of any desire to make him overshadow the President, but quite naturally because the work is based on the House Papers. And if the figure of the President seems a bit distant and nebulous in the narrative, we must remember that, not having the permission to publish the letters from Wilson to House textually, Professor Seymour was reduced to the necessity of matching the *ipsissima verba* of Colonel House's messages to the President with only paraphrases and "the gist" of the President's replies to him.

In the first volume of his work Professor Seymour gives a list (pp. xiii-xviii) of about 2000 letters and telegrams from Wilson to

[1] *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House.* Arranged as a Narrative. By CHARLES SEYMOUR. Vols. III (*Into the World War*) and IV (*The Ending of the War*). Boston, Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1928.—xviii, 453; xii, 552 pp. $10.00.

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House, covering the period from October, 1911, to March, 1917, which he has "utilized" but not been allowed to reproduce. This material is equally, or even more, abundant for the period 1917-1919, covered in the last two volumes of the work, as the frequent paraphrases of the Wilson correspondence (cited in footnotes as simply "Wilson to House", with the date) show. Just how much the President suffers in respect to sharpness of outline by this procedure, for which, of course Professor Seymour and Colonel House are in no way to blame, we shall not know until Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, who is now at work on the "official" biography of Wilson, with authorization to print his correspondence, shall give us the full text of such letters, telegrams and cablegrams of the President as he sees fit. Probably it will not change the picture very much, for Mr. Wilson, while a consummate orator and essayist, was not an enthusiastic correspondent, like Theodore Roosevelt and Walter H. Page. His letters are rather brief and pragmatic. He liked to share his ideals and theories with a larger audience.

One could scarcely overpraise the skill with which Professor Seymour has woven a narrative which moves forward with coherence, logical sequence and undiminished interest, out of the vast mass of material deposited in the library of Yale University by Colonel House. The Diary alone, carefully composed with Miss Denton's invaluable assistance at the close of each day's exacting labors in correspondence and interviews, contains more than 2000 pages. The correspondence itself, says Professor Seymour, "would fill several volumes". To select and combine the pertinent passages from this wealth of documents and to supply the connective tissue of events to bind them into a unified historical narrative has been an exacting task, whose difficulty is not obscured, for historical students at least, by the art with which it has been accomplished.

The constant collaboration of Colonel House with Professor Seymour in the choice of material and the revision of the manuscript makes it fairly certain that we have as complete a story of the Colonel's activities as if he had written the volumes himself as memoirs. Still one has the feeling that not all has been told that might have been told. For example, one would not gather from Professor Seymour's account of the important controversy with Italy over Fiume in April, 1919 (vol. IV, chap. xii), that it had any effect upon the relations between Colonel House and the President. Yet there are some men who were intimately concerned in this con-

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troversy who maintain that it was the main cause of the altered relations between the President and his adviser, and newspaper correspondents in Paris spoke thereafter to one another of "the passing of the third floor front" (the Colonel's apartment in the Crillon). Professor Seymour was one of the experts who sent a letter to the President in April, 1919, supporting his refusal to give in to the Italian demand for the control of the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Mr. H. Wickham Steed gives the impression that Colonel House was in favor of compromising the matter (*Through Thirty Years*, vol. II, pp. 327 *et seq.*). Professor Seymour might have told us (the Colonel being willing) the whole amount of truth or falsehood in these representations. He might have told us, too, the whole story of the effect of Mr. Steed's article of February 13, 1919, in the Paris *Daily Mail*, which, according to Steed (vol. II, pp. 282-4), "worried" the Colonel and got him, as he himself put it, "in a very bad hole", because he thought that it would be impossible to persuade the President that he had not inspired the article, which seemed to contain a criticism of the President's "too unworldly" idea of the League of Nations. Seymour prints Steed's article (vol. IV, pp. 307-8) and concedes that it was directed (in part) "at Wilson's unwillingness to compromise"; but he makes no mention of its having caused any uneasiness in Colonel House or contributed in any way to disturb the cordial relations between him and the President.

On a subject of major importance for judging not only the policy but also the character of President Wilson, the *Intimate Papers* are very disappointing. That is the question of the President's knowledge, before he went to Paris in December, 1918, of the secret treaties for the division of the spoils of war, which the Allies had made with Italy, Rumania, Russia and Japan. When President Wilson returned from the Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles was in the hands of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, he invited the members of that committee to the White House for a conference (August 19, 1919). Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the chairman of the committee, published in Appendix IV (pp. 297-379) of his *The Senate and the League of Nations* (Scribner's, 1925) a full stenographic report of the conference. Senator Borah asked the President whether his knowledge of the secret treaties came after he reached Paris, and the President's reply was: "Yes, the whole series of understandings were disclosed to me

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for the first time then". A few minutes later Senator Hiram Johnson returned to the point, mentioning specifically the treaties with Italy and Rumania, and asking: "Then none of these did we (and when I say 'we' I mean you, Mr. President) have any knowledge of prior to the Conference at Paris." To which the President replied: "No, sir, I can confidently answer that 'No' in regard to myself".

Now the volumes before us make it abundantly evident (vol. III, pp. 51, 61, 282, 317, 322, 346; vol. IV, pp. 134, 135, 145, 153, 168, 175) that the President knew of these treaties before he went to Paris. Seymour says (vol. I, p. 443, n.): "On April 30, 1917, Mr. Balfour explained the details of the treaty [of London with Italy] to President Wilson". And Balfour himself not only stated in the House of Commons that he "had no secrets from Wilson", but wrote to Wilson in January, 1918, commenting on the Treaty of London, "which Wiseman said was disturbing Wilson"; and again in a letter to House of July 17, 1922 (vol. IV, p. 364) Balfour says: "He" —meaning Mr. R. S. Baker, whose *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* had just begun to appear in serial form in *The New York Times*—"was certainly wrong in his statement that Mr. Wilson was kept in ignorance by me of the secret treaties, an error which I feel the more acutely because it is a calumny which, if I remember rightly, I have already publicly contradicted." In view of these facts Professor Seymour says (vol. III, p. 61): "It is difficult to reconcile this statement [of President Wilson before the Senate Committee] with the available evidence."

If Professor Seymour had left the matter there, every historian would have agreed with him. But, unfortunately, he devotes a note two pages long to the effort to reconcile the unreconcilable. He suggests that the President may have confused the Treaty of London (which he knew of) with the agreement with Japan over Shantung (which he did not know of until he reached Paris). But Senator Johnson separated the two carefully in his question. Seymour also suggests that, "following the turmoil of the Conference", the treaties may have been "crowded out of his mind by the influx of an astounding amount of detail", and thus he may have failed to recollect the date of his knowledge of the treaties when "several years later" he was questioned about it. But August, 1919, is hardly "several years later" than April, 1917, when Balfour discussed the Treaty of London with the President. Finally,

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Seymour reminds us that the President's interview with the Senate Committee occurred "barely a month before his complete physical and nervous collapse." True, but during that month, in his speeches made on the visit to the Pacific coast, the President gave no indication of such mental weakness as would explain his forgetting his concern over the treaties before he left America for the Peace Conference.

Colonel House himself hardly improves the case for Wilson when he adds to Seymour's labored apologetic the sentence: "There was no man living at that time who had more varied information and misinformation brought to him than President Wilson. How could he on the spur of the moment know when he first heard of this or that?" But surely the Colonel would not include under "varied information and misinformation" the intimate conversation of April 30, 1917, at the White House between himself, Balfour and the President, in which "the ground covered was exactly the same as Balfour and I had covered in our conference Saturday"—i. e. the discussion of the secret treaties "over a large map of Europe and Asia Minor" (vol. III, pp. 43, 48). And finally, when the Colonel adds: "There are those who believe the President laid too little stress upon the treaties and that he should have had some understanding with the Allies regarding them before he committed the United States to war" (vol. III, p. 62), does he not surrender the whole case? For the President could hardly have had an understanding about a subject of which he had no knowledge. Decidedly, Professor Seymour would have done better leaving out all of his long apologetic note except the first sentence.

Perhaps the most valuable contribution that the *Intimate Papers* make to the history of the Peace Conference is the material adduced (vol. IV, pp. 363-376, and corroborated by the recent work of David Hunter Miller on *The Drafting of the Covenant*) to refute the widespread legend that as soon as President Wilson left Paris in the middle of February, 1919, for his short visit to the United States, the Conference set to work to "sidetrack" the League of Nations and conclude a hasty preliminary peace with Germany. Professor W. E. Dodd, in an article in *The New York Times* Magazine Section, on the decennial of the Armistice, says: "In Paris Colonel House was promising that the League might be sidetracked." Mr. R. S. Baker, in his *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (vol. II, p. 47), writes: "The Colonel would make peace

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quickly by giving the greedy ones all they want. He sides with those who desire a swift peace on any terms. The President struggles almost alone to secure some constructive result out of the general ruin." Professor Seymour shows that there was no such "plot to betray Wilson." Not only was Colonel House an enthusiastic advocate of the League through thick and thin, furnishing the President with the articles which formed the basis of his Washington draft in the summer of 1918, and urging the President in Paris to "put his back under the League and make it his main effort during the Conference"; but during Wilson's absence in America House kept in touch with him daily, reporting what the Council was doing on the subjects of reparations and boundaries. The President expressed his general approval of the activities reported, and, in fact, had invited the Council to proceed as it did by requesting that work on the economic and territorial articles of the treaty be not "held up" during his "unavoidable absence" in America. If Colonel House and his associates on the Council of Ten ceased to discuss the Covenant of the League of Nations when President Wilson left Paris, it was quite naturally because the Covenant had already been completed by the committee of nineteen (with the understanding that it was to be the first article of the treaty) and had been presented to the plenary session of the Conference by President Wilson on the eve of his departure for America. Mr. Balfour confirms this refutation of the legend of the "betrayal" of Wilson in an important Memorandum prepared from the papers of the British Foreign Office in 1922, which he gave Colonel House permission to publish in 1927 (vol. IV, pp. 364 *et seq.*).

The volumes give proof in many a passage from the Colonel's Diary that, in spite of the unparalleled devotion and confidence of what Sir Horace Plunkett called "the strangest and most fruitful personal alliance in human history", there were important points on which the President and his "second personality" (the phrase is Wilson's) differed. "To my mind, the President has never appreciated the importance of our foreign policy", wrote House in June, 1915. After the sinking of the *Lusitania*, House, in London, notes in his Diary: "I have concluded that war with Germany is inevitable and I have decided to go home . . . to help the President fight the war with spirit." He "strongly urged" the unwilling President to increase the army in the early months of the war, and wrote to Seymour in April, 1925: "The United States might have

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changed the course of history if we had armed to the teeth in the beginning of the war and waited for the proper opportunity to intervene" (vol. II, p. 83). He was in favor of dismissing Bernstorff when the *Arabic* was sunk in August, 1915, and again when the *Sussex* was torpedoed in March, 1916. He wanted the President to break off relations with Austria when the *Ancona* was torpedoed in the Mediterranean, in November, 1915. He disapproved of the President's appeal for the election of only Democrats to Congress in the autumn of 1918, and regretted that he had not advised Wilson against such a step before he himself sailed for Europe a few days prior to the appeal. He wanted the President to appoint some influential Republican as a member of the Peace Commission, and pleaded with the President to treat the Senate with conciliatory prudence. He even favored accepting the Lodge reservations to the Covenant for the sake of getting the Treaty of Versailles ratified. When there was some prospect in 1915 and 1916 that we might as a neutral nation participate in a peace conference, he was in favor of Wilson's going to Europe to preside over it; but he disapproved (though from his own position at Paris he could not with propriety advise against) Wilson's attending the Conference in 1919. "It may be," he wrote in his Diary the day after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, which he regarded as a very poor settlement, "that Wilson might have had the power and influence [to secure a better peace] if he had remained in Washington and kept clear of the Conference. When he stepped from his lofty pedestal and wrangled with the representatives of the other states upon equal terms, he became as common clay" (vol. IV, p. 488).

However, none of these differences, nor all of them together, would suffice to account for the final severance of the intimate friendship between the President and Colonel House. It is a question which everybody would like to have answered, perhaps no one more than Colonel House himself. When the two men parted at Paris at the end of June, 1919, their cordial relations seemed unimpaired. The Colonel sent word to Wilson from London of rumors of a breach between them, and the President cabled in reply (August 29): "Am deeply distressed by malicious story about break between us and thank you for the whole message about it. The best way to treat it is with silent contempt" (vol. IV, p. 515). Four days later the President left the capital for his western trip, and was brought back to Washington a broken man. As late as November, 1920, he wrote

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to House, but in a rather brief and formal manner, omitting the "affectionately yours" from the subscription. But the Colonel was not invited to the White House, and his two letters of advice to the President on the handling of the Treaty with the Senators went unanswered. The men never saw each other again after their goodby in Paris. Professor Seymour's request for an explanation of the mystery in the spring of 1928 brought from Colonel House a dignified and touching reply, in which he affirmed his unchanged and unchanging devotion to the memory of Woodrow Wilson and spoke of the sudden severance of their confidential relationship as a secret which lies forever buried in the President's grave. To indulge a speculative curiosity on the subject after this final word from Colonel House would seem to be trespassing on sacred ground.

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RECENT LITERATURE ON MODERN CONSTITUTIONS[1]

> Political science concerns itself with the life of men in relation to organized states. . . . We have not only to define aims. We have to discover both the institutions through which those aims are likely to be realized, and the methods by which they are to work. Do we need, for instance, a parliamentary system? Does the latter require, if it is to realize its best results, a highly trained and non-elective civil service behind it to supply the *expertise* in which the general competence of an elected person is almost certain to be deficient? We have, to generalize, two sets of problems before us, those, in the convenient German terminology of *Staatslehre*, and those of *Politik*. We cannot separate them with any precision, for the simple reason that any *Staatslehre*, however independent it may seem, is, in fact, a generalization from the environment and experience of those who make it . . .
>
> If this is the context and scope of politics, how is it to be most fruitfully studied in order that conclusions of value may be reached? I stand here to plead for the study of politics in the terms of history, to know how our traditions and institutions have been moulded, to grasp the policy of the forces by which their destiny has been shaped—that, I am anxious to persuade you, is above all the key to their understanding.

SEVERAL recent volumes attempt to study politics in this fashion. Their authors would not challenge the principles set forth in the eloquent and suggestive inaugural lecture which Mr. Laski delivered as Professor of Political Science in the University of London. *Politik* and *Staatslehre* are not formally

[1] *On the Study of Politics.* By Harold J. Laski. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1926. 27 pp.

Éléments de droit constitutionnel: français et comparé. By A. Esmein. 8th ed. revised by Henry Nézard. Paris, Recueil Sirey. Vol. I, *La Liberté moderne: Principes et institutions,* 1927, xliii, 648 pp.; Vol. II, *Le Droit constitutionnel de la République française,* 1928, xv, 725 pp.

The Mechanism of the Modern State, A Treatise on the Science and Art of Government. By Sir John A. R. Marriott. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1927. 2 vols. xxiv, 596; xii, 596 pp.

Second Chambers, An Inductive Study in Political Science. By Sir John A. R. Marriott. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1927. viii, 250 pp.

The New Democratic Constitutions of Europe. By Agnes Headlam-Morley. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1928. viii, 298 pp.

Les Constitutions de L'Europe Nouvelle. By B. Mirkine-Guetzevitch. Paris, Librairie Delagrave, 1928. 412 pp.

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separated. Institutions are considered in the terms of history. Attempts are made to get at the theories underlying particular constitutional arrangements and to discover how those arrangements actually work. The authors seek to "codify the results of experience in the history of states."

These recent volumes deal with governmental institutions horizontally rather than vertically. They are not, that is to say, confined to the institutions of a single state. This is as it should be, for the practical problems of organization and function which confront modern governments have many phases in common. The different states of the modern world have attempted to solve these problems in different ways. Political institutions may have identical parents, but some may now seem to be ugly ducklings; or quite different in origin, the institutions may at the present time show striking kinship. Problems cut across several governments. The powers of the titular executive in Germany, for example, can hardly be appreciated without a consideration of cognate problems in France and indeed in England, which, method of choice and permanence aside, furnished the model for the French presidency. It is much easier for a writer to concentrate on a single political system, but if he does the lessons taught are blunt and indecisive. Comparative treatment may occasionally be devious and dangerous, but it is much more alluring and useful. It is essential to the ascertainment of knowledge that will justify proposals of readjustments in governmental machines. It provides the only gauge by which smoothness of operation may be estimated.

The eighth edition of the monumental work of the late Professor Esmein is probably the most useful single treatise on modern governments. "Monumental" is not too strong a word to use. When Professor Esmein published his first edition thirty years ago, he broke new ground. Since that time successive editions (the last three by Professor Esmein's colleagues) have added a wealth of detail. The footnote references to monographs, periodical literature and public documents furnish a fairly complete bibliography of comparative government. The treatise, however, is far more than an encyclopædia. It rarely contents itself with mere description. Many pages are devoted to *Politik*.

M. Nézard has left Professor Esmein's text unchanged. The editor's qualifications and additions are put in brackets. Thus, for example, you have M. Esmein's discussion of the manner in which

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the irresponsible French president has been held responsible—the Macmahon, Grévy, and Casimir-Périer incidents—and M. Nézard's comments on Millerand's forced resignation. Similarly, Professor Esmein's arguments on matters concerning which he adopted rather original views—e. g., the inability of the French Senate to hold a ministry responsible—are left as they were originally written. This preservation of the first text leaves untouched some rather refined passages which have little interest for students other than the French constitutional lawyers who engage in endless debates on such points; but this is a small price to pay for the continued accessibility of Professor Esmein's luminous opinions. In short, the Esmein volumes are an extremely useful and entirely satisfactory treatment of governmental theory and of the manner in which different systems adhere to or depart from the theory.

Macaulay once suggested that he would sooner expect a great original work on political science from an apothecary in a country town than from a member of the House of Commons. Macaulay, to be sure, specified a statesman who "ever since he was one and twenty had been a distinguished debater in the House of Commons." That classification does not apply to Sir John Marriott, who has served in the House (with one interregnum) only since 1917. Nor would the general caveat be necessary, since Sir John Marriott has already published an impressively long list of books, and is a regular and prolific contributor to the more solid English reviews. To the task of this treatise he brings, therefore, exceptional qualifications: ample historical learning, academic experience as a Fellow, Lecturer and Tutor in modern historical subjects and political science at Worcester College, Oxford, and service in Parliament. As he says in his preface, the present work "is an attempt to epitomize the work of a life which has been consistently devoted to 'politics'. . . . This book represents a portion of my personal contribution, both to Science and to Service." The publisher goes further and declares that "Sir John Marriott is at once the most learned of politicians and the most politically minded, in the classical sense, of historians."

The two volumes on the mechanism of the modern state are not a great work. They will add little to the author's reputation. It is difficult to see that experience in the House of Commons has made his pages ripe with any particular insight. Indeed, one cannot escape the conviction that this "treatise" would have been better if Sir John Marriott had not contributed to "Service", for he might

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then have had more time to fill in gaps, eliminate inaccuracies, familiarize himself with constitutional developments during the last ten years in systems other than the English, and to excogitate opinions which as a politician he considered it wise to keep tentative.

Sir John Marriott says in his preface that he has drawn heavily on some of his previous books, and on contributions which he has made to the quarterly and monthly reviews. This would be evident without his explicit statement. The "facts" which some pages set forth disclose the dates of composition; the emphasis which other pages give to events or literature indicates their journalistic origin. Some sections are hardly relevant to modern constitutions. This historical matter is included because Sir John Marriott has evidently lectured upon such subjects at Oxford for many years. Some of this material had already appeared in the author's admirable book on English political institutions. There it was quite in point, but why should it be reprinted in a treatise on the modern state? The chapter on Swiss federalism relies largely upon Bonjour's *Real Democracy in Operation*—a book which had just been translated when Sir John Marriott wrote his article for the *Edinburgh Review* eight years ago. That article, with insufficient revision, is the basis of the chapter on the Swiss governmental system. Figures on the Swiss initiative and referendum have been brought up to 1925, but there is no detailed information later than 1920. This is unfortunate—doubly so, for Sir John Marriott is thereby led to state later in his volumes, that "Switzerland—one of the most conservative of democracies—has made no change since the War" in respect of the conduct of foreign affairs. By constitutional amendment adopted in 1921 Switzerland may have a referendum on certain treaties. One such referendum on the Franco-Swiss free zones dispute has had important international repercussions.

In a footnote the author records the fact that an amendment to the American Constitution permits women to vote, but apparently thinks that there are twenty amendments. His discussion of financial procedure in the United States takes no account of the changes under the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the concentration of responsibility in single committees of the House and the Senate. Little is said about post-war constitution-making in Europe. There is an ample discussion of the federal system of pre-war Germany, but little on the constitution of the German Reich. Scant mention is made of the constitutions of the German Länder,

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which from the standpoint of the mechanism of the modern state are of considerable importance. Had the post-war constitutions been analyzed, Sir John Marriott would have been unable to insist so readily on his antithesis between the parliamentary system of Great Britain and the Swiss and American systems. For the fact of the matter is that in the modern political institutions of Europe are the seeds, if not the full-blown plants, of new forms of cabinet government. Some of these systems dispense with the titular executive. Some confer on the titular executive larger authority than he has in England or in France. Some mix individual and collective ministerial responsibility. Some set up special devices to prevent cabinet responsibility from meaning that the executive must live from day to day under the shadow of instant and unexpected dismissal by the legislature.

Indeed, it is with reference to this matter of cabinet government that the author is probably weakest. He gives many pages to the development of cabinet government to its modern form, but is not very informing on the problems which now clamor for consideration. The complaint is frequently made that the House of Commons is completely under the dominance of the cabinet. Sir John Marriott pays some attention to this criticism. Various proposals of reform have been made. To these Sir John Marriott pays scant attention. Continental systems have a different problem. They have been seeking a workable device to protect a cabinet against legislative caprice. Constitutional provisions inviting a cabinet to stay in office unless a formal vote of lack of confidence is passed by a majority of the members of the legislature, may furnish means of permitting the legislature greater freedom than it now has under the British system, while at the same time safeguarding its power to dismiss a cabinet which has really lost its confidence. Such devices, whether they are in constitutions or are only advocated by publicists, do not receive consideration in Sir John's sections on the mechanism of cabinet systems.

The chapters on administration give many details of the history of the civil service, the numbers of personnel, and the salaries received, but fail to indicate the rôle of the civil service in the modern state. There is nothing on the problem of state organizations of public employees. There is a discussion of French administrative courts, with Professor Dicey's classic criticism serving as the text, but practically nothing on the modern development of French ad-

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ministrative law with its increasing allowance of recoveries for tortious acts by governmental agents. The American doctrine of judicial supremacy is referred to, but the influence of American courts on social policy is not considered. Nor does the discussion of the English judiciary—extremely learned in its historical details—remotely suggest that social policy in Great Britain is determined not only by an omnipotent legislature, but by courts that hand down decisions such as the Taff Vale, Osborne, and Poplar judgments. Proportional representation receives some consideration, but there is no discussion of professional representation as now embodied in the Reichswirtsschaftsrat, and to a lesser extent and for different purposes in the Conseil National Économique. There is nothing on England's recent Emergency Powers Act of 1920, nor, in connection with the discussion of party organization, is there any treatment of the "federal" organization of the Labor Party, its relations with the Trades Union Congress, and the special devices which seek to influence decisions by the front bench—a mechanism which the London *Times* once described as "governing the government."

Nothing is easier or more unfair than for a reviewer to complain because subjects in which he is interested fail to receive what he considers due attention. Perhaps some of the *lacunae* which I have noted fall in this category, but they and others are to be found in a work which pretends to be a well-rounded attempt to discuss the mechanism of the modern state. One explanation may be that the treatise has grown by the accretion of articles for the English reviews. This genetic process should have been counterbalanced by decretion and a good many pages devoted to Greek political philosophy and to the early history of the British constitution should have been left out.

Similar criticism will be made by the critical reader of Sir John Marriott's book on *Second Chambers*. This volume was originally published in 1910. It was to some extent a *livre de circonstance*, inspired by the pending proposals to lessen the powers of the House of Lords. Sir John Marriott says that he undertook the task of revision "with a light heart, imagining that a few notes with perhaps one additional chapter would suffice to bring the book up to date. I have been undeceived, and in the event found myself compelled in order that it might now be uniformly up to date (July, 1927) not only to undertake complete revision, but in parts to rewrite whole paragraphs and even chapters."

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It is not worth while to pause to discuss Sir John Marriott's optimism in believing that during seventeen years much bicameral water had not flowed under the political bridge. Such optimism was somewhat temerarious, for one of the most striking innovations of post-war constitutions was the distinctly subordinate place assigned to second chambers. But if the "light heart" with which the revision was begun became heavier, the rewriting pen remained "light." What should be said of an author who reprints in 1927 a chapter on the American Senate exactly as it was written (even including the errors) in 1910, with the addition of a single footnote calling attention to the fact than an amendment (not the 16th as the author says) changed the method of electing senators? What shall be said of an author who does not think that the struggle between the Senate and President Wilson was of sufficient importance to be mentioned, or who apparently does not know that the inquisitorial powers of the Senate and its refusal to put restrictions on debate distinguish it from other upper chambers? What comment should be made on an author who quotes a French writer quoted by Lecky thirty years ago as authority for the statement that money bills may be introduced indifferently in either house of many American state legislatures? That the statement is not incorrect makes such confidence no less amazing.

The chapter on the French Senate is reprinted with no more than a very few verbal changes. These changes are unfortunate, for they show a high percentage of inaccuracy. A sentence added to a paragraph on the responsibility of cabinets to the Senate says that "In 1904 the Senate compelled the resignation of the Léon Bourgeois ministry, and that of the Briand ministry in 1913." Bourgeois resigned in 1896, not in 1904, and Briand was not *compelled* to resign because of the failure of the Senate to adopt his electoral law. There is no mention of the Herriot resignation in 1925, nor of Poincaré's gesture in 1923. Similarly, Sir John Marriott rewrites a sentence dealing with constitutional changes but does not thereby achieve accuracy, for he fails to remember the *caisse d'amortissement* provided for by constitutional amendment in 1926. He apparently thinks that the last trial before the Senate of persons accused of attempts on the safety of the state took place in 1899, for his list does not include Caillaux and the others who were so judged in 1918.

The upper chambers in pre-war Germany, Austria and Hungary

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have been swept away. Those chapters could not be reprinted, and new information must be given. Sir John Marriott, nevertheless, falls into some snares in paraphrasing the language of the constitutions. It is hardly accurate to say that the Reichsrat "may with the consent of the president, demand a referendum". The analyses of the powers of the Prussian Staatsrat and the Austrian Bundesrat are confused. Indeed, the author misses the point with respect to these new second chambers. He does not see that the idea of the Parliament Act—i. e., a suspensive veto—has been taken over and that for the time provision of the Parliament Act these new constitutions substitute specially large majorities in the lower house in order to overcome objections expressed in the upper house. The second chambers, in a word, have become secondary, but they can nevertheless perform most of their theoretical functions—of revising, of warning, of delaying, and of causing reconsideration.

There is a satisfactory discussion of these new tendencies in Miss Headlam-Morley's comparative study of post-war European constitutions. Even though her volume gives special attention to Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Yugoslavia and the Balkan states, its author is confronted by a wealth of material extremely difficult to deal with in less than three hundred pages. Miss Headlam-Morley has not contented herself with a mere paraphrase of the new constitutions. She gives a good deal of information on the manner in which the constitutions were drafted and the alternative schemes which were discarded. She has many pages also which deal with the governmental systems actually at work. She covers practically all of the more important problems: the division of power between central and local governments, the electoral laws, the organization of political parties, direct legislation, the powers of upper chambers, the titular executive, the ordinance-making authority, the dissolution of the legislature, and the relations between the real executive, i. e., the cabinet, and the legislature.

In spite of the fact that many clauses must be cited from different constitutions, Miss Headlam-Morley occasionally finds space for a statement of her opinions on certain matters of governmental structure. She indicates, furthermore, the extent to which newer adjustments adhere to or depart from the British practice. Her subject, however, is one which should be treated on a larger canvas. The mass of detail is so great that the broader outlines of the picture are sometimes obscured.

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M. Mirkine-Guetzevitch has not made this mistake in his edition of the text of eighteen of the new European constitutions. His "Essai Synthétique" is devoted only to the most general tendencies. It is, however, a suggestive introduction to a study of the constitutional texts. These include the constitutions of Turkey, Greece and Rumania, which have rarely been included in any of the collections of texts. The constitutions of Prussia and Bavaria are given as samples of the governments set up by the German Länder. Lack of space compelled the omission of the others. This is a pity, since, as I have said, the German Länder have gone in for a wealth of governmental experiments. Some of the most interesting innovations are to be found in the smaller states. The Prussian Constitution is the only one that has been translated into English; but Prussia and Bavaria, while they hint at some of the things to be found in the other texts, fail to suggest the many adaptations of older forms which the "Founding Fathers" of the German Länder thought warranted by the problems which confronted them.

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SENIOR'S "SOCIAL ECONOMICS"[1]

IN the development of political economy in Britain, there was a space of fifty-four years between Ricardo's *Principles* and Jevons' *Theory*. During the middle half of the nineteenth century, according to our accredited historians, only one luminary of the first magnitude entered the galaxy of British economists. That bright light was John Stuart Mill. There were, of course, other distinguished economists and systematizers, among whom James Mill, McCulloch and Torrens are most conspicious. Yet they were less elevated, less brilliant, and less independent than the great luminaries; they were, indeed, satellites gravitating about the doctrinal figure of Ricardo. The position of J. S. Mill as the single fixed occupant of the space between Ricardo and Jevons, or between classical economics and modern economics, leaves many questions of relationship to be explained. For while Mill was near enough to Ricardo to receive and reflect the Ricardian luminosity, he was so far removed from Jevons that even light-miles will not suffice for a figurative measure of distance. Jevons himself was the first to realize this and to declare the need to rescue economic science from the confusion created by "that able but wrong-headed man, David Ricardo", and intensified by "his equally able and wrong-headed admirer, John Stuart Mill".[2]

Among Mill's contemporaries, the only economist who was a serious rival to his exclusiveness and supremacy was Nassau Senior. Yet Senior's early promise did not, apparently, bear fruit in great accomplishment. During his life he published only one slender volume on the theory of his science, the widely read *Political Economy* which appeared first in 1836 as an article in Coleridge's *Encyclopedia Metropolitana*.[3] This little book consists of a demon-

[1] *Senior's Industrial Efficiency and Social Economy,* edited by S. Leon Levy. New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1928. 2 vols. xxiii, 375; vi, 422 pp. $8.00.

[2] W. S. Jevons, *Theory of Political Economy,* p. li.

[3] Several fragmentary statements concerning economic theory were published by Senior in the form of articles, addresses, and pamphlets. There also were his *Three Lectures on the Transmission of the Precious Metals* (1828), *Two Lectures on Population* (1829), *Four Introductory Lectures on Political Economy* (1852). Yet his *Political Economy* was his only systematic treatise.

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stration of four axioms which Senior regarded as "the four elementary propositions of the science of political economy."[1] By a rigid adherence to these narrow postulates, he accounts for the production and distribution of wealth. As a rigorous schematization of economic theory, it has been regarded by critical readers as a work of exceptional merit. As a presentation of a comprehensive body of principles, it has been found wanting by most students.[2] Perhaps it should be regarded in the same way as other encyclopedia articles, i. e., as a skeleton. It unquestionably has the potentialities we associate with skeletons—and also the inadequacies.

Economists, basing their opinions of Senior as a theorist upon his *Political Economy*, have declared themselves impressed by his logical precision, by his critical penetration, and by the illuminating doctrines which are incipient in his work—and dismayed at his failure to carry his arguments through to the conclusions which are sought, *a priori*, by themselves. In the welter of critical estimates of Senior, two opinions appear to be traditional and widely shared. The first is that Senior was a Ricardian classicist. The second is that, with the publication of his *Political Economy*, his contributions to the science came to an abrupt and untimely end.

That Senior is a member of the Classical school and a Ricardian is stated repeatedly by Professor Gide.[3] Just what it is that makes him so is not clear. Dr. Ingram adds to the testimony when he includes Senior among the "number of minor writers" who came "after Malthus and Ricardo . . . who were mainly their expositors and commentators, and whom, accordingly, the Germans, with allusion to Greek mythical history, designate as the Epigoni."[4] This seems rather like labeling a man and then hanging him. The question of classicism and Ricardianism will receive further consideration at a later point in this article.

[1] These axioms are, briefly: (1) that every man desires to obtain wealth with a minimum of sacrifice; (2) that population is limited only by moral and physical evils or by standards of living; (3) that wealth increases cumulatively because of the productiveness of capital; (4) that, skill remaining constant, agriculture is susceptible to diminishing returns.

[2] A discussion of the content of this early work of Senior's is not consistent with the purpose of this article. A penetrating and judicious estimate of it is contained in H. J. Davenport's *Value and Distribution*, pp. 44-52.

[3] Gide and Rist, *History of Economic Doctrines*, pp. 350, 351.

[4] J. K. Ingram, *A History of Political Economy*, p. 138.

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The second traditional estimate of Senior, viz., that his contributions to the science ended with the publication of his *Political Economy*, is well stated by Professor Taussig: "Intellectual indolence prevented him (Senior) from pushing his work beyond the stage of criticism. He began his contributions to economic literature with a burst of promising activity; lecturing at Oxford on value, on wages, on population, on international trade." There followed his article in the *Encyclopedia Metropolitana*. "With this article—written presumably to order and with no great deliberation—his contributions to economic theory, unfortunately, came to an end".[1] With equal regret, though perhaps for a different reason, Count Cavour, in 1860, after eulogizing Senior, added: "But since he has taken to keeping a kind of journal, he has neglected more serious things".[2]

This reference by Count Cavour to the "kind of journal" kept by Senior bears directly upon the question of why the latter did not publish further works in economic theory. And here we must briefly consider Senior's activities from the beginning of his scholarly life until his death in 1864. In 1825, he received a five-year appointment as professor of political economy at Oxford. During his tenure there he wrote eight volumes of lectures, the manuscripts of which are in the possession of his family today. At the close of this academic connection he showed himself to be an intensely practical person by devoting himself to politics and the study of worldly affairs. In 1832 he was appointed to the Poor Law Inquiry Commission, whose famous report is very largely a testimonial to Senior's astuteness. At the same time, and for years after, he was a voluminous contributor to periodicals, especially to the *Edinburgh Review*. His friendship with the French statesman and philosopher, Alexis de Tocqueville, which commenced in 1833, gave rise to many letters and discussions between the two, and helped to foster the cosmopolitanism which characterized Senior's later years.[3] He began to travel widely and to keep elaborate journals of what he learned—particularly of his discussions of various topics with men

[1] F. W. Taussig, *Wages and Capital*, pp. 197, 198.

[2] Sir M. E. Grant Duff, *Out of the Past*, p. 55.

[3] Two volumes of correspondence and conversations between de Tocqueville and Senior were published posthumously under the editorship of Senior's daughter, Mrs. M. C. M. Simpson.

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and women of affairs.[1] Like Socrates, he found conversation a fruitful mode of learning. Thus, in his series of charming dialogues, entitled *Conversations with Distinguished Persons During the Second Empire*, we find Senior discussing monarchy with M. Thiers, the destiny of England with M. Circourt, Louis Napoleon with Mme. Cornu, the Spanish republican movement with M. Merimée, the Manchester school with King Leopold, strikes, wages, peasant proprietors, and education with Messrs. Beaumont and Guizot. But this carries us to 1861, shortly before Senior's last illness. We must turn back for a moment to 1847.

In that year Senior received a second five-year appointment to the professorship at Oxford. Convinced of the inadequacy of his earlier contribution to political economy, he determined to apply himself assiduously during his tenure at Oxford to the preparation of a major contribution to his science. With this in view, he wrote a new series of lectures, intending ultimately to publish them, with other manuscripts, as his treatise on political economy. He persisted in this purpose to the extent of preparing thirty-five lectures —in spite of the interruptions occasioned by his frequent visits with his journals to France (where the Revolution of 1848 and the subsequent *coup d'état* were especially interesting to him), to Italy, or elsewhere on the continent. By the termination of his professorship, he had become so involved in his conversations and journals that he did not complete the editing of his manuscripts before his death in 1864. The manuscripts passed finally into the hands of Senior's granddaughter, Mrs. St. Loe Strachey.

These manuscripts were recently found in England by an American student of economics, who borrowed them from their present owner, edited them, and secured their publication. And now we are permitted, for the first time, to study Senior's mature and comprehensive views. It should be remarked that Mr. Levy, in editing the work of Senior, has drawn the materials for this book, not only from the author's last series of lectures, but also from his earlier lectures, his addresses, pamphlets, reports, letters, articles and miscellaneous manuscripts. The later lectures do not constitute a complete statement of principles; they do not, for example, include a consideration of distributive processes *per se*. Apparently Senior regarded as adequate the pronouncements on distribution contained

[1] A large number of volumes of Senior's conversations and journals pertaining to Turkey and Greece, Ireland, France and Italy, Egypt and Malta, etc., were posthumously published under Mrs. Simpson's editorship.

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in his earlier lectures, and in his various other manuscripts. In justice to Mr. Levy, it should be said that his "pieced together" book is remarkable for its coherence, continuity, and the completeness with which it covers its subject. It also is apparent that Mr. Levy carried out very ably the partial plan of organization which was drawn up by Senior himself, but was never given effect by him. At any rate, we have in this book a work which may justly be called Senior's major contribution to economics. By comparison with it his *Political Economy* seems as narrow and inadequate as its critics claim it to be. What the effect of this book upon the theory of economics would have been, had it been published during the author's lifetime, we can only conjecture. That the lectures embodied in it had an influence upon their auditors in the halls at Oxford may be argued with some certainty.

To those who are acquainted with the flavor of Senior's writing, it is not necessary to dwell upon the literary qualities of this book. In the art of prose composition, Senior is at least comparable to J. S. Mill. But the profusion of detail in this work, the voluminous use of illustrative material, the wealth of historical and empirical data drawn from a wide range of sources, probably will cause surprise to a reader who knows Senior only through his earlier work in economic theory. The same instinct and *finesse* which made him a master at conversation and at journal-keeping embellish this book on economics. More than that, they create substance and reality as a basis for his theoretical structure.

Simply because the book is as old as it is, fairness and profit would not be served by criticizing it, as we should a book by one of our contemporaries, in terms of the present-day vogues in economics. Our purpose—which is to discover the true position of Senior in the development of economics in Britain—is served best by indicating broadly where our author stood in relation to the doctrines which characterized (or comprised) the authoritative British works in political economy at the middle of last century. While there are refinements and nuances which discriminate the writings of the several Ricardian classicists, their common orthodoxy consisted in their close convergence on: (1) the cost-of-production theory of value; (2) the Ricardian rent theory; (3) the Malthusian doctrine of population; (4) the wages-fund theory. Senior's differences from the prevailing thought regarding these matters are briefly indicated below.

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1. The Cost Theory of Value

Senior objects vigorously to Ricardo's treatment of value and cost as if they were synonymous. He himself concedes their inevitable correspondence only in the logical sense that such correspondence will flow from the hypothesis of a static condition of society and industry.[1] But such logic is specious when associated with reality. Exchange value is created by two conditions or forces: utility and scarcity. And by repeated demonstrations of how scarcity conditions utility, Senior presents an incipient marginal utility theory. This, however, is only a secondary phase of his analysis and is in no sense a formula for explaining value. The condition of scarcity is attached not only to the valuable products of industry, but also to the valuable agents of production. These scarce agents are land, labor, and capital. The scarcity of land, both in gross quantity and in special qualities, is a condition fixed by Nature—although further exploitation of new land and other resources may add somewhat to its supply. Labor is scarce, both immediately and as a long-time tendency, because of the limits to population, and because some people find some work unsuited to them or disagreeable. All other valuable things, including capital, are derived from labor and land. These things are scarce because of their cost of production. But Senior's costs cannot be equated with price; for he consistently means by costs of production, the labor and abstinence necessary to the making of a commodity. By taking account of alternative applications of labor and abstinence, Senior gives tacit expression to the modern doctrine of opportunity costs. In so far as equal competition obtains in the producing of different commodities, these commodities tend to exchange for each other in the same ratio as that of their costs (labor and abstinence). The author demonstrates this "normal value" as a tendency toward the lowest costs in the case of manufactured goods and toward the highest in the case of raw materials. As regards commodities produced under the various conditions of monopoly, the applications of labor and abstinence are regulated by the requirement of the highest net gains to the producer.[2] These explanations of value are consistently followed by Senior in his treatment of distribution.

[1] See *Senior's Industrial Efficiency and Social Economy*, vol. II, pp. 79-90.

[2] Senior's theory of value is summarized in vol. II, pp. 3-35.

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2. *The Ricardian Theory of Rent*

Rent, as all students of economics know, furnishes the organizing principle in the Ricardian system. And the members of Ricardo's school, by adopting his theory of rent, commit themselves irrevocably to the whole of his analysis. From the hypothetical foundation of Ricardo's rent theory, his entire structure rises as a set of theorems. Population increases; poorer lands are resorted to; agricultural labor becomes proportionally less productive. Landlords collect as rent the difference between what actually is produced and what would be produced if all land in cultivation were no better than the poorest; hence the shares of the produce taken by the landlord and by the laborer must constantly increase and that taken by the capitalist diminish. But all this is hypothetical. The inference is logical and hence would be true if the assumed premises were true. Senior argues that they are false. "It is not true that rent arises in consequence of a difference between the fertility of the different qualities of land in cultivation—it might exist if the whole territory of a country were of uniform quality. . . . It is not true that the share of the produce taken by the capitalist is least in the richest countries."[1] With this emphatic denial of the Ricardian premises and their attendant theorems, Senior clears the ground for his own system.

To the general problem of rent, Senior applies his analysis of monopoly value, and arrives at an extremely general conclusion:

> The greater part of what we call rent [of land] is merely profit on the capital employed in fitting the land for use . . . The remainder is the gift of *monopoly* . . . and exists wherever an instrument of production, not universally accessible, is employed, and shows itself, indeed, in profits and in wages whenever the one or the other rises above the general average. To give to all such extra profits and extra wages the name of rent would, I think, be an inconvenient departure from ordinary language. Most persons would be puzzled if they were told that when Madame Goldsmid receives £200 for a night's performance, 10*s* of it are the wages of her labor, 30*s* more the profit on her acquired capital of knowledge and skill, and the remaining £198 is a rent derived from her extraordinary powers of which nature has given her a monopoly.[2]

Of land rent *per se*, Senior wrote:

[1] Vol. I, p. 18.

[2] Vol. I, p. 149.

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> The quality which enables land to afford rent, namely, the power of producing the subsistence of more persons than are required for its cultivation, is an advantage . . . As the population of any given district becomes more dense, the power of land to afford a surplus continually increases either because the increase of agricultural skill and capital increases its positive fertility, or because a diminution of its relative fertility—a diminution of its produce relatively to the number of its cultivators—forces the poorer classes to be satisfied with a less amount of raw produce, or from both those causes combined. Of these two causes of rent, one is a benefit, the other an evil. . . . To produce rent both the benefit and the evil must coexist. The one occasions rent to be demanded, but it is the other which enables it to be paid.[1]

3. The Law of Population

Senior's views on the subject of population probably are better known to economists than any other of his detailed doctrines. In his *Two Lectures on Population*, carrying as an appendix the illuminating correspondence between himself and Malthus, one finds a clear statement of principle. Senior expresses great respect for the Malthusian argument as an hypothetical structure, but questions its basis in fact. It is well known that Malthus acknowledged the accuracy of Senior's interpretation of his own theory. In this admission is a more than tacit charge that he, Malthus, had not been clearly understood by other economists and commentators.

The discussion of interpretation is epitomized in the last of Senior's letters to Malthus.

> Your work [he wrote] effected a complete revulsion in public opinion. You proved that additional numbers, instead of wealth, may bring poverty. That in civilized countries the evil to be feared is not the diminution but the undue increase of inhabitants. That population, instead of being a torpid agent, requiring to be goaded by artificial stimulants, is a power almost always stronger than could be desired, and producing, unless restrained by constant prudence and self-denial, the worst forms of misery and vice. These views are as just as they are important. But they have been caricatured by most of your followers. Because additional numbers *may* bring poverty, it has been supposed that they necessarily *will* do so.[2]

Whether this potentiality would emerge into actuality depended, in Senior's mind, on the facts. Hence he entered upon a searching survey of the conditions bearing on the problem. His last series of

[1] Vol. II, pp. 263, 264.

[2] Vol. I, p. 365.

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lectures contains a more elaborate and complete statement of Senior's views than anything published during his lifetime.[1] With reference to the facts, he reclassified the checks to population growth as preventive (prudence, luxury, law and landlordism), destructive (the same as Malthus' positive checks: famine, war and disease), and remedial (emigration). Malthus had disregarded the influence of luxury, law, landlordism and emigration. Senior substitutes "prudence" for Malthus' "moral restraint" and regards it as no business of the economist "whether the prudence by which marriage has been retarded or prevented has or has not been accompanied by strict morality". Both "prudence" and "luxury" are involved in the determination of standards of living. Enhanced production due to social developments, Senior takes to be a fact. Another fact, and a check of the first importance to population, is rising standards of living. Thus he avoids the horns of the Malthusian dilemma and substitutes for the premise that population tends to increase faster than food the conclusion that, in the absence of disturbing influences, the means of subsistence tend to increase more rapidly than population.

4. The Wages Theory

Senior's opinion that wages, rent and profit were but vaguely distinguished from each other has been referred to at an earlier point in this article. To avoid ambiguity, he adopts and consistently adheres to the view that wages consist of income derived from labor —gains derived from monopoly advantage (rent) or from the ownership of property (profits) being excluded. Thus wages are receipts —not disbursements. Wages are not a price paid for labor—nor do high or low wages and high or low labor costs have any essential relationships. Wages are what laborers receive in goods and services in return for their labor. And the determinant of a laborer's condition and conduct is not the amount of his individual wages, but rather the amount of wages received by his family.

Senior attacked J. S. Mill's statement of the wages-fund theory on the ground that Mill failed adequately to account for the creation of the fund out of which wages are paid.[2] His own statement of this process is as follows:

[1] Vol. I, pp. 285-375.

[2] His critical and constructive views were succinctly set forth in a review of Mill's *Principles,* published anonymously in the *Edinburgh Review,* October 1848, which article is an integral part of the present book. See especially vol. II, pp. 227-280.

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> The extent of the fund for the maintenance of labor depends, in the first place, on the productiveness of labor in the direct or indirect production of the commodities used by the laborer; and, in the second place, on the proportion of the number of persons directly or indirectly employed in the production of things for the use of laborers to the whole number of laboring families. The productiveness given, it depends on the proportion. The proportion given, it depends on the productiveness.[1]

The market interrelations of wages and the prices of commodities also receive consideration.

> Wages [Senior wrote], depend on the supply, on the one hand, of labor, and, on the other hand of the commodities intended for the use of the laborer. If the supply of the commodities intended to be used by the laborer is diminished, (*i. e.*, if commodity prices are increased) he is forced to work more hours for the same wages; to send his children, and perhaps his wife, to the factory—in short, to increase the supply of labor. If the supply of those commodities be increased, (i. e., if commodity prices decline) he can support himself by less exertion; he can keep his wife, and perhaps his eldest girl at home—in short, he can diminish the supply of labor, and he does so.[2]

Senior's major doctrines have varied considerably in their consequences to the trend of economic science. His views regarding population had an almost immediate influence on the theory of that subject by receiving the endorsement of Malthus and the partisan support of McCulloch. His conceptions of value determination and of rent were seeds which flowered brilliantly in the writings of Jevons and his followers. His wage theory, on the whole, has been less effectual and fruitful than his other major views. Yet it seems patent in the present book that Senior might easily have cast aside the wages-fund concept, and thus have freed himself to construct a theory of wages based on productivity and psychological motives.

This brief analysis has indicated only the broader differences between Senior's views and the prevailing doctrines of his time. No attention has been paid to illuminating minutiae of his argument, or to the voluminous assortment of detailed facts which are mustered to the defense of his position. Nor have all of his major differences been exploited, as e. g., his deviation from the classical statement of the quantity theory of money. Yet perhaps enough has been said to demonstrate that Senior was not, from the standpoint of doctrine,

[1] Vol. II, pp. 253-254.

[2] Vol. II, pp. 256, 257.

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a Ricardian classicist. It is to be hoped also that enough has been said to make it clear that Senior constructed a consistent system, the logical foundations of which do not vary greatly from those which underlie "modern" systems of economic theory. In order to make plain his differences from his contemporaries we have given, perhaps, an undue weight to the contentious aspects of his work. To object to prevailing ideas is a part of the function of every original thinker. Aristotle did it; so did Jevons, Schmoller, Davenport and Veblen—to name only a few. And this comprehensive work of Senior's should be a sufficient refutation of Professor Taussig's charge, quoted above, that he did not "push his work beyond the stage of criticism".

Students of Senior's earlier work probably will say: "But most of the general distinctions of doctrine outlined here are contained in the *Political Economy*." That is true. Senior's matured major views varied only slightly from his earlier ones. Yet, whereas much of importance in the earlier work exists only by inference, or allusion, or as a derivative from something which seems inferior to itself, these matters are explicit in the later book and are associated with more precision as to perspective and mass.[1] The *Political Economy* compares to the present work much as an outline does to a complete essay, or as a narrow group of discrete but mutually consistent propositions does to a comprehensive treatise which has unity and coherence. Yet the difference in method between the earlier book and the later appears to be entirely one of degree.

Senior was one of the earliest economists to concern himself seriously with questions of methodology. In 1860, he read a presidential address before the Economics Section of the British Association for the Advancement of Science on the uses of statistics to economists. More important than this non-technical discourse was his declaration, in his *Four Introductory Lectures in Political Economy* (1852), that political economy is a positive, not a hypothetical science. The same argument is set forth in the present book, again in the form of a dispute with classical ideas.

> Neither the reasoning of Mr. [J. S.] Mill nor the example of Mr. Ricardo induce me to treat political economy as a hypothetical science. I do not think it necessary, and, if unnecessary, I do not think it desirable. It appears to me that if we substitute for Mr. Mill's hypothesis that wealth and costly enjoyment are the *only* objects of human desire, the statement that they are universal and constant objects of desire, that

[1] Some of the credit for this effect belongs to the editor, Mr. Levy.

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> they are desired by all men and at all times—we shall have laid an equally firm foundation for our subsequent reasonings, and have put a truth in the place of an arbitrary assumption. We shall not, it is true, from the fact that by acting in a particular manner a laborer may obviously obtain higher wages, a capitalist larger profits, or a landlord higher rent, be able to infer the further fact that they will *certainly* act in that manner, but we shall be able to infer that they will do so in the absence of *disturbing* causes. And if we are able, as will frequently be the case, to state the cases in which those causes may be expected to exist, and the force with which they are likely to operate, we shall have removed all objections to the positive as opposed to the hypothetical treatment of the science. . . . A writer who starts from arbitrarily assumed premises is in danger of forgetting from time to time their unsubstantial foundation, and of arguing as if they were true. This has been the source of much error in Ricardo.[1]

The earlier statement of this view gave students of economics some difficulty in reconciling it with the *Political Economy*. Senior appeared to be straining at a gnat. The four axioms which form the basis of that book differ from hypotheses only on the hypothesis that they are self-evident truths. The present work is more nearly consistent. Here we have no elementary axioms, no rigorous adduction of theorems, no intellectual gymnastics in pure economics. Senior worked deductively. In his singularly orderly mind, he classified and sub-classified his material until every significant consideration which could be reached by this approach had been brought into relief. The basis of classification in each instance inheres in his major thesis. Any system must be consistent with some organizing principle — whether it be called a working hypothesis or a fact. Senior's facts appear to come after, rather than before, his organizing principle, although if they were presented as data, instead of as illustrations, they would give the appearance of solid foundations for his doctrines. Thus Senior remained a deductivist and a representative, not of classicism, but of something broader—the most adequate scientific method of his time.

The present book throws new light on the drift of economic theory. J. S. Mill was, in some respects, the most highly refined product of the classical school. But, in the development of political economy in Britain, it is not he, but Senior, who spans the space between Ricardo and Jevons.

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[1] Vol. I, p. 17.

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A PAGE OF DIPLOMATIC HISTORY: RUSSIAN MILITARY LEADERS AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTANTINOPLE DURING THE WAR

NO record is probably more valuable and interesting to the student of history than a correspondence between men who were immediately connected with an important historical event and who discussed their problems freely in the assurance that their writings would never see the light of publicity. To this class undoubtedly belongs the recently published collection of letters [1] addressed to M. Sazonov, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, by Prince Kudashev, who was the representative of the ministry of foreign affairs at the army headquarters from August 1914 until March 1916. The collection also includes a number of letters from M. Bazili who succeeded Kudashev when the latter was appointed ambassador to China. Mr. Bazili is already familiar to students of Russian diplomatic history as the assistant to Baron Schilling, permanent undersecretary at the ministry of foreign affairs, a post he occupied at the outbreak of the war. Both Kudashev and Bazili were on friendly terms with Sazonov and their letters reflect the general atmosphere of headquarters with a wealth of detail which one would seek in vain in a purely official correspondence.

The collection is preceded by an interesting introduction by M. Pokrovsky, the well-known Soviet historian. It may be remembered that M. Pokrovsky, who is now a faithful supporter of the Communist rule, achieved distinction in the field of history long before the Bolsheviks came to power. He was trained under no less a teacher than the late Sir Paul Vinogradoff, and if some of the conclusions of his more recent writings should not be accepted without close examination, the excellence of his method is not to be doubted. The judgment which this not too friendly critic passes upon the documents in question contains a timely warning to those overenthusiastic historians who still look to the archives of Moscow for "revolutionary" evidence on the outbreak of the war:

[1] *Stavka i Ministerstvo Inostrannikh Del* (*Headquarters and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs*), in *Krasni Arkhiv* (*Red Archives*), vols. XXVI, XXVII and XXVIII, Moscow-Leningrad, 1928.

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> The letters of Kudashev to Sazonov . . . are among the most valuable sources for a diplomatic history of the war of 1914-1917. Publications dealing with war-time diplomacy are, so far, by no means as complete as those concerned with the pre-war period. In the latter case the chief task now consists in the systematization of the documents already published and in the elucidation of certain details important from the point of view of polemics, the old habit of distorting facts in this field necessitating a careful scrutiny of every bit of information. But it is idle to expect from new publications an addition to our knowledge of the fundamental facts which led to the outbreak of the war. Every unprejudiced person familiar with the documents already available has a clear idea as to by whom, when and how the war was started, and for what reason.

It would be hardly possible to attempt in a short article the review of all the topics discussed in letters covering almost two years and dealing with a wide range of subjects. The most important among them, from the point of view of diplomatic history, are the negotiations which preceded the decision of Italy and Rumania to side with the Allies, and the problem of Constantinople and the Dardanelles. The latter question is of particular interest and demands discussion at some length. Although the letters of Prince Kudashev relating to Constantinople and the Straits have already been published in the two-volume collection of documents, *Konstantinopol i Prolivi* (*Constantinople and the Straits*), issued by the Soviet government in 1925 and 1926 they have not yet attracted the attention they well deserve, owing probably to the difficulty of the language. In particular, the attitude of the military leaders of Russia towards the problem of Constantinople during the War has never been, to the best of our knowledge, adequately presented to the American public.

No attempt will be made here to present, however briefly, the policy of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs in the question of Constantinople and the Straits.[1] It may be useful, however, to remind the reader of the attitude taken at the much misrepresented conference of February 8/21, 1914, by the responsible military leaders of Russia towards the possibility of an expedition against Constantinople. Such a possibility, it will be remembered, could not arise, in the opinion of M. Sazonov, unless in case of a European war. This view was warmly supported by General Zhilinsky, chief of the

[1] The views of Sazonov are fully stated in his report to the emperor, dated November 23, 1913, which is quoted at length in Professor Fay's *The Origins of the World War*, vol. I, pp. 524 *et seq.*

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general staff, who maintained that in case of a European war Russia would need all her troops on her western front. Quartermaster General Danilov fully concurred in this opinion. As Professor Adamov rightly remarks,[1] the conference was moving in a vicious circle: the problem of the Straits would not occur except in case of a European war, but if a European war should break out all Russian troops would be needed on the Austro-German front and none would be available for Constantinople! The real character of the debate is best illustrated, perhaps, by the fact that General Zhilinsky, abandoning his original point of view, declared rather unexpectedly that a war for the seizure of the Straits might well precede a European war and that this, in his opinion, was even likely to happen. Sazonov had to intervene and to explain to the chief of the general staff the incompatibility of his assumption with the existing political situation, which is the official way of telling an associate that his suggestion is utterly out of the question. Other plans advanced for providing the troops needed for an expedition against Constantinople proved equally impracticable.[2] Nevertheless the conference passed to the discussion of technical matters connected with the landing of an expeditionary force in Constantinople, such as the speeding of the mobilization, the improvement of the transport of troops, the increase of the Black Sea fleet, etc. The decisions reached on these points were submitted for approval to the emperor. It seems almost unbelievable that this inoffensive gathering of bureaucrats, rather pathetically conscious of its own helplessness, has been branded for years as the sinister conclave which deliberately set Europe on fire.

But let us return to our documents! Soon after the outbreak of the war, the whole question of an expedition against Constantinople was raised again in a letter of Sazonov, dated December 8/21, 1914, to General Yanushkevich, chief of staff of the Grand Duke Nicholas. Sazonov maintained that neither the victories over Germany and Austria, nor diplomatic negotiations alone would lead to the solution of the "Eastern problem" in accordance with the desires of Russia.

[1] *Konstantinopl i Prolivi,* vol. I, p. 78.

[2] For instance, M. de Giers, Russian ambassador in Constantinople, advanced the opinion that "anarchy in Constantinople" would follow the declaration of war and would paralyze the Turkish army, thus opening the road to the Turkish capital for the Russian troops stationed in the Caucasus. General Zhilinsky very properly described this suggestion as "impracticable".

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He believed that force should be used against Turkey, and asked General Yanushkevich to let him know what could be done in the matter. The general's answer was, that "the question of sending an expedition for the seizure of the Straits could not be considered until we have obtained a decisive victory on the western front." M. Bazili, who was at that time Prince Kudashev's assistant, properly describes this answer as a piece of "red tape." The general, in his opinion, simply did not understand the letter of Sazonov, who wanted to know whether Russia could carry out an independent operation against Constantinople or would have to rely upon the support of other nations. In the latter case Sazonov felt it his duty to open appropriate negotiations with the Allies. After a repeated request from Sazonov, Prince Kudashev had an audience with the Grand Duke Nicholas, and drew up at his dictation a memorandum, dated December 18, 1914, in which the commander-in-chief emphatically declared that "the seizure of the Straits by our troops alone was entirely out of the question." In the opinion of the grand duke, Russia should be satisfied with the promises already obtained from her Allies, that her interests would be taken into consideration when the problem of Constantinople and of the Straits came under discussion.

On January 8/21, 1915, Sazonov communicated to headquarters Lord Kitchener's plan to force the Dardanelles in the middle of February and his request for Russian coöperation. Sazonov expressed the view that if Russia were not in a position to take a fitting part in the undertaking it might be desirable to suggest that the expedition against the Dardanelles should be altogether postponed. The grand duke, however, did not share this view. While declining to take any direct and immediate part in the operations, for the Russian army and the Black Sea fleet were equally inadequate to the task, the grand duke declared himself in favor of the proposed expedition as highly important for the common cause of the Allies. Quartermaster General Danilov urged Prince Kudashev to ask Sazonov "not to damp the enthusiasm of the British" because even an unsuccessful attempt to force the Dardanelles, would be greatly to the advantage of Russia.

> All that I have heard from our military leaders brings me to the following conclusions [wrote Kudashev on January 12/25, 1915]—(1) the forcing of the Dardanelles is considered to be extremely difficult, almost impossible; (2) an attempt to force them is useful to us and,

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from the military point of view, even desirable; (3) even in case of failure we shall gain by it; (4) in case of success we have nothing to fear and our gains will be still greater; (5) at present we can take no part in the expedition—in May our Black Sea fleet, reinforced by new units, may assist our Allies; (6) we can send no troops to speak of to take part in the expedition until our complete and undoubted victory over Germany is assured.

In the same letter Kudashev reported General Danilov as saying to him that "the annexation of the Bosphorus should not be taken too lightly . . . it will require a separate war, and whether Russia will be able and willing to wage that war, he very much doubted." This view, however, was not shared by the emperor, who was visiting headquarters. On February 1/14, 1915, Kudashev informs Sazonov that General Yanushkevich has told him that the emperor has decided that the problem of the seizure of the Straits should be handled at headquarters, and that His Majesty does not admit of any other solution but the annexation of the littoral of both Straits.

In a very interesting letter of February 10/23, 1915, Kudashev, who just had a long conversation with General Danilov and Admiral Nenyukov, analyzes the whole situation resulting from Russia's inability to send troops or a fleet to Constantinople. He believes that in case of the success of the Dardanelles expedition France and Great Britain will offer Russia an opportunity to carry out her intentions and take possession of the Straits. But Russia will not be able to do so, and the most natural course for the Allies under the circumstances will be conclusion of peace with Turkey. However harsh may be the conditions imposed upon her by the Allies, it is unthinkable that she may be induced, under the pressure of the fleet alone, to part with her capital.

And therefore [wrote Kudashev], the solution of the problem of the Straits "in accordance with our interests" as we, who treasure the historical inheritance of our past, understand them, will not take place. We must not only reckon with this harsh fact but, to the best of my belief, must accept it, and endeavor to prepare public opinion for it. Nothing is more dangerous than to refuse to see things as they are and to flatter oneself with dreams, however dear they may be to us. The annexation of Constantinople not only now, when so many external conditions are so unfavorable to us, but even for a long time to come, will remain a mere dream, because we are lacking in the moral and military power necessary to make it come true.

The very next day, however, a new development took place which

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altered, at least to a certain extent, the pessimistic outlook of Prince Kudashev: he informed Sazonov that General Danilov was reported to have decided that one army corps might be sent to Constantinople in case the forcing of the Dardanelles by the Allies should be successful. Kudashev realized that one army corps was not sufficient to take and to retain Constantinople, but he believed that the presence of Russian troops would considerably change the situation, and might result in the settlement of the problem of the Straits in accordance with the wishes of the Russian government.

> The fundamental problem of the Straits, however [wrote Kudashev], will not be affected by the sending of one army corps, nor will it change my conviction that neither morally nor physically are we ready for the annexation of the Straits. When I say "morally" or "spiritually" this is what I mean: to settle down in Constantinople, as crusaders proclaiming the triumph of the Orthodox Church, is out of the question because of our Pan-Slavic sympathies and affiliations, and our dislike of the Greeks; to add to that, the moral authority of our clergy is hardly very high in the opinion of the Greek clergy. To play the part so brilliantly performed by England in Egypt, we are utterly incapable. Then, what is going to happen if, by a decree of Providence, we obtain possession of Constantinople, the Straits, etc.? Among other things, we shall have against us all the local population made hostile by our backward administrative methods and especially by our treatment of the non-Russian subjects of the Empire; also Bulgaria and Greece, who have quite determined views about the Straits, and especially about Constantinople; and then Rumania, whom we are trying to win on our side and who will be hardly attracted by the rumors of our desire to settle down on the Bosphorus, which would mean for her the impossibility of obtaining an outlet from the Black Sea.

The question of the participation of the Russian troops in the Dardanelles expedition, strongly advocated by the ministry of foreign affairs, was soon raised again. It was suggested in the spring of 1915 that a Russian expeditionary force of some 4,500 men should be sent via Vladivostok to join the Allied expeditionary forces. Lord Kitchener, however, opposed this plan on the ground that it would give a great deal of trouble to the British while its practical effect would be negligible. Prince Kudashev communicated the apprehensions of Lord Kitchener to General Danilov.

> The latter [wrote Kudashev on June 9/22, 1915] took it very much to heart. He told me that as a Russian he cannot admit the idea that the occupation of Constantinople will be carried out without the parti-

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> cipation of Russian troops, that if the English complain that our expeditionary force will give them trouble, this does not matter in the least. They simply don't want us to take part in the operation, they don't want us to enter Constantinople together with them.

And when Kudashev attempted to calm Danilov by remarking that Sazonov, too, did not think it worth while to send troops, unless one could dispatch a substantial force, the general replied:

> Then let M. Sazonov make it clear. If he is willing to take upon himself to explain to Russia why Constantinople has been taken without the participation of our troops, then let him do it. But we [the military] don't want to suffer the reproach that we could not find 4,000 men for this operation. . . .
>
> And then [added Kudashev] he told me that he fails to understand my argument. . . . It seems to me that we are all inspired by the same feeling, by the same desire to see Constantinople taken by our troops, or largely by our troops. (This would also be acceptable to the English.) But as our wishes cannot be satisfied, we are looking for various substitutes: Danilov accepts the idea of our "symbolic" participation, in the shape of 4,500 men. . . . I would prefer our complete non-participation in the expedition, especially as it will be obtained at the price of unpleasant conversations and friction with the Allies.

At the end of August 1915 the Grand Duke Nicholas was sent to the Caucasus and the immediate leadership of the army was assumed by the emperor with General Alexeev as chief of staff. These changes, coupled with the failure of the Dardanelles expedition, gave a new orientation to the attitude of headquarters towards the problem of the Straits. In his letter of September 19/23, 1915, Kudashev reported his conversation with General Alexeev who declared that the liquidation of the Dardanelles expedition was a matter of the greatest importance because it would make possible a separate peace with Turkey, with the resulting transfer of the army of the Caucasus to the German front, which might prove a decisive factor. "This leads me to believe," remarked Kudashev, "that General Alexeev is rather sceptical as to the probability of our annexation of Constantinople."

The entrance of Bulgaria in the war on the side of the Central Powers removed the last doubts Kudashev could have as to attitude of the chief of staff towards the problem of Constantinople.

> The situation created by the decision of Bulgaria to join our enemies [wrote Kudashev on October 8/21, 1915], is considered by General

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> Alexeev so serious that he emphatically declared to me that we will not be able to get out of it unless we conclude peace with Turkey. To my remark that such a peace, even if it could be concluded (and this seems all but impossible for technical reasons) would mean the ruin of all our hopes for a settlement of the sore problem of Constantinople, General Alexeev replied: "What can be done? One has to accept the inevitable."

Ten days later, however, Kudashev reported to Sazonov that General Alexeev made no further mention of separate peace with Turkey, probably because he realized that it was impracticable. But he was mistaken. The success of the Russian army on the Turkestan front and the capture of Erzerum early in 1916 brought General Alexeev back to this subject. In a letter dated February 5/18, 1916, Kudashev reported that while not insisting on a separate peace with Turkey General Alexeev would like to submit to the minister of foreign affairs certain considerations bearing on the matter. The hope of Russia to obtain compensation on account of Turkey had been frustrated. The proposed annexation of the Straits was a tremendous obstacle on the road to peace. The most important task of the Allies at the present time was the defeat of Germany and it could not be achieved without heavy sacrifices. It was idle to speak of territorial expansion in any direction when a large portion of one's own territory was occupied by the enemy. An offer of peace to Turkey on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*, if successful, would be an important, perhaps a decisive, step towards the achievement of the main purpose of the Allies. "Of course, we would have to renounce some beautiful dreams." But they cannot be realized, anyhow, under the present conditions.

The interesting documents of which this review gives only a few excerpts, seem to show that the glamor of Constantinople did not blind all the statesmen of Russia. General Alexeev was certainly among those who had little faith in fulfillment of Russia's "historic mission" on the shores of the Bosphorus. And while the ministry of foreign affairs, backed by a strong body of public opinion, claimed Constantinople or at least the Straits, there were also thoughtful men like Prince Kudashev who doubted not only the feasibility, but even the desirability of this undertaking.

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REVIEWS

Europe. By COUNT HERMANN KEYSERLING. Translated by Maurice Samuel. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1928.—399 pp. $5.00.

Count Keyserling's latest installment of world—or worldly—philosophy is given the subtitle, "A Spiritual Guide to Europe". A more accurate title would be "Count Keyserling and His Europe". For this Europe is probably the Europe of no other observer. I know of only one other book which gives in the same degree the feeling that the author knows completely and finally whereof he speaks. That book is Max Beerbohm's *Seven Men.* Whatever is said about these seven men is absolutely true, for they had no existence outside the author's own imagination. Nor does the resemblance of the two books end there. Both create a feeling of reality by the same device. Both abound in what a character in *The Mikado* calls "corroborative detail added to give verisimilitude to an otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative". Hiding behind his seven fictitious characters Beerbohm pokes fun at the foibles of his fellow Englishmen. In a similar way Count Keyserling includes, with many absurd generalizations about European peoples, much that is probably apt and true about individual nationals of the countries concerned, creating an illusion of comprehensive intimacy out of the minutiae of character criticism.

The author's broad knowledge, wide contacts and acquaintances and rich experience add to these almost unlimited generalizations the atmosphere of omniscience. Occasionally this is admitted. "Seen not only from the high point of vantage, but from the point of view of God Himself, mankind looks like what the *grand seigneur* judges it to be" (p. 198). Now the Count *is* the *grand seigneur.* As such he writes throughout this book. The title page of *Europe* bears the apostolic legend "For all have sinned and come short of the glory of God". The various chapters of the volume reveal this clearly, so far as people are concerned, but not as affecting the *grand seigneur.*

Herein lies the great value of the book: it gives an interpretation of Europe from the standpoint of the "intellectual" and of "the

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intellectual class". Many books are as frankly aristocratic in their attitudes; none, so far as I know, so frank and complete in their estimate of all others from this particular point of view. To the observer who may believe that very many of the fundamental ills of various European countries are due to the dominance of this same intellectual class or to the *grand seigneur*, surviving beyond his age, this intimate portrayal of the sins and defects of all is very enlightening; "all culture hitherto has been established by conqueror races" (p. 210).

The defects of democracy are not so much exposed, as the glories of aristocracy illumined. To the author Hungary and Spain represent the highest present-day product of European culture. In fact, the chapter labeled "Hungary" should have been the general introduction to the entire volume, for at least any one can understand it. Any one who has had personal acquaintance with the intellectuals or the aristocracy of these two countries may quite readily admit all the comments on their admirable qualities, without necessarily accepting theirs as the norms for all societies, as does the writer. But the critic who feels inclined to question the nature, extent and certainty of Count Keyserling's knowledge of the nations whose souls he so positively portrays will find his answer in the following sentence which occurs in this section: "If the heavyfooted, respectable middle class could only understand how lightly all really serious decisions come to truly superior persons!"

To the American who remembers any of the details of Count Keyserling's late visit to America, the reading of the book gives rise to speculations, probably irrelevant but none the less interesting, as to the kind of entertainment which was offered to the author in various countries of Europe on the occasion of the visits preliminary to the preparation of his book. One can imagine, for example, an official neglect in Switzerland, forcing the distinguished visitor to patronize the hotels, and the picture of Switzerland correspondingly characterizing the Swiss as a nation of innkeepers. Sweden, on the other hand, evidently made the Count very welcome and fed him instead of listening to him. The most human note in the book is the author's evident satisfaction over the treatment he received in that country. And who knows what responsibility for the Count's judgment that the English are of the unreflecting animal type must be borne by England's unimaginative cooks and undemonstrative hosts.

Of almost every trait which persons of the "heavy-footed, respectable middle class" find admirable in the national groups de-

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scribed, Count Keyserling is altogether scornful. For work he has the utmost contempt. Democracy he finds passé and spiritually without significance. Only to those nations and to those national characteristics which seem least worthy does he give grudging credit. He saves his praise for Spain and Hungary, whose rôle in European affairs seems to offer no possible rivalry to that of Germany. He seems to believe that the truest measure of worthiness of soul is to be found in the mortification of the flesh; and that praiseworthy spirituality can flourish only in the absence of any personal or national ability to play a creditable part in the world at large.

Americans will enjoy the book. It is human nature to take satisfaction from the discovery by someone else of defects of character whose existence we had not even imagined in persons for whom we have a measure of dislike because we have been patronized by them. To get the full enjoyment of this book, however, the American public should read it quickly. That Count Keyserling should restrain his pen from a devastating description of democratic America is inconceivable, and Americans should therefore get such pleasure as they may from the reading of *Europe* before the inevitable companion volume *America* comes from the press.

PAUL MONROE

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Oxford History of the United States. By S. E. MORISON. New York, Oxford University Press, 1927. Two volumes.—xv, 461; viii, 531 pp. $10.00.

This book was written for the English public; it is presented to that of America, because England gave "a quiet place in which to sit down in peace and write about America, and . . . a far-off place of calm from which to view America." Its scope, it is stated, was largely determined by the questions asked by English friends and Oxford undergraduates. It cannot be said that these conditions have produced striking novelties in contents or interpretation. Somewhat more attention is given to diplomacy than in most treatments of similar length, but the story is the classic tale of the formation of the constitution and the struggles of North and South. Some 461 pages bring general development from 1780 to 1835, an average of about nine pages per year; then 141 pages continue the story from 1835 to 1860, an average of about six; 182 pages are devoted to the four years of Civil War, an average of about forty-five; and 150 pages

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cover the period from 1865 to 1917, an average of about three; 29 pages of admirable bibliography complete the volumes.

The story is beautifully told, with much evidence of quiet reading, more in sources than in monographs. It is told with detachment, but not with sympathy. The West and the old Middle states are pale ghosts, the South recognized, but not understood. Of the Southern attitude toward the situation in 1850, Mr. Morison remarks: "More likely we need a psychotherapist to unravel the Southern complexes of that day" (vol. II, p. 98). Evidently he did not employ one, as, while he has learned much of Southern economics from Phillips and Dodd, he knows no more of its politics than did Mr. Rhodes; though perhaps the presence of a haze in place of the latter's clear-cut confidence indicates an advance. The difference between his attitude toward North and South is illustrated by the fact that while in many ways he disapproves of Garrison, the latter thrills him (vol. I, pp. 460-61), while Calhoun tires him (vol. I, p. 389).

To confine ourselves to the treatment of the Civil War, it may be said in the first place that this is the best account of a similar length. The discussion of Southern resources contains points not elsewhere in print. The narrative of military affairs is excellent and includes admirable sketches of Lee, McClellan and Grant. The author accepts Channing's theory of the failure of morale in the South: a theory which certainly cannot be held to err without authority, although the reviewer disagrees. With more confidence, the latter questions the ascription of first place among our military historians to Ropes (vol. II, p. 495). More important is the failure to recognize the strategic and historic importance of railroads.

Politics are dealt with more briefly and less satisfactorily. Lincoln is often quoted, but his principal problems are not presented, for instance that of deciding between war and peace, nor is his influence in 1864 appreciated. The legend that the Republican party receded from high ground in 1860 is restated almost in the words of Godkin. Lincoln's renomination in 1864 is said to have been by the Republican Convention (vol. II, p. 310), which statement is corrected in a footnote. The Democratic policy during the war is not understood, and the majority faction is referred to only in a footnote (vol. II, p. 313). The attitude of the Southern Unionists, such as Stephens, and that of the financial interests of New York, are equally misstated (vol. II, pp. 146, 165).

With the close of the war, comes the usual abrupt change to unqualified criticism of Congress. Few would now accept the state-

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ment that: "Southern society remained static, immune to modern movements of education and social regeneration", until 1900 (vol. II, p. 346). Some looseness is indicated by such statements as that Thaddeus Stevens was "ill-educated" (vol. II, p. 335), and no one who reads the Andrew Johnson MSS. will suppose that he "had all the private virtues" (p. 336).

CARL RUSSELL FISH

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Le Monde Économique, 1918-1927. By ACHILLE VIALLATE. Paris, Marcel Rivière, 1928.—258 pp. 30 francs.

There are two possible forms of approach to the subject of this volume—the descriptive and the analytical. Professor Viallate has limited himself largely to the former and has furnished an excellent, helpful survey of the nine years or more covered by his treatment. He divides the study into five chapters dealing with (1) destruction, disorganization and reconstruction, (2) financial reorganization, (3) industrial reorganization, (4) economic policies and (5) national necessities and ambitions.

Each chapter is a description of the field indicated by its title. Because of the chosen method of treatment there is little that is controversial, the only opportunities for dissent in the first three or four chapters arising perhaps from choice of topics and emphasis given to one as compared with another. To dwell on such points when the field covered is so wide would be inappropriate, for the survey is an admirable one and differences on such matters are relatively unimportant for treatment in a brief review. He closely pictures the destruction from the war, the early post-war disorganization and the later recovery in the different fields of economic activity. The heavy direct losses in the war, the over-expansion in many lines of production and the fact that the post-war difficulties are due largely to disorganization rather than to actual lack of productive capacity, are effectively presented. The same favorable comment may be made regarding his discussion of the economic policies of different countries. Under this heading he treats of (1) raw materials and energy, (2) population growth, (3) commercial policy, (4) the economic work of the League of Nations and (5) economic internationalism. American policies are on the whole understood and sympathetically presented. The point on which the reviewer strongly dissents from his treatment in this chapter, however,

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is his contention that the study of international industrial ententes dominated the labors of the World Economic Conference at Geneva in 1927 (p. 188). On this issue there was extended discussion apparently to give many delegates an opportunity for public debate but the report on this topic was comparatively unimportant and was rather colorless. Much more real effort went into the discussion of commercial policy, a stronger report was produced on it and in the long run more valuable results are apt to follow from it than from the report on ententes.

In the last chapter dealing with national necessities and ambitions there is, of course, much more opportunity for disagreement. A presentation side by side of the necessities and ambitions of England, Germany, the Succession States, France, Italy, the United States, Russia and the Far East is a much-needed and heroic attempt, but is bound to cause dissent. Even intelligent observers in any given country are often uncertain regarding the necessities and ambitions of their own country and are very apt to err in stating those of other countries. Perhaps the author's difficulties lie partly in his belief that, in the international field, politics and economics are in opposition, that in the past the former has been dominant though in the future their positions may be reversed (pp. 195-6). This view is a common one but gives too little emphasis to the inextricable interrelations of the two.

Rather than to stress in this review any strong disagreement with particular judgments of Professor Viallate it is better to emphasize the two outstanding difficulties inherent in any such study as the one he has attempted. One is the fact that the field to be covered is so enormous and the issues so intricate. General surveys are needed and it is to be hoped that more and more of them will be attempted, yet no student will be able to present all aspects of so huge a topic in a manner to which there will be complete agreement. In this instance the reviewer feels that inadequate attention has been given to the viewpoints of many countries. French and English material is the most thoroughly covered. The American bibliography contains many excellent works but likewise omits much of the best. German authorities are conspicuously absent, except as the authors of several of the documents presented to the World Economic Conference. Other countries could be mentioned to which it would seem the ideal amount of emphasis has not been given. Yet what one of us could have covered so vast a field?

A second difficulty is that detachment is not easy. This is partly

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an outgrowth of the first difficulty, the inability of any one student to cover so vast a field. But it is in part due to the controversial nature of many of the issues and the strong nationalistic viewpoints that many of us still retain. Professor Viallate here and there, though seldom, lets us see his own background. But again we may wonder whether any of us would do better.

More such studies are needed. This one gives the student a convenient summary with a moderate amount of interpretation, perhaps as much as can be effectively written at present. Later studies, many of which we may hope will come from the same author, will not only supplement this assembly of fact material but will go still farther in helping us understand the delicate and intricate issues involved.

ERNEST MINOR PATTERSON

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Locarno: The Reality. By ALFRED FABRE-LUCE. Translated from the French by Constance Vesey. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1928.—viii, 209 pp. $3.00.

The present little book carried a title in the original French which was slightly more accurate as a description of its contents than the title which has been given to it in the English translation. It was there called *Locarno Sans Rêves* (literally, "Locarno Without Illusions"). The treatment is so pungent and caustic that it seems a pity that the original title was not preserved. (The publisher's jacket of the American edition carries a still less vigorous title: "Locarno: A Dispassionate View").

The objects of the writer are two, namely, to provide an intelligent realistic commentary upon the true state of European or world politics—thereby providing a searching study of the problem of maintaining peace in the world by means of the League of Nations and the Locarno treaties—and to set out a practical program with that aim in view. To this end we are given six chapters of uneven length which carry such titles as "Has Nothing Changed?", "Geneva Insufficient", "Locarno—A Policy", and "Learn or Perish". In point of fact the text runs along from page to page and from chapter to chapter in a rather smooth and casual manner, and while here and there systematic passages and closely reasoned argument occur, the prevailing style is that of the staccato commentary. The reader is left with the impression that the realistic critique of existing peace

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programs more than counterbalances the aspiration and the proposed program at the end.

M. Fabre-Luce is disheartening to the peace people and the Leaguists. It is true that he repudiates Cambon's cynical denial that any change has come over the face of things since 1914; and he points out some six or seven changes which have actually occurred in recent years in the facts of international life to sustain his position. But he points so clearly and so surely to the fundamental weaknesses of the League and the Locarno pacts that the net result is not greatly in favor of peace in the world. By taking the Covenant at face value and attempting to discover the probable results of an attempt to operate the elaborate system of sanctions therein contained he—deliberately or not—accentuates the mechanically unworkable character of the League when considered as an effort to guarantee and preserve peace by coercion. He also shows the decisive reasons for this at least at the present time—the non-participation of the United States (not emphasized), the tepidity of Great Britain, the moral isolation of Russia, and continued Franco-German estrangement, not to mention any others. These things may all still be said when the Locarno system is brought into consideration. The result is to suggest that only far more fundamental changes than have come about as yet will serve to avert war. The assumption on the part of the governments of the Powers of an absolute and an almost unreasoning refusal to tolerate war—as an incident of international politics and therefore as an instrument of national policy—would alone bring this result, or, failing this, the sort of revolution against the professional statesman-diplomat group which threatened ten years ago. We may very well see the failure of the statesmen-diplomats to make the necessary great refusal; and we may, as M. Fabre-Luce intimates, very well see another carnage; in such case we shall almost certainly see another more general and more sweeping revolution.

But what is M. Fabre-Luce's program? He claims to offer a solution: "Our aim throughout this book has been to formulate a practical program". By it he should be judged.

To a certain extent it is merely the general idea of "an organized peace, founded on collaboration between the Great Powers, on defense of their common interest [in the maintenance of peace] and its progressive identification with the general interest". And in so far the suggested program lacks the originality of the analysis which preceded it, and its power to convince. For M. Fabre-Luce has already shown that collaboration between the Great Powers is

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exceedingly difficult, their common interests few, and their appreciation of their common interest in the preservation of peace slight, not to mention the impossibility of identifying their interests, apart from the maintenance of peace, with that or those of other nations. If this were all, M. Fabre-Luce's suggestion would be disappointing. Even when he adds a sharper proposal for Franco-German *rapprochement*, entente, or even alliance, one is hardly convinced. That is not a new idea, exactly. True, such union would, as the writer points out, provide a firmer basis for the League than trans-Atlantic philanthropy or trans-Channel partial solicitude. But the reviewer for one remains unconvinced that the critique of the general League-Locarno theory does not apply here as well. Granted that, other circumstances being as they are, such a development promises more than any other step in the direction of deliberate peace-making. But has not M. Fabre-Luce shown us not merely Locarno and the League *sans rêves* but also Europe and the international world in their hard facts, namely, in absence of any international political unity or any consciousness thereof? That being the case, is any degree of effective world government not impossible and the hope of peace not dependent upon voluntary renunciation plus voluntary conciliation? Or upon revolution against the diplomats who make war? The great value—and a very great value—of the present book is its searching analysis of the existing situation; as such it is, to the reviewer's knowledge, unrivaled.

PITMAN B. POTTER

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Bibliography: Practical, Enumerative, Historical. An Introductory Manual. By HENRY BARTLETT VAN HOESEN and FRANK KELLER WALTER. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928.—xvi, 519 pp. $7.50.

This is an encyclopaedic work designed for use as a text-book for college classes. Dr. Van Hoesen, the principal author, is Assistant Librarian at Princeton University. The collaborating author, Mr. Walter, is Librarian of the University of Minnesota. Both have been called upon to teach college and university students the elements of bibliography to the end that after graduating from instructor and textbook they may in any subject that interests them carry on independently "the further acquisition of knowledge, the news gathering of current discoveries, and the production of new researches".

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The volume had its origin in a course of lectures given each year by Dr. Van Hoesen at Princeton University, beginning in 1923, lectures designed to give students a command independent of instructor and text book of the sources for individual reading and study. Mr. Walter has drawn upon his experience in conducting a bibliographical seminar in the University of Minnesota and his earlier experience as a library-school instructor. Both authors found their teaching "handicapped by the lack of any text-book suitable for upper-class and graduate students which should at once indicate the scope, functions, and methods of bibliographical work of all kinds and topics, and describe or enumerate the fundamental works through which the student may most advantageously approach the selection of books, whether for study or for purchase, the survey of the literature of any given subject, country, or period, the study of books as books, and the production of new works of scholarship."

Following an introductory chapter the volume begins, as the student is supposed to begin, with a chapter on "Practical Bibliography", that is, the methods of work of a student and author — reading, research, compilation of notes and bibliography, the preparation of manuscript for the press, publication, etc. This is followed by "Enumerative Bibliography", a collective term used for lists of books of all sorts, with one chapter on "Subject Bibliography in General" and separate chapters for the subject bibliography of "Historical and Social Sciences", "Music, Art and Archaeology, Language and Literature", "Religion, Philosophy, Pure and Applied Sciences", "General Reference Books", "Special Bibliographies", "National Bibliographies", "Universal Bibliography, Bibliography of Bibliography. Journals and Series". Four historical chapters deal with the history of book production, the history of writing, the history of printing and binding, and illustrating and publishing. A chapter on library science aims to give the student enough information about libraries to enable him to use them efficiently.

The person whose needs the authors have tried especially to keep in mind and provide for is the student, say in the field of political science, who has begun to specialize and needs to know how to proceed in order to make a survey of the literature of his field. The directions given are necessarily of the most general character, since they must apply to all subjects alike. It is assumed that the specialist with an established reputation will know the literature of his own field better than the general bibliographer, but it is doubtful whether

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this assumption is fully warranted in the social sciences, a field in which the bibliography is so poorly organized that it is well nigh impossible for even the specialist to keep abreast of the outpouring of print which bears upon his own specialty. The difficulty lies, as the authors point out, in the fact that in the social sciences a large part of the literature is produced by writers who are not specialists. "Everybody has his theories and opinions on economic, social and political questions — and airs them."

This volume makes no attempt to provide an adequate bibliographical apparatus for any of the social sciences. Mention is made in the three pages of text devoted to political science of only a few of the outstanding bibliographies and works containing bibliographical information. A section of the appendix includes some additional titles and a few are to be found in other discussions of the social sciences, but less altogether than a student should become acquainted with in a good undergraduate course in the subject. The value of the volume to a student of political science does not lie in its ready-made lists of titles, but in the acquaintance it should give with the different types of bibliographies and sources of bibliographical information from which the student who knows how to use them can bring together the literature of any subject in which he may be interested. He should study especially the section listing and describing government publications in which much of his source material would lie buried except for the labors of the expert bibliographer.

Much of the matter included in the volume will have but slight interest for the student of the social sciences, or for that matter for the specialist in any other subject. The inclusion of certain chapters seems to be explained by the fact that the authors are librarians, one of them a palaeographer, and that the volume originated in an attempt to orient college students in the world of books. This accounts for the chapter on bookselling and publishing. The inclusion of chapters on the history of writing and book production is justified on the grounds that in every field there are "classics, historical monuments, which can be thoroughly understood only with the aid of a group of studies on the history of book production which we include under historical bibliography—history of writing, printing, binding, etc."

C. C. WILLIAMSON

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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Race and Civilization. By FRIEDRICH HERTZ. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1928.—xii, 328 pp. $7.50.

It was in the last decade of the last century that the writings of Count Arthur de Gobineau were revived by the great Wagner and his circle. Gobineau himself, with his deep brown eyes, was somewhat fickle in his allegiance to the different branches of the white stock of mankind, though he made numerous flattering references to the tall blond Teuton. Nevertheless, being a Frenchman, he made it quite plain that he did not consider the modern Germans to be Teutonic, but predominantly round-headed Alpines and mongrels. This last qualification was, however, passed over by the new Gobineau cult whose idealizations of the Teuton culminated in the remarkable effusions of Chamberlain, Woltmann and Schemann. They were not only convinced of the right of the Teutons, that is, Germans, to rule the world but had a religious conviction that a revival of Teutonic numbers and leadership was the only way to save civilization from an otherwise inevitable collapse. While the war gave at first an extraordinary impetus and then a check to this Nordic propaganda in Germany it has since been revived, but with fewer wild extravagances and obvious absurdities, in the writings of Eugen Fischer, Fritz Lenz and Hans Günther.

Hertz has written by all odds the most thorough criticism of the vast literature of so-called "racial science" that has come to my notice. While both the general tenor of his arguments and their main factual content have already been made familiar to students of such matters in this country, the wealth of his information and the acuteness of his observations make his work a worthwhile contribution. He is at his best in pointing out the absurdities of race hatred and the contradictory claims made by those who try to explain the historical movement in terms of racial traits. He meets Gobineau and Chamberlain on their own ground and leaves little doubt as to where the chief merit in argumentation lies.

Nevertheless, he has written a badly balanced book. At the very start the reader is impressed by his failure to define race. With a veritable virtuosity of slippery cleverness he glides over the concept of race. What he actually says is that there is no such thing as race (pp. 20-21), since "divisions are only artificial names." And yet he continues to talk freely of races and racial differences to the end. As one proceeds one begins to feel that the author has some deep-seated "complex" regarding racial differences, which leads him, even when admitting them, to take back in the next breath all their significance.

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His failure to give definiteness to what he means by race enables him to blithely cite his examples from the Germans, the French, the English, as though these were races.

The author's ability to slide around an important point is shown in his discussion of racial decay. Here he limits himself entirely to the question whether decay has been, in the light of historical evidences, a result of race mixture. He does not attempt to discuss this question in the light of biological evidences. Most important of all, though admitting that upper classes in all advanced cultures breed slowly, he does not face the question whether this might not lead to a decline in the national fertility in superior men. This is all the more striking because the author admits the importance of men of genius for the development of a high culture.

The author's overweening cleverness overreaches itself in his discussion of race crossing. The arguments of the racialists include the contention that the Nordic element was quite pure during the era of cultural ascent in Greece and Rome but became much mixed with alien elements just before and during the era of cultural decline. Hertz seems to think it important to refute both ends of this argument, so he tries to show that the Greeks and the Romans were much hybridized at the start but maintained a rigid caste purity during the decline. Needless to say, his argument becomes somewhat mixed. If the Greeks were impure at the start, and were afterwards rendered more impure by alien infiltrations (each of which the author finds was followed by an outburst of cultural advance), they did not shortly thereafter become pure. Moreover, one cannot identify aristocratic class and race when it suits his argument and deny the right of the racialists to do so when it suits theirs.

Finally, this overreaching of the author leads to the same kind of absurdity with respect to the influences of environment which he criticizes in the racialists. Thus, in support of the idea that the Negro is rapidly approaching the typical European in physical type, he says with reference to certain photographs of Negro journalists: "Many of them undoubtedly show the professional face of the journalist" (p. 268). This is as bad as Chamberlain's contention that children instinctively know a Jew from a non-Jew and have an innate repugnance for the former. Nor can one follow the author (p. 34) in his assumption that it is on account of some subtle influence of environment or mode of life that the Jews of China resemble the Chinese, those of Africa the Negroes, and those of Germany the Nordics.

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In a word, Hertz has written a most successful demolition of the historical myths cherished by the orthodox group of racial determinists, but he has betrayed a very considerable blind spot of his own. There is a very large body of data of a fairly accurate sort showing differences in the average mental level of races, his curious tables (pp. 251-2) showing the mental superiority of Negro boys and girls over whites to the contrary notwithstanding. These tables, by the way, are made up by Hertz from some data compiled by the industrious Arthur MacDonald about twenty-five years ago. Why this neglect of the vast literature of recent mental tests? The important question of racial temperament, though admittedly difficult of solution, cannot be brushed aside by a few cavalier statements. Nor does one refute what is sound in the eugenic doctrines either by ignoring them or by rejecting them because they seem contrary to certain aspects of democratic theory.

F. H. HANKINS

SMITH COLLEGE

Political Pluralism. By K. C. HSIAO. New York, Harcourt Brace and Company, 1927.—viii, 271 pp. $3.50.

Although this interesting and useful volume can hardly be said, as the cover claims, to survey "the whole field of modern political theory" since it is not concerned either with Fascism, Bolshevism, or with modern English and continental restatements of older theories, it does include rather more than one would expect to find under the title of pluralism. It is a difficult thing to frame a definition for pluralism that will at once cover the theories of Krabbe and Duguit, of Laski and the syndicalists, of G. D. H. Cole and of the Webbs. Yet, according to Mr. Hsiao, all these theories are equally pluralistic, since "Pluralism undertakes to transform the State" by discrediting it and comprises all those theories which attack juristic monism. This method of definition by negation leads him to classify even those jurists who would revive the *Rechtsstaat* idea as pluralists on pretty much the same terms with the most intransigent syndicalists.

Such a sweeping inclusion has the virtues of simplification in classification and of dealing broadly with a movement of somewhat amorphous proportions. It makes relatively easy, furthermore, Mr. Hsiao's task of showing that the pluralists are all mistaken in attacking juristic sovereignty, because the logic of the *Rechtsstaat*, too,

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demands this unification for the rule of law. On the other hand, he is precluded by his own juristic logic from doing complete justice to the political realities with which some of the theorists whom he terms pluralists are attempting to deal, although he is led later to recognize that pluralism is also a political theory concerned with the validity of political authority and the basis of representation.

It may be worth suggesting that the nexus between political forces and juristic systems is always the weak point of the latter. Analytical jurisprudence simply ignores the problem and contents itself with the tautological expansion of its premise that the state makes law. For political theory, however, it is precisely here that the difference arises between an adequate normative account of political behavior and mere formalism. Mr. Hsiao links up his theories with medieval and ancient thought, but he is, perhaps, hardly enough concerned with modern political facts. One may be permitted to suggest that Duguit can be properly evaluated only against the background of organic economic interdependence and the associational movement that exists within and across the limits of modern nationalism. This is the background of syndicalism, both revolutionary and Fascist. Mr. Hsiao appears to be familiar only with the growth of administrative syndicates. He includes the English literature but seems not to find it necessary to consider either the French and continental syndicalist movement or the ideology of M. Georges Sorel and his like. Yet surely this is the extremest form both of pluralist doctrine and practice, and a form which has the value of showing the purest type of pluralist ideas, just as Fascism shows the most extreme monist type. To classify Mr. Cole and the Webbs as pluralists and leave out the general bearing of the syndicalist labor movement appears to be somewhat arbitrary.

In accepting the theory of a general will, Mr. Hsiao leans heavily on Hegelian idealism. He finds an acceptance of a theory of the general will in all his pluralists, except Mr. Laski, although the essence of political pluralism is the rejection of a general will or anything that would serve the same purpose. But that is because the general will is (at least at this point) treated by Mr. Hsiao as the reconciliation of coercion and freedom through an *a priori* principle of legislation (the Kantian "right"). Even M. Duguit's "social solidarity" can be made to assume such a character. What help does this "general will" offer in determining the area and limits and intensity of solidarity of the *actual* political communities in which law is being made? The universal categorical imperative is

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important, but it wants to be given more concrete channels of operation before it is used to justify actual laws.

The political value of pluralism lies, Mr. Hsiao finds, in its attempt at a solution of the problem of the relation between economics and politics: The classic Aristotelian doctrine of political monism had been to treat economics as existing only for politics. Locke, on the other hand began the subordination of politics to economics (rights of property and control by propertied men) through the "insurance-company conception" of the state. In socialism and communism this subordination is completed by an economic monism. Pluralism, in doctrines like those of the Webbs and of the Guild Socialists, is a reconciliation of functional economic society with the political state. Doubts as to the possibility of this reconciliation without reëstablishing political monism (p. 125) lead him back to Hegel as the great reconciler who had found a theory of the state which included unity in diversity, both pluralistic and monistic. The pluralists have at least forced a reconsideration of the problem of representation in this direction.

It is possible, of course, to differ on many controversial points with Mr. Hsiao's interpretation of pluralism. The present reviewer would take a quite different view of the connections between pluralism and pragmatism, and a more restricted view of the scope of genuinely pluralist doctrines. Certainly, on any definition, the works of Mr. John Dewey and of Mr. Walter Lippmann deserve at least a mention.

But it would be quite unfair to Mr. Hsiao to overemphasize the limits of his bibliography, the lack of an index, and some unimportant errors in the notes, or to dwell on the modern political experiments in functional representation and advisory economic parliaments which might fittingly have found a place in his appendices instead of or supplementary to the single page devoted to older modes of "Class Representation in the European Constitutions." The fact remains that he has remarkably overcome the difficulties of language and has written a critique of political pluralism filled with insight and marked by a broad grasp of the philosophic and juristic problems involved. He has digested and amplified the previous criticisms of F. W. Coker, Miss E. D. Ellis, Norman Wilde, J. H. Sabine and others, and has added the unity of his own Hegelian perspective.

W. Y. Elliott

Harvard University

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The Rise of the German Republic. By H. G. DANIELS. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928.—vii, 292 pp. $4.00.

The increasing interest taken by the American public in the vicissitudes of republican Germany is amply shown by the publication in this year alone of at least five volumes on that subject. Among them this present work by Mr. Daniels, correspondent of the London *Times* in Berlin for the past eight years, takes rank as the most complete account of the German revolution and the establishment and evolution of the republic.

The author has based his study partly, of course, upon first-hand information and partly upon the numerous memoirs which have been published by active participants in the events recorded. As he remarks in the preface, he has used these biased accounts critically and has interpreted them in the light of his own knowledge. Not that he has been hostile to the Germans; rather, he has on the whole shown sympathy for them and understanding of their problems, an understanding which deepened as he progressed with his writing. Furthermore, his study is detailed and is singularly free from those valueless generalizations in which a journalist is usually prone to indulge.

Mr. Daniels focuses his discussion, even of international affairs, upon the internal political development of the republic. Where he handles economic matters, such as the inflation of currency and the reparations, he does so mainly from a political angle; social, intellectual, and religious changes he disregards almost entirely. Thus since some of the main forces in the growth of the new Germany manifested themselves in these fields, the author's picture of the history of the republic is colored too black.

The book begins with a discussion of the origins of the revolution, wherein the split in the Social Democratic Party over the question of the war played a prominent part, as it led to the repudiation of the government and the state by the Independent Socialists and the Spartacists. The author shows how the disintegration of the existing governmental forces, under the dominance of unpolitical military leaders, brought the state to a point of collapse. He thinks that the real revolution was achieved when the emperor granted parliamentary government, and that the later armed one was almost accidental. He is more concerned with recording the concatenation of events leading to the revolution than he is with explaining why those events occurred. Hence he gives disproportionate space to the deeds of the few Independent Socialists and Spartacists, and neglects the part

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played by the great mass of the moderate middle class whose demands for political reforms helped to make the revolution possible. In fact, throughout the book he emphasizes the colorful and dramatic extremists of both Left and Right more than he does the more important moderate elements which served as stabilizers during those critical times.

Mr. Daniels next describes the revolution in detail. He is interested in showing how an unpolitical, unrevolutionary people, desirous at most of parliamentary government under a limited monarchy, overthrew a crown and set up a republic which few of them wanted, at first not even the Social Democrats. It is again a question of whether in portraying at such length the attempt of the ill-led radicals to establish soviets late in 1918 and in 1919 the author is not guilty of having tried to magnify what most Germans aptly called a *Schweinerei* into something over-important for the sake of the story. Certainly, as Mr. Daniels makes evident, the vast mass of the nation was entirely opposed to internal turmoil, and the revolutionary changes, although directed by the Marxian Majority Socialists, were meager ones. A few half-hearted attempts at socialization were made; the bureaucracy was accepted; the old military elements were in some measure mollified; the political parties remained practically the same. Only the type of government was transformed.

In 1919 two highly important events conditioning the future of Germany occurred: the drafting of a constitution and the acceptance of the Treaty of Versailles. Mr. Daniels' discussion of the former is rather slight. He praises the work of the Weimar Assembly, but he finds the constitution less centralizing in effect than is usually thought. As to the peace treaty, in contrast to his countryman, Mr. Keynes, he cannot understand the bitter wrath of the German people over the terms, apparently arguing, in spite of Wilson's Fourteen Points, that "to the victor belongs the spoils". Then, after the republic, "the despairing gesture of a beaten people", was established and the treaty was forced down Germany's throat, resistance arose against both, which the author is inclined to call reaction. All parties, except the Independent Socialists, however, opposed the peace treaty, mainly, as the author points out toward the end of the book, because of the two-fold fact that German national honor was besmirched therein and that the Allies were trying to dictate impossible terms to a nation at a vehemently nationalistic time.

In his treatment of the domestic politics of the republic Mr. Daniels describes the jarring mixture of republicanism, monarchism,

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and communism, of radicalism and conservatism of all shades in the new Germany and the conflicts which ensued in the endeavor to strike the proper balance. The chief trouble lay, of course, in adjusting the old social, economic, and intellectual forces to the republican government and society, and Mr. Daniels explains in detail the history of that process. There were the various seditious movements—the Kapp rebellion, the Fascist movement, the plots in Bavaria, the organized assassinations—all intent upon overthrowing the government but otherwise of varied objective. The attempts soon collapsed; they were led by self-deluded incompetents; and in some cases the actions of the leaders smacked of the comic opera. These men wished to avoid civil war and to accomplish a change in government partly by force and partly by negotiation with the existing authorities. Then when the ventures failed, the government was willing to make concessions in order to obviate occasion for further trouble. Thus gradually the reconciliation took place. Early in 1925 the Nationalists entered the government, and General Hindenburg was elected president without any endangerment of the republic. In fact, it is a question whether the republic was in danger as often as the author believes.

The author regards the last part of 1923 as the crucial time for the republic, when rebellion in Bavaria, a separatist movement in the Rhineland, communist troubles in Saxony, inflation, and the failure of passive resistance to the Ruhr invasion all struck the republic at once. But again the government, strengthened by the acceptance and participation of Stresemann and his party, was able to adjust the internal difficulties and to begin the settlement of the questions of reparations and of security by making the London Agreement and approving the Dawes Plan. "The London Agreement was the first real Peace Treaty", writes Mr. Daniels. "It led to the first step toward consolidating a united Germany under the Republican system". And so the author views the prospects of Germany's domestic and international affairs with hope. Although he regards a Fascist march on Berlin as "remote but not impossible", he sees no great likelihood of a change in government in the near future. He states that the militant nationalistic spirit survives in Germany, and he believes that without the Peace of Versailles Europe would now be in the midst of another war. But so long as that treaty obtains and the French remain vigilant, he thinks that that spirit will be held in check. He admits, however, that the peace treaty will have to be revised.

The book has defects, perhaps the results of too hasty composition. One would like to know which workmen followed the Spart-

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acists and the Independent Socialists, and whether all the industrialists in the Ruhr and the Rhineland played with separatism (which is improbable in view of the actions of the prominent Ruhr industrialists in defying the French). The relation between the invasion of the Ruhr and the inflation needs clarifying. The author's animus against Dr. Helfferich seems too strong. His accusation of incompetence against the political leaders is not altogether fair since they were just learning the ways of popular government. War was not declared on the British Empire on August 3. Prince Max and not the militarists wanted hostilities continued in October and November, 1918, in order to enable Germany to negotiate peace on more equal terms. The part played by the political parties in overthrowing Bethmann-Hollweg needs more emphasis. But in spite of these defects, the book is graphic and interesting, and forms a valuable introduction to the study of the German republic.

EUGENE N. ANDERSON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Justice and Administrative Law: A Study of the British Constitution. By WILLIAM A. ROBSON. London, Macmillan and Company, 1928.—xviii, 346 pp. $5.00.

Dicey's classic theory that the English constitution is characterized by "the rule of law" appears to have gone the way of Montesquieu's still more famous doctrine of the separation of the powers of government. Neither, as formulated by its distinguished author, was ever fully warranted by facts, and both have given rise to serious misconception. One of the meanings that Dicey attached to "the rule of law" was that "no man is punishable or can be lawfully made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary Courts of the land". In the Introduction which he prepared for the last edition of his treatise on *The Law of the Constitution*, published in 1915, he admitted that recent legislation had conferred judicial, or "quasi-judicial", authority upon administrative officials, but insisted that "the rule of law", as he had defined it in the first edition, published thirty years before, was still a distinctive principle of English constitutional law. This opinion, it would seem, must be consigned to the realm of what Bagehot called the "literary theory" of the constitution.

The learned author of the volume in hand shows that a striking

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development in recent English constitutional law, though it has not received much attention, has been "the appearance of a whole series of official tribunals, more or less closely connected with the administrative departments of government, possessing power to decide questions of a kind which would 'normally' have come within the jurisdiction of the formal courts of law". Though a barrister, Mr. Robson has no prejudice against these official tribunals, nor does he view the justice which they administer, "administrative justice" he calls it, as "a temporary and accidental intrusion into the mellowed sanctity of the British Constitution". On the contrary, he looks upon it as a concomitant of the expanding sphere of governmental activity and as likely to assume increasing importance. The principal sources of administrative law are to be found in social legislation enacted by Parliament during the last fifty years or so—acts relating to public health, housing, health and unemployment insurance, education, old-age pensions, etc. The author's purpose is "to examine in detail the nature and scope of the judicial functions exercised by government departments and other public and private bodies; to analyse the causes which have led to such power being conferred on informal tribunals of this kind; and to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages which result therefrom".

After showing that the exercise of administrative and judicial powers by the same public officers is no novelty and comparing the characteristics of judicial and administrative functions, Mr. Robson gives an account of the more important administrative tribunals now existing in Great Britain. They vary greatly in structure, but they all "either form part of or are connected with the central government . . . or they are constituted through the action of a public administrative agency". If the essence of the judicial function is, as the author suggests, the power to determine a controversy and make a binding decision affecting the parties thereto, it seems impossible to deny that these tribunals exercise powers that are genuinely judicial.

In a concluding chapter, entitled "Trial by Whitehall", the author considers the advantages and the disadvantages of administrative justice. While he sees no reason to fear that administrative tribunals will be subject to political influence or interference, he finds a good deal in their procedure to criticize. He believes, however, that their defects can be remedied, and he makes a number of constructive proposals to this end.

R. L. SCHUYLER

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Capital and Finance in the Age of the Renaissance: A Study of the Fuggers and their Connections. By RICHARD EHRENBERG. Translated from the German by H. M. LUCAS. New York, Harcourt-Brace and Company, 1928.—390 pp. $4.50.

This is not a new book but a translation of Dr. Richard Ehrenberg's *Das Zeitalter der Fugger*, a solid work, full of information, originally published in Germany in 1896. Those sections of the original which dealt with "The Genoese (not "Geonese", as the Translator's Note quaintly spells it), Spaniards and Netherlands", with "The Importance of the Financiers of the Sixteenth Century", and with "The Time of the International Financial Crises", have been omitted in the translation. It is difficult to understand why, unless in order to reduce arbitrarily the length of the volume and cost of publication. Even in this mutilated form, the volume constitutes a welcome addition to works on economic history available in the English language. It is also difficult to understand why the title has been changed in the translation except for purposes of disguise, since the page-head employed throughout is "The Age of the Fugger," an exact translation of the original German title.

The execution of the translation appears to be faulty at certain points. At least some sentences do not make sense as they stand. Thus on page 33 we read: "The fact that all burghers were liable for the debts of their cities, while this was certainly not the case without more in regard to the subjects of princes was decisive for the chief basis of any credit, the ability to pay." And again on the same page, "This power, as we saw, had various degrees, but never went so far that the subjects were liable without more to meet the prince's debts." At page 51 Pope John XXIII is twice referred to as John XXII. Such petty imperfections are rather too characteristic of the volume.

The volume before us consists of a very interesting introductory chapter on "Money Capital and Public Credit towards the End of the Middle Ages"; three further chapters of the first book on the Fugger, other German financiers, and the Florentines and other Tuscan financiers; a second book on the international bourses of the sixteenth century, with chapters on Antwerp, Lyons and "Capital Transactions on the International Markets of the Sixteenth Century". The work ends with a brief conclusion covering from the age of the Fugger to the present.

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Despite the fact that the author repeats the trite generalization, "At the Renaissance European culture turned from unattainable ideals to Nature and reality" (see pages 22 and 58), he recognizes that "genuine mercantilism . . . was chiefly the result of the experience in economic matters collected throughout many centuries by the medieval cities," and that the sound finances of these medieval cities were vastly superior to the extortionate taxation and ruinous financial expedients of the princes of rising modern states. "Incurable financial disorganization, corruption of the whole of public life, dependence of the Government on the financiers, exhaustion of the people—these ills, which proved the ruin of many states, sprang immediately from the farming out and splitting up of the finances of the princes."

The fairly numerous footnotes, with their citations of many publications in foreign languages, are a valuable feature of the work. It further has an index of some ten pages in double columns.

LYNN THORNDIKE

Heading for the Abyss: Reminiscences. By PRINCE LICHNOWSKY. New York, Payson and Clarke, Ltd., 1928. — xxvi, 471 pp. $7.50.

Perhaps no incident of the Great War caused a greater sensation than the publication, in March 1918, of a little pamphlet entitled *My Mission to London* by Prince Lichnowsky, who had been German ambassador to the Court of St. James's from November 1912 to the outbreak of war. The Prince, who had been severely criticized in Germany for his failure to keep Great Britain neutral, wrote the pamphlet in 1916 primarily for the benefit of his family, but he showed it to some friends and, by a breach of confidence, it was published in Switzerland. Since he laid the responsibility for the war primarily on his own government for its reckless support of Austria-Hungary and its refusal to coöperate with Sir Edward Grey for the maintenance of peace, it was an invaluable instrument in the hands of Allied propaganda and was bitterly denounced by the author's countrymen as an act of treachery, for which, in consequence, he was expelled from the Prussian House of Lords. Even after the war Prince Lichnowsky was the object of scathing criticism in Germany. With the object of justifying himself, he published the present volume shortly before his death in February 1928.

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In addition to the famous pamphlet the book contains two documents of considerable importance—a memorandum on "England before the War" dictated on August 19, 1914, and an essay dealing with "Delusions" written in January 1915. In addition, there are some fugitive pieces on various topics, a few letters, and an introduction in which the prince explains his position and defends his views; finally, as proof, he prints a large number of the dispatches and telegrams sent by him from London. The translator appends a short note on the controversies which the book has aroused in Germany.

"I have never on any occasion", says Prince Lichnowsky, "maintained that our so-called statesmen in July 1914 wanted the world war, so far as they had any clear idea of what they actually did want. . . . In my Memorandum . . . I have reproached our 'statesmen' of that time not with their will for war but with their hasty decisions, their infatuation and their incompetence" (p. xxi). The reproach is abundantly justified. The prince, however goes even farther. He condemns the whole policy which rested on the Austrian alliance, on the ground that Austria-Hungary had become an anomaly and was doomed to perish, and regrets that the Emperor William I did not refuse to sanction the alliance, even at the cost of Bismarck's resignation; he would have preferred an agreement with Russia which would have spared Germany the necessity of fighting a war on two fronts. Holding such views, he was, from the moment he became ambassador in London, critical of Austrian policy and resentful of the support which it received from Berlin, with the result that he was disliked by the German foreign office and sometimes reprimanded. In Berlin he was regarded as gullible because he accepted the assurances of Sir Edward Grey that England had no commitments to France, and so great was the distrust of the ambassador that when the German secret service secured copies of the letters exchanged between Grey and Cambon in November 1912, these documents were not communicated to Prince Lichnowsky, a neglect of which he bitterly complains. Nevertheless, although he believed British policy to be pacific and desirous of an accommodation with Germany, Lichnowsky always asserted that if war came, Great Britain, even without commitments, would be forced to side with France; which was not believed in the highest German circles. Lichnowsky, for his part, came to regard the attitude of his superiors as dictated by jealousy, particularly on the part of Herr von Stumm, the political director of the foreign office, who had hoped to be made ambassador

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and who is accused (without proof, however) of trying to prevent the signature of the colonial agreement between Germany and England. Why, it may be asked, was he not replaced by a man enjoying the confidence of the German government? Presumably because he had achieved such success in England that to recall him would have been regarded as a slap at the British government. One may also wonder why, with his anti-Austrian views, he was ever appointed to London. The prince himself professes not to know (p. 1), apparently out of loyalty to William II, whom he never criticizes. But the facts are known. In 1912, about the time that the London embassy fell vacant through the death of Marschall, Lichnowsky wrote an article defending the German naval policy, and this commended him to both the emperor and Bethmann-Hollweg, who were later unwilling to admit that their nominee was not suitable.

There has been much controversy in Germany because Prince Lichnowsky revised both the document of August 1914 and the memorandum of 1916 before publishing them, as became known when Dr. Thimme, the editor of *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, published the original versions in the *Archiv für Politik und Geschichte* (Heft I of 1928), and pointed out that the Prince had also omitted many documents which might throw doubt on the consistency with which he had reported that England would in any case be drawn into the war. Students will certainly do well to consult the original versions; the curious thing about the irritation in Germany is that the edited versions are softer than the original, because Lichnowsky had in the meantime convinced himself that some of his assertions were incorrect! The translator has restored in part the original text of the August document and given the version of the 1916 memorandum published in 1918.

Much more serious is Lichnowsky's suppression of those telegrams relating to the last days of the crisis of July 1914 in which he expressed hope for the neutrality of England and which were obviously inconsistent with his contention that he had always foreseen and predicted the intervention of England. Presumably he sent such telegrams because he was aware of the dissensions within the British cabinet and was counting on the uncertainty of British public opinion; but he was not warranted in his book in concealing the existence of these reports. He also did not print a telegram in which he expressed his doubts about the feasibility of a conference as proposed by Grey, although he elsewhere represents such a conference as the only means of preserving peace.

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His book will, therefore, have to be used with great caution; fortunately the documents which he publishes are available in other books in complete form. But if his methods of propaganda leave much to be desired, it is highly probable that Prince Lichnowsky had a much clearer view of the international situation than the people in Berlin, nor can it be doubted that he worked sincerely for peace. His bitterness, while it has led him to questionable practices in his writing, is at least intelligible.

BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Graf Benckendorff's Schriftwechsel. Edited by B. VON SIEBERT. Berlin and Leipzig, Walter de Gruyter and Company, 1928. Three volumes.—xv, 416; xvi, 564; xii, 335 pp. 30 marks.

The imposing volumes which have just appeared in Germany under the above title constitute a new edition of the *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Ententepolitik der Vorkriegsjahre* (Berlin, 1921), a collection also edited by von Siebert, which supplied the historian with the first considerable body of material from allied archives and gave rise to much discussion. Few collections of documents were ever more poorly arranged and more difficult to use, though it might be said that the English edition was even more unsatisfactory than the German. A new edition was desirable to say the least.

We are told in the Preface that the editor, who died two years ago, had long been at work revising, rearranging and amplifying his material, which is now offered to the public in this new form. Many changes have indeed been made. In the first place the individual documents have been carefully gone over and the reader will find the translation recast in many places. Besides, many sections of documents, omitted in the original edition, have been replaced. All the documents have been arranged in chronological order, which greatly facilitates their use. Finally, a great many documents have been omitted, these being primarily parts of the correspondence between Paris and St. Petersburg which is now available in Stieve's excellent edition of the Izvolski papers. The reviewer finds only two documents of the first edition, which are not in the Izvolski correspondence, omitted from this new collection. These are the reports of Sazonov to the Tsar regarding his visit to Balmoral in September 1912 and regarding Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburg in August 1912 (original edition pp. 200, 546, 792).

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The most important point about this new edition is, however, the addition of new documents. There is no indication whatsoever as to what has been omitted or what has been added, but the reviewer has gone to the trouble of comparing the two editions throughout and has counted three hundred and fifty-six new documents in a total of ten hundred and seventy. It must be confessed that a great many of these additional papers are not of great importance. They were probably omitted from the earlier edition for this reason. The subjects dealt with are primarily the Bagdad Railway, the Persian situation, the question of Chinese loans and kindred problems which were already handled with considerable detail in the earlier edition. Among other topics might be mentioned the Serbian-Bulgarian relations in 1909-1910 (no. 93: a Serbian memorandum on the subject; no. 111: report of a conversation with Milovanovic; no. 123: report of a conversation with Ferdinand of Bulgaria), the strengthening of the Turkish fleet (no. 237: a very detailed report on the question) and the Moroccan crisis of 1911 (no. 453: a long report of Benckendorff concerning conversations with Cambon, Grey and Nicolson). There is also an interesting document (no. 259) reflecting the Russian attachment to Hardinge and Nicolson. But far and away the most important addition is the large collection of reports from London at the time of the Conference on Balkan affairs in 1912-1913. There are no less than one hundred and eighty-six new documents on this subject alone, the evidence indicating that the collection is complete. It is a day-by-day record of the work of the conference, and even though the course of the negotiations is well known from the French *Affaires Balkaniques* and the German documents, it is hardly necessary to stress the importance of these papers. Roughly they cover numbers 763 to 960. The collection closes with a few new documents bearing on the crisis of July 1914. Numbers 1069 and 1070 report Grey's suggestion (July 21) that Russia enter into direct pourparlers with Austria in case the crisis became acute. It will be remembered that this was the suggestion which Poincaré vetoed during his visit to St. Petersburg.

The reports of the London Conference alone would make this new edition of the Benckendorff correspondence of great value and the historian will be grateful to the publishers for seeing it through the press even after the death of the editor. But it is to be greatly regretted that no indication of omissions and additions is made, especially where reference to the original edition is so difficult.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY WILLIAM L. LANGER

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Le contrôle juridictionnel de la constitutionnalité des lois. By ANDRÉ BLONDEL. Paris, Receuil Sirey, 1928.—xiv, 383 pp. 35 francs.

Even if a book is what the French call a "solid" work, it may none the less, especially if it be French, have a simple thesis. Such a work is Dr. André Blondel's comparative study of judicial review in the United States and France. It is a book of considerable proportions, the result of manifest industriousness and evident erudition, and, for the student of government, of exceeding interest. Its simple thesis is that judicial review should be adopted in France, just as it has for some time been successfully practised in the United States, and that the existence of a rigid constitution in France demands such a practice out of sheer juristic consistency. This frank attitude of advocacy is announced at the beginning; and thus, with sides taken, with a consciously assumed legalistic point of view, and with a steadiness of aim which has rightly or wrongly given the French a reputation for inflexible logic, the thesis is supported by the various parts of the contents.

Of these contents, the first part, approximately one-third of the whole, deals with American practice, the remainder being concerned with the problem as it exists in France. The history and foundations of judicial review in the United States are set out, and contemporary practice is on the whole accurately described. Surveying all this, the author, given his thesis, can but pronounce it good, generously if somewhat optimistically viewing as a passing phase now happily ended certain well-known abuses practised by American courts. With attention turned more directly to France, a long history of the various French constitutions is given in order to show that those which were rigid were from the nature of the case incomplete in the absence of judicial review. This naturally leads to a consideration of the obstacles to adoption in France, certain legalistic and theoretical objections being conjoined in the examination with the historical. These obstacles are of course shown to be founded on error, and they are argued to be not only mistaken but, when better understood, reasons for accepting judicial review. A final chapter considers the best practical organization for the effective employment of judicial review in France.

Mistakes are apparently inevitable on the part of any author who writes of foreign countries. In the present case, certain errors are to be attributed to the partisan bias of the writer. For example,

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evidence elsewhere in the book shows that the author knows better when he several times states wrongly the relationship between common and statute law and when he says that the American federal constitution is amended by popular vote. Other errors are simple mistakes of facts, such as the statements that all the original state constitutions in the United States were adopted in conventions specially called for the purpose and that Magna Carta was first signed by Henry III. Typographical errors in the French text of French books are not so infrequent as to cause surprise when such mistakes occur in connection with English words. An American wonders whether, when he employs French words, any of the locutions present the startling appearance of one—which should delight certain labor thinkers—like "open shop".

Partisan bias is also responsible for a considerable amount of logical inconsistency. Of such, space permits only passing mention. Throughout the historical sections the author argues that judicial review is less imperative in the case of the enactment of a bicameral legislature than in the case of a single assembly; and yet in respect of the Third Republic, he advocates the non-application of statutes passed by a bicameral Parliament if they are inconsistent with the enactments of a unicameral National Assembly of the same individual composition. Finally, adoption of American practice is recognized to involve fundamental change in French public opinion, which would have to entrust the courts with this function and vigilantly keep them worthy of the trust. Surely a change in opinion no greater would be required so to improve the French parliamentary system as to render Parliament worthy of this trust and thus to attenuate the antiparliamentary movement of which the present fashion of advocating judicial review appears a manifestation on the conservative side.

R. K. GOOCH

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

W. E. Gladstone. By OSBERT BURDETT. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928.—viii, 307 pp. $4.00.

The author disarms his critics to some extent by the frank admission that he has attempted only "a partial portrait of Gladstone." He does not pretend to have unearthed new facts or to have made a thorough study of the whole or even a section of Gladstone's life and work. Morley has been used as a quarry, supplemented in a few particulars from other books. Little of the printed and nothing of

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the mass of manuscript source material has been examined. Mr. Burdett's object has been to fix attention "upon the more revealing moments of action, word and growth in Gladstone's life," to present "a partial portrait of character."

The selection of the "revealing moments" follows conventional lines. We have here the well-known story of youth, education, early parliamentary career and experience in office, change of views, Gladstone as leader of the Liberal party, his policy while in power, etc. Space naturally precludes a lengthy treatment of the various topics; although the last one dealt with, namely, Gladstone's fight for Irish Home Rule, has been discussed quite fully. Mr. Burdett generally sympathizes with what Gladstone did, and his approval is especially marked in the case of "the last crusade." It is evident that Mr. Burdett feels strongly on this subject; and he has described with skill and insight the Irish situation in the eighties, Gladstone's tactics, 1885-1893, and the peculiar perplexities created by the O'Shea-Parnell divorce case at a time when the rank and file of the Liberal party had been trained by their leader to apply exacting standards to men in public life.

In treating Gladstone, the man and the statesman, Mr. Burdett's study shows none of the adulation which characterizes, and in part mars, recent biographies of Disraeli. Tribute is paid to Gladstone's charity, humility, simplicity, financial and oratorical ability, devotion to duty, desire to right wrongs, and untiring industry; but intellect, originality, and intuition are denied him. It is frequently asserted that Gladstone neither had ideas nor could recognize an idea that came his way. His success is attributed to a great capacity for work, the gift of public speaking, a keenness in scenting popular issues, and a faculty for mastering and appreciating facts.

In his effort to prove his thesis Mr. Burdett makes many shrewd observations; but frequently his assertions are too sweeping—the facts do not always support his postulates. Readers of this book are apt to inquire why Gladstone, who, we are told, lacked ideas and intellect, could appear in such different light to contemporaries whose insight and sound judgment cannot be impugned. They will ask how he, without intuition, could, as Mr. Burdett admits, be in advance of his age in advocating many reforms; and if he were always dependent on the populace for his ideas, why he could inaugurate measures of which they had not dreamt, or adopt a method of settling the Alabama dispute of which they did not approve, or take up Home Rule for Ireland to which they had to be educated.

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Mr. Burdett gives due prominence to the racial inheritance and to the evangelicalism of his mother as factors in molding the character of the future statesman. But he fails to grasp that much in Gladstone's conservatism had been imposed by Eton and Oxford upon the young Scotsman, the son of one of Liverpool's canniest and most hard-headed business men who had trained his offspring never to take anything for granted. The shedding of Toryism was natural for a man of Gladstone's character and antecedents. It is, indeed, to be regretted that Mr. Burdett has not on any question studied the working of Gladstone's mind at close range. A perusal of Gladstone's memoranda on the tariff and the Corn Laws, found among the Peel Papers, would doubtless have proved more beneficial to the author and to his readers than any number of the Corn Law rhymes quoted on pp. 60-64. A careful examination of Gladstone's views on religious equality and foreign and colonial policy would have been equally revealing.

The book contains some fine passages and makes pleasant reading. But it lacks the light incidents, the human touches. We get no glimpse of "the happy-go-lucky ways of the family" at Hawarden. To interpret a many-sided and perplexing personality such as Gladstone's must always prove a formidable undertaking, and the task becomes doubly difficult when the interpreter has failed to establish direct contacts.

PAUL KNAPLUND

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Innere Anleihen Sowjet Russlands. By R. KUCZYNSKI. Berlin-Schlachtensee, Verlag der Finanzpolitischen Korrespondenz, 1928.—124 pp. 3 marks.

Economists should be grateful to Dr. Kuczynski for bringing out this compact summary of the facts with regard to the flotation of internal loans by Soviet Russia. The monograph is modestly presented for just what it is, and nothing more: there is no elaborate attempt to set the problem into its general background of Soviet public finance; nor to discuss in detail—though the salient facts are of course presented—those problems of definite interest to monetary theory which are connected with certain of the loans, such as, for example, the "grain loans" of 1922 and 1923, and the "sugar loan" of 1923, with their provisions for the equivalence of one pood of rye to a definite number of roubles. Nor is there any

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attempt to supplement the description of the methods by which the funds were raised, by a detailed account of the way in which the proceeds were distributed among competing units within the Soviet structure. Dr. Kuczynski is content to let his valuable summary serve as a guidepost for those who will pursue in greater detail some of the problems he was able only to indicate briefly in passing.

There is yet another range of problems to which Dr. Kuczynski's bare recital of facts has so direct and immediate a reference that it will not escape any of the readers of the monograph, despite the fact that Dr. Kuczynski is extremely careful to avoid discussing the matter directly. What is involved, of course, is an additional instance of conflict between certain forms of socialist theory and present Soviet practice. An attack upon the justification of interest as a "share" in distribution has always been a chief weapon in the socialist arsenal; the floating of loans within Russia implies the giving and taking of interest, in its most "explicit" form. Under the circumstances, one can hardly be blamed for pushing curiosity just a bit further, and inquiring *how much* in the way of interest-payments to their own citizens the Soviets, whom one would expect to find determined to discourage the exaction of any but the smallest charges, have actually found themselves forced to pay. In this connection, Dr. Kuczynski's bare account provides us with all that anyone could wish to know, and more than some will care to recall.

The facts are that the Soviet government has not only at virtually no time been able to float loans without interest, but has in fact paid to its citizens rates of interest which under any other circumstances would be characterized as cruelly usurious. The so-called non-interest-bearing loans either bore a disguised interest return in the form of substantial discounts from par, the loan having only a few months to run—as in the case of the commodity-loans of 1922 and 1923; or, as in the case of the railroad certificates of 1923, were in effect merely a disguised form of stable currency, prior to the formal inauguration of a program of monetary reform; or, finally, as in the case of the so-called non-interest-bearing loan of 1926, represented in fact nothing more than a public lottery with unusually high premiums, the cost to the state being estimated at not less than 14 per cent annually. The last figure is by no means abnormally high: the so-called 5 per cent loan of 1925, for example, was sold at a discount of 18 per cent from par, with one year to run; loans bearing a nominal rate of 6 per cent, as in the case of the third "peasants' loan", of 1927, are in fact, as a result of the addition

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of lottery features, found to have represented an average annual interest cost to the Soviet government of 17 per cent—and so on. If we except the 8 per cent loans of 1924, 1926 and 1927, since these loans were, as a matter of fact, devised primarily for the special purpose of providing a liquid investment for the reserve-funds of state-controlled enterprises—an investment, Dr. Kuczynski hints, which these enterprises were apparently reluctant to make, at so "low" a rate of interest—it would appear that the lowest rate at which the Soviet government has been able to borrow for longer periods from its own subjects is represented by the 9 per cent which it was able to obtain on the railroad loan of 1927, while the average rate of interest which it paid in the preceding five years was certainly very much higher. It is on such terms that a "socialist state" borrows from its citizens!

There is another consequence of the facts adduced by Dr. Kuczynski, which is worth considering. We have been told that the capitalistic system is forced to appeal only to the basest and most sordid aspects of human nature; that in the true "socialist state", altruistic motives will be appealed to, and will be found to be more efficient spurs to action than were the old ones. Those who are interested to know what motives are appealed to when the "socialist state" of Russia needs money in a hurry, had better study Dr. Kuczynski's brief account of the nature of the propaganda accompanying both the 6 per cent lottery loan of 1922 (p. 6) and the "peasants'?" 12 per cent lottery loan of 1925 (p. 14). The reader will notice, incidentally, that the loan of 1922, which supplemented its appeal to the cupidity of the people by an appeal to their patriotism and revolutionary spirit, failed, and had to be converted into a forced loan, whereby the workers, along with others, were virtually compelled to assign a portion of their wages to the purchase of securities; whereas the loans of 1925, the official propaganda for which was able to point out a possible gain of 27.2 per cent annually to the subscribers, succeeded. Just what this proves, let those who are deeply concerned with "human nature" and its possibilities, tell us. Meanwhile there are some of us who are content to admire the scientific detachment of workers like Dr. Kuczynski, who can set down these bare facts in order, without a word of sententious comment to point the moral or adorn the tale.

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Reparationsagent und Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik. By H. VON BECKERATH. Bonn, Kurt Schroeder Verlag, 1928.—107 pp.

Transfer. By ALBERT VON MÜHLENFELS. Jena, Gustav Fischer, 1926.—101 pp.

The Reparations Problem. By BERTIL OHLIN. Stockholm, Index, Svenska Handelsbanken, 1928.

Although few persons would deny that many of the difficulties of the reparations problem are the result of the application of legal thinking to an essentially economic difficulty, it seems also to be true that the reason for which it has been so comparatively simple to overlook the advice of economic experts, has been the extreme divergence of views which even a superficial study of that advice revealed.

The scientific literature concerned with the transfer of reparations and the reparations problem in general is full enough of flagrant contradictions to turn any student into a determined eclectic. There are few problems where the line between one's opinions and one's objective findings has been so difficult to draw, and there is on the whole no problem of which the literature is so fit to illustrate the widening gulf in present-day economics between those with primarily static views and those who are most vitally concerned with the impact of dynamic factors.

These three studies which have been chosen from the large and growing literature of the problem, are — each in its own way — somewhat exceptional in this respect, although only Mühlenfels' work shows a careful study of the previously published literature of the subject. His monograph is perhaps strongest in its discussion of the readjustment of German industry to which many students of the question look for an increase in the German exports.

The argument generally bases itself upon the theory that German industry in order to increase its markets will have to specialize more and more in those industries in which its special aptitudes are most highly developed, where—as J. A. Hobson has remarked —science, technique, established plant and business organization give Germany a relative superiority over other countries, and where therefore her industries would be able to overcome foreign competition and even protective legislation.

In these branches Germany would therefore have to acquire a much higher percentage of the world's exports than she had before

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the war, but the great obstacle is, of course, that most of Germany's exports are in lines which are highly competitive and which are amongst the most closely guarded and protected industries of the other large industrial countries. Professor Graham's argument that the sum of 2,500,000,000 Reichsmarks when divided amongst the combined population of the allied countries of 240,000,000, only amounts to an average increase of per-capita consumption of two dollars and a half, and that such importations can consequently not bring about the general prostration of industries in the allied countries, is to say the least, quite nonchalant as to the importance of such a marginal increase in an already very sensitive market. The increase would not really be spread over the total of the world's exports but would take place in extremely specialized goods and in a market in which the demand is highly inelastic. Furthermore—as Mühlenfels points out—in order to pay reparation annuities of 2,500,000,000 marks a very much larger increase in exports will be required, as the raw materials must to a very great extent first be imported into Germany and consequently be paid for by German products, always of the highly competitive, finished industrial type. Professor Cassel has estimated that Germany, because of the peculiar character of her economic organization and its specialty (finished products), will be able to pay only about 10 per cent of her exports. With an annuity of 2,500,000,000 that would mean an export trade at 25,000,000,000 marks and an import trade at 22,500,000,000 marks to cover the food and raw materials. Although the figures seems quite fantastic, they at least illustrate the principle involved quite clearly.

Professor H. von Beckerath's monograph is of value for its discussion of the incidence of the reparations settlement upon social legislation and, generally speaking, labor conditions in Germany. He points out that there is a curious contrast between the political attitude of German labor, which is generally loyal to the Dawes Plan, and the economic interest of that same class of the population, which will more likely than not pay the final bills of the transaction in lower wages and poorer labor conditions. The study is well documented and carries a number of interesting appendices, including a letter to the Prussian Ministry of Labor by a number of representative German industries on the subject of working hours.

The substance of Professor Ohlin's study is an able refinement of the traditional theory of international exchange, which leads the author to an optimistic view of the future. There is an interesting

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discussion of the influence of Germany's foreign borrowing concerning which the author comes to a conclusion which is at variance with that of the Agent General, who seems to be inclined to follow the views of Dr. Schacht of the Reichsbank somewhat too readily.

It seems clear, however, that foreign loans have up to now dominated the situation so completely that no difficulties of transfer could arise. The mechanism which the experts had set up has therefore not been able to produce the experience which they had anticipated after four years of preliminary operation, and we are really facing the future with little more knowledge as to that particular aspect of the problem than we possessed in 1924.

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BOOK NOTES

Latin America and the United States, by Graham H. Stuart (New York, The Century Company, 1928; ix, 465 pp. $3.75) was published in 1922 and the title page of the present edition announces that the original volume has been "thoroughly revised". Considerable revision has indeed been done and the work has been brought down to date, but it is still unsatisfactory. The "supplementary reading" lists at the end of each chapter have been expanded by the addition of several recent publications, but the text does not reveal that the author has incorporated many ideas from the work of his colleagues. In his previous work Professor Stuart neglected to consult many important Latin-American authorities. In this second edition the defect has been remedied only partially. One looks in vain in his footnotes and reference lists for Latin-American sources. A few secondary works are mentioned in the lists, but there is little indication that the author has taken account of their ideas in his text. The author makes a plea for a better understanding of Latin America's point of view, but his revised edition does not present a good illustration of the conformity of precept and practice. Moreover, certain important topics have not received adequate treatment. The work contains nothing on the relations of the United States and Venezuela, nothing on Bolivia, little on Colombia and on the important subject of our huge investments in many parts of Latin America. And yet it must be admitted that Professor Stuart has presented the most extensive treatment of our Latin-American relations that has yet appeared. Such an admission is not flattering to Yankee historical scholarship, nor indicative of a rapid development in this country of a thorough understanding of this important subject. There is great need in the United States for a thorough discussion of the whole matter based upon an examination of the sources on both sides. Until this has been done our knowledge will be incomplete and one-sided and we shall be compelled to depend upon the work of Professor Stuart and the more penetrating, if less extensive, volume by Professor Latané. Perhaps it should, in justice, be added that Professor Stuart has faithfully examined the English language sources in the United States and has presented an impartial account of what these reveal. His conclusions are set forth, also,

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in an attractive style and his book is equipped with four good maps and a fairly adequate index.—J. FRED RIPPY.

In a volume, some six hundred pages in length, entitled *The History of American Political Thought* (New York and London, The Century Company, 1928; ix, 633 pp. $4.00) Professor Raymond G. Gettell essays to trace the evolution of American political ideas from decade to decade in our historical development. Beginning with the European background of American civilization, the volume traces the various currents and eddies in our political thinking through the colonial and revolutionary periods to that centering around the formation of the constitution. The winds and doctrine of the years of Federalist, Republican and Democratic supremacy next occupy the author. Inevitably slavery, Civil War, and Reconstruction thought follow. In the remainder of the book, dealing as it does with the political philosophy of modern times, considerable emphasis is placed on the development of our foreign policy, current theories of governmental organization and governmental function. Under this last caption the theories of individualism, governmental regulation, socialism, anarchism and syndicalism are given due attention. All in all, Professor Gettell has made a very satisfactory contribution to the secondary literature of the subject, and, although one might wish that he had allowed himself a great deal more space for the development of his material, he should nevertheless be congratulated upon his ability to epitomize epochs and personalities.—SCHUYLER C. WALLACE.

Through his *Éléments du droit international public universel européen et américain* (Paris, Librairie Arthur Rousseau, 1927; xv, 433 pp.), Professor Karl Strupp, in collaboration with Professor Joseph Blociszewski, has made available to a wider public his *Theorie und Praxis des Völkerrechts* which appeared in 1925. The substance of the book is the same but the new title is intended to bring out more clearly the theory and method of the author. He shares the well known views of Señor Alvarez (who contributes a preface to this French edition) that only a part of international law is universal and that the rest is merely continental. Despite this underlying hypothesis, with which the reviewer strenuously disagrees, the book is highly valuable both for its arrangement and for the views of its author. Departing from the traditional division of the Law of Peace and the Law of War, Professor Strupp divides his subject matter into "Public International Law", *Le Droit préventif de la guerre*, and the "Law of War". The second part covers the

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various forms of pacific settlement of international disputes, including not only the usual topics of mediation, conciliation and arbitration, but also the organization of the Pan-American Union and the League of Nations. Some of the author's subdivisions are also highly suggestive, as chapter VI on "The Principal Kinds of International Treaties" (including what is commonly called in this country "International Organization") and chapter VII on "International Delicts and their Consequences". Professor Strupp sets forth his views clearly in definitions followed by explanatory comment. Where his own view is not generally accepted, the opposing theory is pointed to in the footnotes. This method, however, sometimes tends to overstress verbal distinctions at the expense of factual realities. Nevertheless the book does not neglect the factual side and is rich in illustrative material. On the selection of material one might suggest that the space devoted to the recent Peace Treaties is disproportionate in a general treatise the greater part of which will undoubtedly have permanent value. The utility of the volume is enhanced by excellent bibliographies and an index.—P. C. JESSUP.

The important part played by Wakefield in the development of the British Empire is well known to students of history, but it has never been appreciated by the public either in Great Britain or in those colonies which owe their existence so largely to him. In the hope that a short and readable biography of the great colonial reformer might lead to popular realization of the significance of his work and influence, and to the establishment of some suitable memorial, Dr. A. J. Harrop has written an interesting and reliable sketch of his life entitled *The Amazing Career of Edward Gibbon Wakefield* (London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1928; 253 pp.). The adjective in the title might cause the reader to expect a sensational story of a career in which the sensational was not lacking, but the folly that resulted in Wakefield's trial and imprisonment is not exploited for melodramatic purposes, though it could not be overlooked. Had it not been for his abduction of Ellen Turner and his consequent experiences at Newgate, it is highly improbable that he would have turned his thoughts to the subject of colonization, and if he had not done so New Zealand might never have become a part of the British Empire. Those who talk glibly of law in history would do well to reflect upon such momentous accidents. Access to private papers in the possession of relatives of Wakefield has enabled the author to add vividness to his narrative at several points. The subject that receives fullest treatment in these pages is Wakefield's re-

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lation to the colonization of New Zealand; his connection with the founding of South Australia and with the Durham Report is dealt with more briefly. Some extracts are appended from his first important work, *A Letter from Sydney*, which was published in 1829 and has never been reprinted.—R. L. SCHUYLER.

Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith's *The Board of Trade* (London and New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928; 288 pp. $2.00) is one of the volumes in the "Whitehall Series" on the British departments of state, now in course of publication under the editorship of Sir James Marchant. As Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade from 1907 to 1919 the author acquired intimate first-hand knowledge of its multifarious and important activities, which he describes in chapters on its relation to commerce, merchant shipping, railways, industry, industrial property and statistics. He shows how rapidly its functions have expanded in recent years and what arduous duties have been thrown upon it by acts of Parliament. His purely historical chapters are less satisfactory. The account given of the early committees and councils for trade and plantations, precursors of the present Board of Trade, shows little acquaintance with the modern historical literature on this subject.—R. L. SCHUYLER.

Six and a half years ago Harcourt, Brace and Company published a volume, edited by Harold Sterns, entitled *Civilization in the United States, An Enquiry by Thirty Americans*. A second volume in the series has inevitably followed. Although not as comprehensive within its scope as its predecessor, this later volume bearing the title—*Recent Gains in American Civilization*, edited by Kirby Page (New York, Harcourt Brace and Company, 1928; 357 pp. $3.00)—includes within its compass analyses of the forward steps which have been taken since the conclusion of the World War in the fields of government, industry, international relations, the press, education, literature, art, science and religion. The observers who have been called to comment on the recent developments in these various fields are for the most part outstanding critics of American life in their respective spheres. Most prominent among these commentators are Charles A. Beard, Stuart Chase, Mary Van Kleeck, Norman Thomas, Oswald Garrison Villard, David Starr Jordan, Harry Emerson Fosdick, John Dewey and Harry F. Ward. Despite the eminence of the contributors, however, the student of the social sciences will find the volume only mildly interesting. Indeed, he may turn from its pages with the definite wish that analysts of the caliber here assembled might cease from tormenting their readers

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with "skimmings" of this character and confine their activities to more fundamental attacks on the various realms of activity in which they are specialists. In these pages, however, the tired liberal may find both consolation and solace, and from the record of achievement herein set forth he may, perhaps, draw sufficient encouragement to renew his somewhat enfeebled attack upon the problems of the day, with the conviction that, although in all probability full success will never be his, nevertheless a measure of victory may be attained.—SCHUYLER C. WALLACE.

The 1927 lectures on the Harris Foundation were presented at the fourth summer institute since the beginning of the Foundation at the University of Chicago in 1924. The purpose of the Foundation is stated to be "the promotion of a better understanding on the part of American citizens of the other peoples of the world, thus establishing a basis for improved international relations and a more enlightened world order." This series now presented in book form entitled *Great Britain and the Dominions* (University of Chicago Press, 1928; x, 511 pp. $3.00) deals respectively with the British Empire as a whole and with the various self-governing Dominions, thus excluding India, Egypt and the Crown colonies. While an informed and intimate treatment is assured by the selection as lecturers of representative men of the countries described, the aim of the Foundation—"To give accurate information, not to propagate opinion"—has been in general well observed. Nevertheless, the restriction imposed upon them has very properly not prevented the various contributors from furnishing intelligent discussion of the more pressing problems confronting the British Commonwealth of Nations as a whole as well as those of its constituent parts. The Canadian questions are treated with especial amplititude of informing detail. On the other hand, the lectures on the Irish Free State and New Zealand are somewhat sketchy in character, those on Australia show the hand of a lawyer, and the two on South Africa —"Economic and Political Problems of South Africa" and "South Africa and the British Empire"—involve a certain amount of repetition. Sir Cecil Hurst expresses a characteristically British point of view when he remarks (p. 19) that it was fortunate that earlier plans to define the respective limits of local and imperial powers failed, since they might have prevented the present constitutional development and recent progress in the conduct of their own affairs by the Dominions. Few assertions can be called in question. However, the statement commonly made (p. 3) that the British have

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no written constitution is scarcely correct, rather one might say that it is not embodied in any single document; the navigation laws were not repealed in the twenties (p. 309); they were then modified, and repealed in 1849. The following sentence (p. 428) needs some interpretation: "Various measures have been taken, the most important being the Immigrants Act of 1913, whereby immigration of Asiatic males into the Union is prohibited, except in the case of the wives or young children of domiciled Indians." — ARTHUR LYON CROSS.

In the year 1324 Marsiglio of Padua completed his work which was called the *Defensor Pacis* (Defender of the Peace). Its purpose was to show that the popes by their extravagant claims to ecclesiastical and temporal superiority were a constant menace to the peace of Europe. On this theme as a basis he built his theories of the powers of the church and state and the relations between the two. He attacked the doctrine of the Petrine Supremacy, the temporal power of the popes and many other theories which had been used by ecclesiastics in support of Roman supremacy in matters spiritual and temporal. Though not primarily interested in shattering the prevailing ideas of monarchical powers, he did, in elaborating his general purposes, enunciate theories of government which we ordinarily think originated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Condemned by the popes and probably none too cordially welcomed by the civil authorities (except for its antipapal pronouncements) his work, though frequently used by scholars, never received the circulation which it certainly deserved. Down to the issuance of the present edition prepared by Mr. C. W. Previté-Orton and presented under the title of *The Defensor Pacis of Marsilius of Padua* (Cambridge, The University Press, 1928; xlvii, 517 pp.) it has not been available to American students at all except for the reprint of the Editio Princeps of 1522 in Goldast's *Monarchia S. Imperii* (1614), copies of which are to be found in the Columbia and Harvard College Libraries. It may be regarded as doubtful if even now there will be much reading of this truly remarkable work. A Latin text is suitable for scholars and students, but few will be the laymen who will undertake to read it. What is needed is translation not only into English, but into German, French and Italian. Our debt to Mr. Previté-Orton is immeasurable. No one unfamiliar with the difficulties incident to the publication of a basic text founded on the necessary collation of some twenty manuscripts in widely scattered libraries in Europe can appreciate the prodigious amount

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of labor which this work has cost the editor. Whether the edition which Professor Scholz of Leipzig is preparing for the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* will show any vitally different textual readings may be considered doubtful. Possibly Dr. Scholz may date some of the manuscripts differently and offer variants in reading, but it is unlikely that they will alter any of the fundamental meanings which Marsiglio had in mind. In an introduction of some forty-seven pages the editor treats of the participation of John of Jandum in the compilation of the work, gives an analysis of its structure and contents, and a critical survey of the manuscripts. Not the least of the services rendered by the editor are those portions of his introduction which are devoted to showing the essential unity of the work and to setting aside those theories of earlier nationalistic writers who would have it that Marsiglio got his ideas from the English and the French. Mr. Previté-Orton shows the close relationship of Marsiglio's ideas to the existing Italian republics and closes one portion of the preface with these words: "This main author seems to me to be Marsilius of Padua, bred in an Italian commune, hating the ecclesiastical powers which put it out of gear, and anxious to combine the sharply bounded and compact unitary State he loved with a kind of society of Christendom guided by its elected advisory General Council." The author appends some excellent indexes and includes some five plates to show the characteristics of the manuscripts.—JAMES SULLIVAN.

There always has been a number of statesmen and of "historians" in the United States who insist that traditionally American foreign policies "are, and of right ought to be," policies of isolation and detachment rather than of coöperation with the other nations of the world. The members of this school of political thought, however, are living, at present at least, in a world of their own. If their standpoint was tenable one hundred and fifty years ago, the industrial revolution has made it impossible now. In May of 1916, President Wilson told Congress: "We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as the affair of Europe and of Asia." With this general idea as his thesis Professor James Wilford Garner delivered at New York University a series of talks which have now been issued in book form under the title of *American Foreign Policies* (New York, The New York University Press, 1928; viii, 264 pp. $6.00) and which mark a real contribution to the

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study of the place of America in world relations. Professor Garner begins his lectures with a discussion of the "Influencing Factors and Conditions," showing how our foreign policies have been influenced by tradition, demagogy, chauvinism, emotionalism, the attitude of the foreign-born element, the organization of the treaty-making power, economic conditions, and the financial supremacy of the United States. Lecture two deals with the traditions, interpretation, and practice of isolation and non-intervention. A careful survey leads to the conclusion that "while the old tradition has usually been dragged out and made to do service on nearly every occasion when it was proposed that the United States should emerge from its isolation and play its part in the affairs of the world, it has so often been departed from in practice that it has lost much of its binding force." The lecture on "Imperialism and Dollar Diplomacy" criticizes the nice distinction between expansion and imperialism which Americans are wont to draw when comparing the territorial aggrandizement of the United States and that of European nations. There follows a consideration of the Monroe Doctrine which leads to the conclusion that the enunciation and enforcement of the original principle "has been a distinct contribution of the United States to the cause of peace and liberty in the western hemisphere." But, at the same time, "it is hard to avoid the feeling that this contribution belongs to the past, that the policy proclaimed by Monroe has served its day, and that some of the recent policies which masquerade under his honored name can hardly be defended as contributions to the cause of peace, good will, and mutual friendship among the peoples of America." The fifth lecture reviews America's contribution to the advancement of arbitration and the judicial settlement of international disputes. The inevitable conclusion of an impartial investigation is that our practice in furthering the principle of arbitration, and our willingness to submit differences to the decisions of tribunals, have fallen far behind our professions to that effect. And Professor Garner is particularly severe, although always fair, when he takes up our relations with the League of Nations. He is quite in sympathy with the views of Elihu Root, which, he asserts, represent the judgment of the rest of mankind (outside the United States), and which, he thinks, are certain to be the verdict of history. The concluding section points out the international responsibilities, duties, and opportunities which are ours by virtue of the tremendous power which we as a nation possess. But "the *possession* of power means little if, instead of being exercised, it is thrown away by a policy of iso-

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lation and detachment, or dissipated and wasted through partisan political controversy." Taken as a whole, the volume is a severe indictment of our supposedly traditional policy of aloofness, and a warm recommendation to "Hear, O America, thy comrade nations calling!"—to "Lift thy great heart, and haste to join the Builders." —WALTER C. LANGSAM.

Mr. Sisley Huddleston's volume in the Modern World Series, entitled *France* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927; xi, 613 pp. $5.00) is a most remarkable work. The purpose of the series ostensibly is "to provide a balanced survey, with such historical illustrations as are necessary, of the tendencies and forces, political, economic, intellectual, which are moulding the lives of contemporary states." The authors of most of the other volumes in the group have tried to reach this aim by giving just enough of the pre-war history of each particular country to make intelligible the turn of post-war events therein. But not so Mr. Huddleston. He goes back to the days of the Roman occupation. His chapter on economic and financial development starts with a discussion of the four classes of inhabitants in ancient Gaul. The section on French overseas expansion begins with a sketch going back to the year 1365 when some "adventurers from Dieppe created numerous establishments on the coast of Senegal and Guinea." The Merovingians, the Capetians, Joan of Arc, Louis XI and a host of others all find room somewhere between the two covers. Were the book intended to be an encyclopaedia or a Who's Who of France, such references would be quite in order. But the foreword states specifically that it was the author's other book, ***France and the French***, which was meant to be "a sort of French encyclopædia." Writing in breezy style, the author indulges generously in loose generalizations. One might well be pardoned for doubting such observations as that the Frenchman in industry "is the most ingenious inventor"; or that "the people as distinct from some of their chiefs, are entirely cured of Militarism and Imperialism." Is it really "a mistake to suppose that the French have not produced the greatest colonizers from the earliest days of world navigation"? But of course "it is almost superfluous to state that France has been foremost in the development of recent inventions"!—WALTER C. LANGSAM.

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